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It is finished." (John 19:30)
Rightly did Hegel say that Plato in comparison 
with Aristotle is 'not ideal enough', if idealism is 
the power of seeing the ideal elements in the 
actual in preference to destroying the actual in 
the hope of finding the ideal elsewhere.
(W.D. Ross)
1SUMMARY
This study presents a critique of the social and political 
thought of Emmanuel Levinas. We aim to demonstrate that 
Levinas' hostile characterisation of Hegel's System serves to 
disguise a latent 'Hegelian' dimension in his own thought. Levinas' 
covert Hegelianism has essentially three aspects: first, Levinas, like 
Hegel, advances a post-critical concept of the infinite; second, his 
philosophical discourse bears a strong family resemblance to 
Hegel's speculative logic: and, third, notwithstanding his protests 
to the contrary, his philosophy exhibits a systematic structure (in 
the speculative sense of the term). By identifying these speculative 
motifs in Levinas' work we show, first, that it is possible to subject 
Levinas to an immanent Hegelian critique and we then proceed to 
execute it.
The dominant trend in Levinasian interpretation, follows 
Derrida, and tends to overlook the significance of Levinas' concept 
of society. We aim to show, however, that the notion of a visible 
ethical community is at the centre of Levinas' philosophy. 
Moreover, we attempt to demonstrate that Levinas’ concept of an 
ethical community is ultimately incompatible with the subjective 
principle underlying modem social and political life. This in turn 
leads Levinas to violate his own emphasis on respecting the 
absolute alterity of the Other. Finally, we attempt to show that 
Hegel's System provides a way of redeeming the ambition of 
Levinas' philosophy, while avoiding its negative implications.
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6INTRODUCTION
The philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas is steadily emerging as 
an important influence on contemporary Anglo-Saxon thought, 
particularly in the area of political theology but also in social and 
political theory generally. The appeal of Levinas' 'ethical 
metaphysics' is that it promises to meet the challenge of 
postmodernism, as it were, on its own territory. That is to say, 
Levinas' philosophy appears to embrace the postmodernist 
emphasis on anti-foundationalism, indeterminacy and pluralism 
while, crucially, rejecting the politics and moral relativism that this 
is conventionally thought to entail. Indeed, Levinas maintains it is 
the very incapacity of modem philosophy and the state to ground 
their own theory and practice that opens the ontological order to 
the dimension of ethical transcendence.1 / In short, then, Levinas 
offers us an absolute ethic without foundations. This has led a 
number of contemporary thinkers to contend that his philosophy 
may provide the basis for a radical, critical, progressive and 
emancipatory politics.^/ In this study we shall not confront their 
claims directly; rather we will undertake a systematic examination 
of Levinas' social and political philosophy in order to place 
ourselves in a position to evaluate them at a future date.
Now, it is our central contention that Hegel's system is 
uniquely qualified to provide the basis on which to present a 
sustained critical examination of Levinas' philosophy. Insofar as it 
is the only post-critical philosophical system that can fully grant 
the absolute presuppositions upon which Levinas' philosophy 
rests, and thereby subject it to a thorough-going internal critique.
7Therefore, the main objective of this study is to undertake an 
immanent Hegelian critique of the social and political implications 
of Levinas' philosophical thought. However, an important 
subsidiary aim is to contribute towards the renewal of Hegelian 
philosophy as the basis of an ethical comprehension of modem 
political and social life.
Broadly, and abstractly, speaking, we shall seek to develop 
the following argument. First we shall attempt to show that 
Levinas' understanding of infinite alterity falls within Hegel's 
concept of the true infinite, and that therefore Hegel and Levinas 
have a common point of philosophical departure. Second, we 
highlight the fact that Levinas' notion of the face to face 'relation' 
has a collective or societal dimension. That is to say, it constitutes 
a separate 'society of faces' standing over and against the 'faceless' 
world of the 'state'. In short, Levinas is committed to a notion of 
ethical life. Third, we aim to demonstrate how this separation of 
this 'society of infinity' from 'the state' results in a concept of 
community that is ultimately incompatible with the subjective 
principle underlying modernity. Fourth, we shall also show, that 
Insofar as Levinas bases his philosophy of the Other on exclusion, 
it is necessarily both violent and exposed to violence, in a way that 
directly contradicts its most basic axiom.3/ Finally, in and
through the process of demonstrating these points we will 
endeavour to indicate how Hegel's system, insofar as it places the 
speculative relation to infinity directly within history and not at one 
remove from it, is able, in principle, to fulfil the ambition of 
Levinas' philosophy, and so accomplish an absolute recognition of
8the otherness of the Other, in a way that is reconcilable with the 
existent plurality of modem forms of subjectivity.
Of course, we are fully aware that our project faces a number 
of difficulties. To begin with are we not simply proposing to 
subsume Levinas under Hegel's critique of Judaism? And would 
not this study, then, itself be a prime instance of the 'imperialism 
of the concept' that Levinas ceaselessly warns against?^/ To meet 
this objection we must make it clear from the outset that we intend 
to confine our assessment of Levinas' oeuvre solely to a 
consideration of his philosophical works. Accordingly, no reference 
will be made in the pages that follow to Levinas' religious writings. 
Levinas himself insists that there is a clear distinction to be drawn 
between his philosophical and confessional texts, and that the 
former are not to be adjudged on the basis of the latter but purely 
on their own merits.5/ Moreover, Hegel's early critique of Judaism 
has no historical specificity; rather it stands as a shorthand term 
to describe various forms of moral positivism. Hegel's target is 
more often than not Kant rather than the religion of Israel. Indeed, 
one might say, that the term 'Judaism' in Hegel's early oeuvre 
functions in much the same way as that of 'Hegel' in Levinas' 
philosophy, that is to say, as an exaggerated ideal-typical construct 
designed to encapsulate the central features of a given 
philosophical-cultural phenomenon. In his later work, Hegel 
developed a more nuanced and valid understanding of Judaism, 
but this is based on Biblical sources alone and makes no reference 
whatsoever to the Talmudic tradition.®/ Hence it would be of 
limited value in assessing the political implications of Levinas'
9Judaica. In any case, such an undertaking is beyond the remit of 
this study.
A second powerful objection to our project is this: does not 
the notion of an immanent critique imply a philosophy of 
immanence??/ And, if so, are we not begging the question against 
Levinas from the very beginning? In short, does not our entire 
study threaten to produce an elaborate apogogic proof of Levinas' 
central contention that Hegelian philosophy is the philosophy of 
the same? One possible Hegelian response to this charge is to 
positively embrace the circularity of the system and to defy Levinas 
to formulate an objection to it which does not presuppose the logic 
of its catégorial determinations. Gadamer concisely sums up this 
standard Hegelian riposte as follows:
The appeal to immediacy - whether of bodily 
nature, or that of the Thou making claims on us, 
or of the impenetrable factualness of historical 
change or the reality of relations of production - 
has always been self-refuting, in that it is not 
itself an immediate attribute but a self-reflective 
activity.®/
However, this response will not suffice to dispose of the radical 
challenge Levinas' ethics poses for Hegel's system. First, Levinas 
anticipates this formal repudiation of his notion of ethical 
transcendence and develops a counter-argument, on the basis of 
an analogy with scepticism and its refutation, to the effect that Just 
as the rationalist must acknowledge, at least for a moment, the 
truth of the sceptic’s radical doubt, if only for the purposes of 
refuting it, so, too, the philosophy of immanence must perforce, for 
an instant, 'see into' the absolute otherness that its own reflective
10
edifice negates, as it were, in the very act of negating it. Thus the 
self-refutation of absolute otherness in the reflective statement that 
expresses it becomes the very exigency by which its transcendent 
content is conveyed before us. Second, the "ethical immediacy" to 
which Levinas refers, is, therefore, not so much pre-reflective as 
trans-reflective and, indeed, trans-ontological. As Levinas puts it:
Ethics is not derived from an ontology of nature; 
it is its opposite, a meontology which affirms a 
meaning beyond Being, a primary mode of non- 
Being fme-on).9/
It would appear, then, that Hegel's System must either 
dogmatically repudiate Levinas' notion of ethical transcendence or 
else give up its own claim to completeness.
However, this conclusion only follows if we assume an 
analytical connection between the method of immanent critique 
and an (ultimately materialist) philosophy of immanence. But, as 
we have already indicated, it is our contention that no such link is 
to be found in Hegel's System. This is, of course, not to say that 
many Hegelian scholars have not postulated such a connection; 
Levinas' overt characterisation of Hegel stands in this tradition. 
However, it is our view that such interpretations of the system are 
radically mistaken. Accordingly, the Hegelian reading of Levinas 
developed in this study implicitly rules out all anthropological and 
immanentist interpretations of the Wlssenschaft. (For example, A. 
KoJevelO/; G. Lukács 11/; H. Marcuse^/; s. Rosen 13/; r , 
Solomanl^/). For the same reason, we also set ourselves against 
all 'large-entity' or Neo-Platonic interpretations, which present the 
absolute as an emanatlve cosmic substance (C. Taylor 15/; m .
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Rosen 16/). Finally we reject 'non-metaphysical' reconstructions of 
the system which maintain that Hegel is primarily a category- 
theorist (K. Hartman 17/; t . PinkardlS/; and A. White 19/) and 
transcendentalist interpretations which aim to demonstrate that 
Hegel's philosophy represents the immanent completion of the 
Kantian project.
Our own approach, instead, attempts to draw together three 
distinct strands of contemporary Hegelian scholarship. First, we 
are indebted to those commentators who place Hegel's Christology 
at the centre of the system. (For example, J. Burbidge^O/; l .
Dickey^l/; E. Fackenheim22/: j .  Hyppolite23/; w . Jaeschke24/;
H. Kung25/; q . Lauer26/ and M. Westphal27/.) Collectively these 
interpreters demonstrate that Hegel's system is not a philosophy of 
immanence but consists in the systematic demonstration of the 
speculative unity of transcendence and immanence. Moreover, 
although Hegel sometimes refers to 'God' as an absolute substance, 
it is abundantly clear from Hegel's use of the term that this is a 
necessary concession on his part to the exigencies of natural 
language; he nowise conceives of the infinite as an entity, not even 
as a 'supreme' entity, but always as a relation between the finite 
and that which exceeds it. Second, we also draw heavily upon 
post-Adomian readings of Hegel which illuminate the nature of 
speculative discourse as the dynamic attribution of an identity of 
identity and non-identity between substance and subject (for 
example, G. Rose28/; s. Houlgate29/ and S. éièek^O/). This 
approach precludes the hypostatisation of Hegel’s speculative 
terms into determinate entitles, that is characteristic of so many 
misrepresentations of his thought. Third, we endorse a critical
12
approach to Hegel's Wissenschaft which points up its radically 
presuppositionless and anti-foundational point of departure (for 
example, R. Dein Winfield^!/, K. Dove32/) jn our view, the 
integration of these three strands of interpretation provides us with 
a consistent hemenutical key that is able to do justice to the 
integrity of Hegel's absolute method.
We conclude from this that Levinas' presentation of Hegel's 
System as an immanent panlogism is simply false. Moreover, 
Levinas' caricature of Hegel serves to conceal an important 
Hegelian dimension in Levinas' own thought. In saying this we are 
endorsing Robert Bemasconi's claim that Levinas' presentation of 
the infinite - finite relation as a 'relation without relation' 
constitutes a [Hegelian] form of speculative discourse.33/ 
However, we shall go further than this and propound the stronger 
thesis that Levinas' philosophy tout court constitutes a speculative 
system coextensive in terms of its range and scope with Hegel's 
Wissenschaft.
We may directly illustrate our point with reference to Levinas' 
understanding of the history of philosophy. Levinas contends that 
for the most part the Western philosophical tradition constitutes a 
homogeneous bloc founded on the primacy of Being and the denial 
of absolute alterity. However, he credits a select few thinkers with 
having stumbled upon the notion of ethical transcendence. At 
various points in his writings, Levinas cites Plato, Aristotle, Denis 
the Areopagite, Descartes, and Bergson as examples of this, but 
never Hegel. However, once Hegel's philosophy is understood 
speculatively we can see that this is an unjustified omission on
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Levinas' part.34/ For Levinas and Hegel are agreed that it is 
possible to conceive the infinite in a positive sense, that is to say, 
otherwise that as a mere negation of the finite; that there is a form 
of reason that is higher than ratiocination; and that it is possible 
meaningfully to transcend the limits imposed by ordinary 
language. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that Hegel's 
distinction between Reason fVemunftl and Understanding 
fVerstand! is broadly parallel, mutatis mutandis, with Levinas' 
presentation of the distinction between Saying ile dire) and the 
Said ile dlt). Therefore, in the same measure as Hegel's speculative 
reason transcends the dialectical standpoint of the Understanding, 
it is equally transcendent with respect to the Said (le dit), ergo it 
cannot be reduced to the level of a theme within the Said, as 
Levinas asserts. Conversely, Vemunft occupies the same 
ideational level as Saying, or, stated in Levinasian terms, one of the 
ways in which Saying has 'erupted' into the history of Western 
philosophy is in the guise of Hegelian Reason. In short, Levinas 
cannot consistently deny that his philosophy is immanent within 
Hegel's System without pari passu repudiating the basic 
presuppositions of his own philosophical thought.
The immanence of Levinas' philosophy to Hegel's System 
further entails that the present study is, at least in part, as much a 
Levinasian reading of Hegel as a Heglian reading of Levinas. This 
is entirely consistent with the absolute method, in so far as the 
latter represents the full presentation of all philosophical 
perspectives. It will be noted that this also implies a distinction 
must be made between the absolute method and the textual corpus 
of which Hegel is the author. Thus we shall have no hesitation in
14
criticising Hegel's authorship from the standpoint of the absolute 
method.
In summation, then, it is our view, that the philosophy of 
Hegel and Levinas both have as their "object" a single infinite- 
totality. This is not to say that they have a shared understanding 
vis-a-vis the nature o f this infinite-totality and its inner 
articulations; but only that it is the same infinite - totality they 
subject to diverse interpretations.
The point of entry into the system is the Preface to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, which doubles as an introduction to the 
system as a whole. The express purpose of the Preface is to 
provide a means by which the individual consciousness may be 
granted access to the standpoint of the Notion. In Hegel's famous 
words:
The individual has the right to demand that 
science should at least provide him with the 
ladder to this standpoint, should show him the 
standpoint within himself. (Phen Para 261
Joseph Flay perspicuously observes that the most significant 
feature of Hegel's use of the ladder metaphor in this context is not 
the suggestion of a 'stairway' to the absolute, but rather the 
emphasis Hegel places upon the necessity to show natural 
consciousness the standpoint of the absolute within itself.35/ 
Immediately following on from the passage cited above, Hegel 
continues by saying:
His right is based on his absolute independence, 
which he is conscious of possessing in every
15
stage of his knowledge; for In each one, whether 
recognised by science or not, and whatever the 
context might be, the individual is the absolute 
form ie, he is the immediate certainty of himself 
and, if this expression is to be preferred, he is 
therefore unconditioned being. [Ibid)
We see from this statement, first, that, for Hegel, the 
individual always possesses an absolute reflexivity vis a vis its own 
existential irreducibility "which he is conscious of possessing at 
every stage of his knowledge" ... "whether recognised by Science or 
not", and, second, that it had the absolute "within itself', in a 
sense, as we shall see, that includes but also transcends the 
Platonic motif of immanent recollection. The relationship between 
the 'absolute standpoint' and the existential self constitutes the 
structural axis of the Phenomenology, which consists of a double 
narration wherein the experience of consciousness is demonstrated 
to be the experience of the absolute in consciousness.
However, the Phenomenology does not begin with the bare 
individual, but with "natural consciousness", the post-Cartesian 
reflective subject. This yields an epistemological standpoint which 
posits a knowing subject standing over and against a favourable 
object. Cognition is conceived either as an instrument, actively 
synthesising intuitions with concepts in accordance with the a 
priori forms of the Understanding (Kant), or else as a medium, 
passively receiving sense impressions and duly 'abstracting' 
concepts from them (Locke). Cognition qua instrument necessarily 
alters the object in the act of cognizing it; cognition qua medium 
inevitably 'refracts' the object through its own prism. In both 
Instances the net result is the same: we only know the object "for
16
us", as it were, "subjectively", not as it is "in-itself' (cf: Phen Para 
731.
As a consequence, reflective consciousness is haunted by the 
fear of scepticism, and this leads it to develop a preoccupation with 
method, in a vain attempt to divorce its own contribution, so to 
speak, to the cognition of the object so it might come to know the 
latter in its objective purity. Hegel, however, proclaims this fear of 
error to be the error; for it is grounded in an undisclosed fear of the 
truth [cf: Phen Para 74].
Hegel's critique of "natural consciousness" has certain 
parallels with Husserl's dismissal of the 'natural attitude’. Husserl 
by the singular device of the phenomenological epoche suspends 
the 'natural attitude' and places consciousness within the field of 
pure phenomena. From this standpoint, the sceptical predicament 
that bedevils transcendental and empirical philosophy, viz, how to 
subtract the contribution of cognition to the knowledge of the 
object so as to know the 'thing-in-itself, is exposed as something of 
a pseudo-problem. For, Husserl, both the reflective ego and its 
transcendent object are the result of quite distinct intentional acts 
fErlebnissel of transcendental consciousness. Levinas, in his early 
study of Husserl's theory of intuition, sums up Husserl's stance as 
follows;
Any theory of knowledge presupposes, indeed, the 
existence of an object ana of a subject that must come 
in contact with each other. Knowledge is then defined 
as this contact, and this always leaves the problem of 
determining whether knowledge does not falsify the 
being which it presents to the subject. But the 
problem is exposed as fictitious once we understand 
that the very idea of "an object" is to be found in the
17
concrete life of a subject; that a subject is not a 
substance in need of a bridge, namely knowledge, in 
order to reach an object, but that the secret of its 
subjectivity is its being present in front of objects. [Thl 
24-25)
In this work, Levinas goes on to develop his own distinctive 
thesis that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is, in essence 
- since it presupposes the absolute being of consciousness - an 
ontology.
Now, Hegel appears to have anticipated Husserl when, in the 
Introduction to the Phenomenology, he maintains that
phenomenological inquiry does not proceed by seeking to apply am 
autonomously justified method to a pre-given object-domain. On 
the contrary, it is only by leaving aside all presuppositions so as to 
simply describe what is there before us that "we" - the 
phenomenological observers - "succeed in contemplating the matter 
as it is in and for itself' [Phen Para 85). Thus, in a similar vein to 
Husserl, Hegel maintains that:
The distinction between the 'in itself and knowledge is 
already present in the fact that consciousness knows 
an object at all. Something is for it the in-itself and 
knowledge, or being o f the object for consciousness, is, 
for it, another moment. (Ibid)
Moreover, since both 'subject' and 'object' are both equally 
'for consciousness' it follows that there is no need to impart an 
external criteria to determine whether they correspond with one 
another, rather "consciousness is itself their comparison" (Ibid).
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At this juncture, however, Husserl and Hegel part company. 
Husserl follows up the initial epoche of the natural attitude with a 
further series of reductions designed to uncover the pure eidetic 
essences underlying the totality of phenomena and the 
transcendental subjectivity through which they are constituted. 
Hegel, on the other hand, is concerned to describe and recollect 
[Er-innerungl the successive shapes of consciousness (Gestaltl and 
their related forms of life, as they appear in time, from the 
standpoint of absolute knowing. We must stress that "absolute 
knowing" does not constitute the kind of subject-substance 
monism or Absolute Ego which Levinas finds in Husserl. Rather, 
as we shall see, it refers to the standpoint of a philosophical 
consciousness which has transcended the forms of 
representational depiction of the absolute.
From the very outset of his philosophical career, Levinas 
rejected Husserl's emphasis on the primacy of theoretical reason. 
Heavily influenced by Heidegger, he ends his early work on 
Husserl's Wesensschau by declaring that the eidetic reduction 
must be grounded in historicity, intersubjectivity and care and not, 
as Husserl would have it, vice-versa. However, Levinas' 
'ontologisation' of Husserl is decidedly un-Heideggerian in one 
highly significant respect. Contra Heidegger, Levinas maintains 
that negativity is not the primary determinans of Being. On this 
point, faithful to Husserl, Levinas contends that negation is an 
internal modification of the plentltudinous, absolute Ego. This 
statement of the matter has the important implied corollary that, 
insofar as negativity does not transcend the absolute being of 
consciousness, but is rather a specific Erlebnls. as it were, internal
19
to It, then the "outside" to the absolute Ego, if there is an "outside", 
is not pure nothingness but absolute otherness.
Now, it is our contention that essentially the exact same view 
of the relation between absolute otherness and negativity is to be 
found in Hegel's Logic. The Hegelian Absolute is not, as one 
commentator avers, a pure negatio negans.36/ por Hegel, 
otherness, in an absolute sense, is prior to negation. Being and 
nothingness necessarily stand together in a relation of dialectical 
opposition. Absolute Otherness - or "Becoming" - constitutes the 
speculative Unity of being and nothingness. In our view, the 
central structural principle of Hegel's entire system - the negation 
of the negation - is predicated on the derivative status of negativity 
with respect to absolute alterity. It is crucial to note that in the 
celebrated movement o f the negation of the negation, the second 
negation is qualitatively different to that of the first. The first 
negation is operative within the realm of representation and 
phenomena, in short, in the realm of oppositions; hence this 
necessarily entails it is implicated in a world of force and violence. 
The second negation, by contrast, is as peaceful as the first is 
violent, for it assumes the form of power and authority over force 
and violence. Ultimately, the negation of finite consciousness is 
negated in turn by an overarching absolute otherness that is both 
in and bevond total negativity. Indeed, as we shall see, Hegel’s 
critical distinction between the good or true infinity and the bad 
infinity rests upon the final presence of this "moment" of pure, 
unconditioned transcendence within the System.
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Levinas renders the priority of absolute alterity to being and 
negation which we found implicit in Husserl's phenomenology, fully 
explicit in his mature work. This constitutes the substantial 
ground of his break with Heidegger's philosophy. It also provides 
the metaphysical basis for his non-negative concept of the infinite. 
But, for Levinas, the infinite is revealed and known to the finite not 
through mystical intuition or miracles, still less through theoretical 
proofs, but rather in the ethical witness borne by one-for-the- 
Other. In Levinas' words "Metaphysics is enacted in ethical 
relations" (TI 79). Moreover, the ethical relation by its very nature 
assumes a collective, social character:
An infinity that does not close in upon itself in a circle 
but withdraws from the ontological extension so as to 
leave a place for a separated being exists divinely. 
Over ana beyond the totality it inaugurates a society. 
The relations that are established between the 
separated being and Infinity redeem what diminution 
there was in the contraction creative of Infinity. Mam 
redeems creation. (TI 104)
Thus, the pluralisation of the ethical relation founds an 
ethico-religious community, although, as we shall see below, 
according to Levinas, it is equally true to say that the ethico- 
religious community is a precondition of the ethical relation.
Now, we find a parallel development in Hegel's speculative 
Trinitarianism:37/ the non-negative infinite, while remaining 
absolutely Other, nonetheless enters into the realm of absolute 
negativity and flnltude, reconciles it to itself, and then withdraws 
into its absolute alterity, leaving only a spiritual trace of its divine 
presence within the world, and in each finite consciousness. This, 
in turn, inaugurates a spiritual community dedicated to the
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commemoration of the redemptive event, on the one hand, through 
the symbolic reenactment of the implicit reconciliation of the divine 
and the human, and, on the other hand, by undertaking the 
vocation to make the implicit reconciliation between the divine and 
the human the fully explicit and actual principle of the secular 
world. For Hegel, therefore, no less than for Levinas, "man 
redeems creation".
However, these broad parallels co-exist alongside profound 
divergences between Hegel and Levinas' thought. These are 
essentially two-fold, first they concern their respective 
understanding of the inner-nature of the infinite-finite relation and, 
second, they relate it to their representations of the relationship 
between the religious community and history.
In contrast to Hegel, Levinas holds that though the infinite 
has been 'put in'3®/ the finite, it is not thereby reconciled with it. 
For Levinas, reconciliation would be tantamount to the refutation 
of the absolute otherness of the Other. Moreover, it would 
substitute an egoistic concern for personal salvation for the divine- 
ethical command to be one-for-the-Other. Hegel, on the other 
hand, would consider the denied of reconciliation to be itself 
unethiced, Insofar as this would entail that the self is not fully 
liberated from the feeir of death to a life of freedom, and hence 
would inhibit the full development of the personality that is 
necesseuy to the accomplishment of an absolute relation to the 
absolute.
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A second major area of divergence between Hegel and 
Levinas, which in large measure follows from the first, is that 
whereas Levinas maintains that the ethico-religious community is 
essentially a-historical and as such, removed from the vicissitudes 
of historical change, and therefore stands over and against an 
unredeemed world; Hegel, contends that from the very beginning of 
history, religion and the secular realm have remained in an 
unceasing dialectical relation to one another; the misrecognitions 
and inversions that this relation has undergone, is necessary to the 
fulfilment of the vocation of both religion and the state.
This identity and difference in the content of their philosophy 
also account for the identity and difference in the form of their 
philosophical method. Hegel maintains that the Absolute cannot 
be comprehended in isolation from its immanent development in 
modem forms of philosophical reason. To attempt to counterpose 
am absolute intuition of the absolute to the prevailing systems of 
reflective philosophy would simply reduce the absolute to a one­
sided, empty determination. Therefore, Hegel insists, it is indeed 
necessary to show how the Absolute is implied by or appears 
through the illusions and the antinomies of the reflection 
standpoint.
To this end, the phenomenological observer identifies with 
the theoretical and practical stances of natural consciousness and 
follows the way in which the latter’s own experimental self­
development brings it into collision with the given epistemological 
or cultural configuration which constitute the immediate horizon of 
its life-activity. The result is a collapse into antinomy and the
23
dissolution or ‘falling to ground' of the particular philosophical 
paradigm and its related form of life. Eventually, after retraversing 
the entire itinerary of the Bildung of western philosophical and 
moral consciousness, the subject of the phenomenology attains to 
the standpoint of science fWissenschaftl. and what first appeared 
to it as alien and external, is now disclosed to be the truth of its 
own existential self-certainty.
For Hegel, the “motor” of the phenomenological development 
is the speculative proposition. In contrast with ordinary 
propositions, speculative sentences do not simply assert an identity 
between a fixed subject and an accidental predicate, but express 
the dynamic internalisation, as it were, of the predicate in the 
subject-term. We see the nature of this distinction when we 
consider that in the case of an ordinary judgement S is P, for 
example, "the rose is red", the correction of such a judgement, 
although it requires an adjustment on the part of the judging 
subject, evidently leaves the object, i.e. the rose, just as it was. 
Conversely it follows that since the object remains entirely intact, 
the subject's relation to the object also remains essentially 
unchanged, and this, in turn, entails that its reflective equilibrium 
is relatively untroubled. However, Hegel's point is that all our 
judgements are made within the context of a given paradigm, and 
are therefore always, so to speak, theory-dependent. Therefore, at 
certain junctures, a revision of the subject's judgement of an object 
will not simply require a mere adjustment on her part, but may 
well result in a transformation of the prevailing paradigm and thus 
generate a whole new subject-object configuration. Hegel sums up 
such a development as follows:
24
... in the alteration of knowledge, the objects itself 
alters for it too, for the knowledge that was present 
was essentially knowledge of the object: as the 
knowledge changes, so too does the object, for it 
essentially belonged to this knowledge. (Phen Para 85)
In other words, when the conceptual framework in which an 
object is apperceived alters, then so too does the nature of the 
object, and this brings about a corresponding change in the 
subject-object relation.
Speculative experience therefore consists in a constant 
process of recognition of self and object. Hegel sums up this 
phenomenological development as follows:
Since consciousness thus finds that its knowledge 
does not correspond with its object, the object itself 
does not stand the test; in other words, the criterion 
for testing is altered when that for which it was to have 
been the criterion fails to pass the test; and the testing 
is not only a testing of what we know but also a testing 
of the criterion of what knowing is. (Ibid)
Experientially, the first relation to the object is negated by 
the realisation of the untruth of the relation. This results in the 
Aufhebung of the previous relationship in a new subject-object 
configuration. That is to say, A's re-cognition of (its relation to B) 
transforms the relation of B to A. Through this alteration, the 
essence of B shows itself in the way it appears to A. Yet it must be 
borne in mind that there is in fact a double transitivity involved 
here: the appearing of essence in being is, at one and the same 
time, the appearing of the Notion in essence.
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At each stage of its phenomenological progress, then, the 
subject experiences the contradiction between its definition of the 
object and the object in re. In Hegel's words, "It suffers, as we 
might put it, a counter thrust. Starting from the subject, as 
though it were a permanent ground, it finds that since the 
predicate is really the substance, the Subject has passed over into 
the Predicate" (Phen Para 60). As a result, the subject no longer 
stands in a merely external relation to the predicate; rather, the 
predicate has become part of the very substance of its own 
subjectivity. From the first person standpoint of natural
consciousness, therefore, "the realisation of the Notion counts for it 
rather as the loss of its own self; for it does lose its truth on this 
path. The road can therefore be regarded as the pathway of doubt, 
or more precisely as the way of despair" (Phen Para 78). But this 
descent into despair is equally a necessary and essential moment 
in the ascent towards absolute knowing. The repeated fall into the 
abyss of absolute negativity punctuates the successive transitions 
of consciousness's phenomenological journey: from the struggle for 
mastery, through to Stoic indifference, to the formal abstraction of 
the Kantian moral will, and the revolutionary nihilism of the terror, 
culminating in the pure conscience of the Beautiful soul. The 
concomitant loss of the natural self "renders Spirit competent for 
the first time to examine what truth is" (Ibid). By working through 
the totality of merely finite representations of the infinite, the 
subject is finally brought face to face with an absolute otherness 
that suffers the negative in itself. Thus, the overcoming of all 
pictorial representations of the absolute - the death of God - is pari 
passu the revelation of the absolute In consciousness and the re­
birth of consciousness In the absolute, i.e. in spirit (Gelst). Hence,
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the subject, through the infinite withdrawal from all determination, 
is finally elevated to the standpoint of a universal self- 
consciousness. Although this 'ascent' is absolutely necessary, it 
nonetheless represents only the penultimate moment in the 
movement towards absolute knowing. For having attained to the 
status of a universal self-consciousness, the subject must allow 
itself to be absolved o f its completed selfhood. Absolute knowledge, 
therefore, is neither the correspondence between a concept and an 
object - adequatlo rerum et intellectus - for Hegel this is mere 
'correctness' fRichtigheit): nor is it a total coherence between 
wholes and parts; it is rather the unity of identity and non-identity 
between infinite alterity and unconditioned finite being. This result 
constitutes the alpha and omega of the entire system: the 
accomplishment of what consciousness already "is", viz, the unity 
of absolute otherness and negative self-activity. In Hegel's words:
Pure self-recognition in absolute otherness, this Aether 
as such, is the ground and soil of science or knowledge 
in general. The beginning of philosophy presupposes 
or requires that consciousness should dwell in this 
element. (Phen Para 26)
The overcoming of all representational depictions of the 
absolute eo ipso raises consciousness to the standpoint of pure 
thought. This allows the transition to a presuppositionless, and 
hence self-determining. Science of Logic, that, in turn, provides the 
conceptual basis for an immanent, self-determining system of 
ethical life fSlttllchkeltl. In the words of Richard Dlen Winfield "In 
the domain of theory, a logic of self-determination realizes the 
radical self-responsibility and independence that reason has 
traditionally claimed in attempting to obtain wisdom. In the field of
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practice, the reality of self-determination establishes a self-ordered 
system of institutions beholden to no standards that are not self- 
imposed".^39/ Both the Science of Logic and the Philosophy of 
Right Eire predicated on the historical advance to modernity and the 
resultant liberation, in principle, of both the mind and the will from 
all natural determinancy and facticity; though it is equally true to 
say that, for Hegel, the advent of modernity is grounded in the 
Absolute Idea and the actualization of the Idea in the concept of 
right.
In our view, the trinity of texts: the Phenomenology, the 
Science of Logic and the Philosophy of Right constitute the kernel 
of Hegel's system and its absolute method: we go as far as to say 
they may be designated as the svstem-proper. Accordingly, in this 
study, we shall treat all Hegel's early writings, of the Frankfurt and 
Jena periods (including the Phenomenologvl as, essentially, an 
extended propaedeutic to these three works; and we shall interpret 
Hegel's later writings, the Heidelberg Encyclopaedia (and its revised 
editions) and the Berlin Lectures, as an exposition of their results 
in all fields of human inquiry and knowledge.
In the light of this brief overview of Hegel's system, and by 
way o f establishing the organizational framework of our study, we 
shall now attempt to add substance to our claim that Levinas' 
philosophy constitutes a speculative system coextensive in scope 
with, and immanent to, Hegel's Science. Our treatment of Levinas’ 
philosophy will almost be wholly confined to a consideration of, 
and commentary upon, Levinas' two major works: Totality and 
Infinity and Otherwise than Being or Bevond Essence. There are
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two reasons governing our decision to make these two works the 
main focus of our attention. First, we consider TI and OBBE to 
represent the culmination of Levinas' entire philosophical 
development. His other works and essays (outside of his 
confessional texts) are comprised either of work-in-progress which 
receives its definitive statement in TI and OBBE, or, else of a 
restatement of their conclusions. Second, we shall seek to show 
that, for Levinas, TI and OBBE constitute a single, systematic 
unity. In our view, OBBE does not consist o f an auto-critique and 
self-repudiation on Levinas’ part of the method and conclusions of 
TI; on the contrary, it represents the completion of the earlier work.
Now, it is by no means fortuitous that the key to 
understanding the relationship between Levinas' two major works 
is to be found in his covert relationship to Hegel's philosophy. The 
structure of TI reflects the combined influence of Husserl, Hegel 
and Franz Rosenzwseig on Levinas' major work. From Husserl, 
Levinas retains the notion of Wesensschau. although he re-works it 
in a radically new direction. At one level, then, the work consists of 
a series of phenomenological reductions, wherein the conditioned 
strata: labour, representation, civil society and the state, are 
secondary to, and derivative of, their ethical foundation in the 'idea 
of infinity', the face to face, the dwelling and fraternity.
However, following in the footsteps o f Franz R o s e n z w e i g , 4 ^ /  
Levinas eschews Husserl's transcendentalism, and, by implication, 
Heidegger's notion of historicity, and maintains that the 
unconditional, ethical foundation of being is "discontinuously 
continuous" with the historical and phenomenal contents that are
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secondary to it. The result is that there is not one but two 
'deductions' to be found in TI. On the one hand, Levinas presents 
the ethical community as a stasis which exists in its own infinite 
time' outside of history. On the other hand, he counterposes this 
notion of a static community to an account of the genesis of the 
socio-historical world, culminating in the development of civil 
society and the rational state. Now, his presentation of the 
phenomenological genesis o f the historical world is not modelled on 
Husserl's notion of the epoche: rather it takes the form of a 
naturalistic appropriation o f Hegel's concept of phenomenology, 
that bears the stamp of Kojeve. However, contrary to Hegel's 
Phenomenology, there is in TI no possibility of an ultimate 
reconciliation between the ethical community and the world, since, 
according to Levinas, the ethical relation requires that 'fraternity' 
and the state remain in a fixed antithesis to one another.
In contrast to TI, where the argument is expounded sub 
specie aetemitas. OBBE begins from the standpoint of a 
consciousness immersed within the field of representation (the 
said). The two works overlap to a large extent in terms of their 
content, with two important exceptions. First, there is no analogue 
in OBBE to Section IV of TI "Beyond the Face". Whereas, TI ends 
with an exposition of "Fraternity", OBBE culminates with a 
statement of the relationship of the ethical relation to the third 
party within the state. Conversely, there is no equivalent in TI to 
Chapter II of OBBE "Intentionality and Sensing", which sets out to 
demonstrate how the notion of ethical saying is communicated 
through the forms of ontological and transcendental reflection. In 
fact, the structure of OBBE is essentially circular: beginning from
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the position of the self within-the-world, it effects its reduction to 
the primary condition of proximity and substitution, before 
integrating it back into the world, as the basis of an ethical 
demand for justice within the state.41/
It is our contention that the entire structure and argument of 
OBBE relies upon a particular deployment of the speculative 
method. To see this we must first turn to the introduction to 
OBBE ("The Argument") where Levinas sums up his intended mode 
of procedure thus:
The otherwise than being is stated in a saying 
that must also be unsaid in order to thus extract 
the otherwise than being from the said in which 
it already comes to signify but a being otherwise. 
[OBBE 7]
In other words, the statement of the ethical relation proceeds via 
two steps: first, there is a thematic negation of the said. This 
amounts to merely a formal negation, since, as Derrida has shown, 
the infinite can only be stated as a negative modification of the 
finite (ie in-flnite). However, Levinas does not leave it there, but 
proceeds to a second step, that negates the apophasis in which the 
infinite is denied. In Levinas’ own words, the said is reduced so as 
to ’surprise’ the saying on the 'hither side' of the theme that states 
it. Now, it is this second step that provides the Inverse parallel to 
the Hegelian negation of the negation. The "unsaying" of the 
thematic negation of the said, negates the first negation of the said. 
But the second negation does not operate on the same logical and 
syntactical level as the first. Rather, the 'unsaying' of the negated 
said, produces a movement beyond representation, though this
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does not merely result in a lapse into non-sense, since it is through  
the negation of representation that the subject is brought into 
relation with an absolute otherness beyond negation. To put it 
another way, the unsaying of the unsaid said is at once a 
presentation of saying qua Saying in the Said.
Levinas, then, contra Derrida, maintains that the apophasis 
does not constitute an ultimate limit which returns us to the 
untranscendable condition of our original flnitude; for insofar as, 
absolute negativity contains a nonnegative trace of absolute 
otherness within itself, absolute negation is an "effect" of absolute 
otherness, and not vice-versa. Ethical language attempts to 'hold 
together’ the aporetic unity of the absolute heteros and total 
negativity. To this end, Levinas asks:
Can this saying and this being unsaid be 
assembled, can they be at the same time. In 
fact, to require this simultaneously is already to 
reduce beings other to being and non-being. We 
must stay with the extreme situation of a 
diachronic thought. [Ibid]
We note that the form of Levinas' concept of diachronic thinking 
corresponds almost exactly to Hegel's definition of speculative 
thought:
Speculative thinking consists solely in the fact 
that thought holds fast contradiction, and, in it, 
its own self, but it does not allow itself to be 
dominated by it as in ordinary thinking, where 
its determinations are resolved only into other 
determinations or into nothing. [SL 440-441]
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In the same passage, Hegel goes on to say that "speculative 
thinking" brings the forms of ordinary thinking "into a relation that 
contains their contradiction and allows their Notion to show or 
shine through the contradiction" (Ibid). It is evident that Levinas’ 
injunction to "stay with the extreme situation of a diachronic 
thought" so as to allow saying to show itself in the said, parallels 
Hegel's speculative demand to hold fast to contradiction in order to 
allow the Notion to manifest itself through the antinomies of 
reflective thought.
However, notwithstanding this underlying identity of 
speculative form between Hegel and Levinas it is equally evident 
that the directions of their respective philosophies are diametrically 
opposed. For Levinas, "staying with diachronic thought" entails a 
reduction of the said to "a passivity prior to the passivity-activity 
alternative" (OBBE 121). It requires, so to speak, an Aufhebung in 
reverse. In this respect, OBBE necessarily presupposes the result 
of the deduction of the ethico-religious community set out in TI, 
for, as we shall see, it is only on condition of the prior existence of 
the ethical community that the absolute passivity necessary to the 
accomplishment of the ethical relation may be lived and witnessed.
For Hegel, on the other hand, 'holding fast to contradiction' 
is the means by which the reflective consciousness is elevated to 
the absolute standpoint of the Notion, that is to say, to a 
conceptual comprehension of the absolute active-passive unity that 
supersedes all ontological and transcendental determinations. 
Moreover, the fully comprehended Notion of the Notion or Absolute 
Idea is accomplished, and concretely accomplishes Itself, as the
33
unity of Absolute Spirit and Objective Spirit, not outside, but 
within world-history.
We contend therefore that on account of the underlying 
(though inverse) unity of speculative form between the philosophy 
of Hegel and the philosophy of Levinas, Hegel's system is able to 
embrace Levinas’ thought without doing violence to it, and so 
subject it to a non-question begging, immanent critique. In the 
sequel, we shall attempt to demonstrate through a Hegelian 
commentary on T1 and OBBE that, given his own premisses, 
Levinas' attempt to isolate the ethical community from history and 
the world, is ultimately untenable in itself, and, what is more, has 
profoundly deleterious social and political implications.
Our study is divided into three parts. In Part One, we 
attempt to make good our claim that Levinas’ philosophy is, as it 
were, internal to Hegel's System. The first four chapters form part 
of a continuous argument. Employing Freud as a tertlum 
comparationis we attempt to demonstrate that Hegel and Levinas 
have an essentially common understanding of the relationship 
between time, creation and forgiveness. In the final two chapters of 
Part One we undertake a commentary on Chapter III and IV of 
OBBE in order to determine the speculative and metaphysical 
unity of identity and difference between our two thinkers. On this 
basis we then proceed, in Part Two and Part Three respectively, to 
isolate the two 'deductions' in TI, identified below. In Part Two, we 
follow Levinas' account of the genesis of the socio-historical world 
through four distinct stages: The transition from the elements to 
the world of representation: from the world o f representation and
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labour to the Illusions of civil society; and from civil society to the 
rational-bureaucratic state. In Part Three, we concentrate on 
Levinas' deduction of the static, ethical community. We critically 
examine Levinas' account of the Dwelling, the 'ethical covenant', 
the 'phenomenology of eros', 'fecundity' and 'flliality'. Finally, we 
conclude with a discussion of Levinas' restatement of the 
relationship between justice and the third party in Chapter V of 
OBBE. We attempt to demonstrate that the positive features of 
Levinas' understanding of the ethical relation may only be 
sustained within the framework of a Hegelian comprehension of the 
relationship between religion and the state.
35
FOOTNOTES TO INTRODUCTION
1/ See Ethics of the Infinite An Interview with Emmanuel 
Levinas in Richard Kearney Dialogues with Contemporary 
Continental Thinkers. The Phenomenological Heritage 
(Manchester, Manchester University Press 1984) p. 64: 
Levinas states, contra Derrida: "whereas he tends to see the 
deconstruction of the Western metaphysics of presence as an 
irredeemable crisis, 1 see it as a golden opportunity for 
Western philosophy to open itself to the dimension of 
otherness and transcendence beyond being".
2/ See, for example, Zygmunt Bauman Postmodern Ethics. 
(Oxford and Cambridge USA, Blackwell, 1993); Simon 
Critchley The Ethics of Deconstruction (Oxford and 
Cambridge USA, Blackwell, 1992) and Tim Gorringe Capital 
and the Kingdom (Orbis, SPCK, 1994).
3/ For a parallel critique of Levinas from a Hegelian perspective, 
see Gillian Rose The Broken Middle (Oxford and Cambridge 
USA, Blackwell, 1992) pp. 247-273.
4/ Levinas is particularly sensitive on this point. See his 
vitriolic article "Hegel and the Jews": "Anti-semitism is based 
within the system which amounts to saying within the 
absolute. What a Godsend! DL p. 236.
5/ Cf Kearney. Dialogues with Contemporary Continental
Thinkers, p. 54.
36
6/ On this point see Peter Hodgson The Metamorphosis of 
Judaism in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion' in (ed) B. Cullen 
Hegel Today (Aldershot, Averbury, 1988).
7/ Theodore Adorno in Against Epistemology. Translated by 
William Domingo (Oxford, Blackwell 1982) asserts just such 
a connection between immanent critique and a philosophy of 
immanence.
8/ Hans-Georg Gadamer. Truth and Method (London: Sheed 
and Ward 1975) p. 308.
9/ Kearney. Dialogues with Contemporary__ Continental
Thinkers, p. 61.
10/ Alexandre Kojeve. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 
edited by A  Bloom, translated by J.H. Nichols (New York: 
Basic Books, 1969).
11/ George Lukács. The Young Hegel, translated by R.
Livingstone (London: Merlin Press 1975).
12/ Herbert Marcuse Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of 
Historicity translated by Seyla Benhabib (Cambridge 
Massachusetts, London, England. The MIT Press 1987) and 
Reason and Revolution (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
1941).
37
13/ Stanley Rosen. G.W.F. Hegel. An Introduction to the 
Science o f Wisdom. New Haven and London. Yale University 
Press 1974.
14/ Robert Solomon In the Spirit of Hegel (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983).
15/ Charles Taylor Hegel (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1975).
16/ Michael Rosen, Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
17/ Klaus Hartmann, 'Hegel a non-metaphysical view' in (ed) 
Alasdair MacIntyre Hegel: A Collection of Essays (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday 1972).
18/ Terry Pinkard, The Logic of Hegel's Logic' in (ed) Michael 
Inwood, Hegel (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985).
19/ Alan White, Absolute Knowledge. Hegel and the Problem of 
Metaphysics (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1983).
20/ John W. Burbidge, Hegel on Logic and Religion The 
Reasonableness of Christianity New York, 1992) and Qn
Hegel's Logic. Fragments__of a Commentary (Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981).
38
21/ Lawrence Dickey Hegel: Religion. Economics and the Politics 
of Spirit. 1770-1807 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987) and Hegel on religion and philosophy' in (ed) 
Frederick C. Beiser The Cambridge Companion to Hegel 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993).
22/ Emil Fackenheim The Religious Dimension in Hegel's 
Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).
23/ Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by S. Chemick and J. 
Heckman (Evanston, 111., Northwestern University Press, 
1974).
24/ Walter Jaeschke, Reason in Religion. Translated by J. 
Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson. Berkeley, (University 
of California Press, 1990).
25/ Hans Kung, The Incarnation of God. Translated by J.R. 
Stephenson, Edinburgh, Tand T  Clark, 1987.
26/ Quentin Lauer, A  Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of 
Spirit. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993).
27/ Harold Westphal, Hegel. Freedom and Modernity, (Albany 
N.Y., State University of New York Press, 1992) and History 
and Truth in Hegel's Phenomenology (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanitieu Press, 1979).
39
28/ Gillian Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology. (London: Athlone Press, 
1981).
29/ Stephen Houlgate, Hegel. Nietzsche and the Criticism of 
Metaphysics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986).
30/ Slavoj Zizek, For they Know not What They Do. Enjoyment 
as a Political Factor. (London: New York, Verso, 1991).
31/ Richard Dien Wienfield, Reason and Justice. (Albany: State 
University New Yor Press, 1988) and The Method of Hegel's 
Science of Logic' in (ed.) George Di Giovanni, Essays on 
Hegel's Logic. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1990).
32/ Kenley Dove, 'Hegel's Phenomenological Method', in Review of 
Metaphysics. 23, 4 (June 1970).
33/ Cf: Robert Bemasconi, 'Levinas Face to Face - with Hegel', 
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. 13 (1982), 
No.3, 267-76.
34/ This is particularly evident with respect to Levinas' 
reformulation of the ontological argument, which is much 
closer to Hegel than to the Cartesian version which Levinas 
standardly cites as an example of the 'eruption' of 
transcendence into Western philosophy. Compare, for
40
example, the following two passages taken from TI and from 
Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion:
The idea of infinity, the infinitely more contained in the less, 
is concretely produced in the form of a relation with the face. 
And the idea of infinity alone maintains the exteriority o f the 
other, with respect to the same, despite this relation. Thus a 
structure analogous to the ontological argument is here 
produced: the exteriority of being is inscribed in its essence 
(TI 196).
The consciousness of finite spirit is the concrete being, the 
material in which the concept of God is realized. We are not 
here talking about any adding of being to the concept or a 
simple unity of concept and being - expressions like these 
are misleading. The unity in question is to be grasped rather 
as an absolute process, as the living activity of God - but in 
such a way that both sides are differentiated in ii so that it is 
the absolute activity of eternally producing itself (LPR III 
356). Emphasis added.
35/ Joseph Flay, Hegel's Quest for Certainty. (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1985), p.26.
36/ Michael Rosen. Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism, p.90.
37/ For a discussion of Hegel's Trinitarianlsm see Dale M. 
Schlltt, Divine Subjectivity. (London and Toronto University
41
of Scranton Press, 1993) and Fackenheim, The Religious 
Dimension in Hegel’s Thought, pp. 149-153.
38/ This is Levinas' own phrase. See his essays 'Philosophy and 
the Idea of Infinity', p.54 and 'God and Philosophy', p. 161, 
both in CP.
39/ Richard Dien Winfield, Reason and Justice, p. 15.
40/ See Appendix.
41/ See Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, p.229. 
Critchley sees the movement from the said in the second 
chapter to saying in chapter III and chapter IV back to the 
said in chapter V as a movement fron an unjustified to a 
justified said.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: PROXIMITY AND THE PROBLEM OF 
MASOCHISM
In OBBE, Levinas adopts a violent language to describe the 
way in which I am obligated to the other prior to my constitution as 
a self. Thus: "an-archic" responsibility "uncovers the one that 
speaks", (OBBE 44) exposing me to "insults and to wounding" 
(OBBE 49). By "stripping me of every identical quiddity" to the 
point where I am left "without complexion" (Ibid). Levinas 
continues:
It is a denuding beyond the skin, to the wounds one 
dies from, denuding to death, being as vulnerability. It 
is a fission of the nucleus opening the bottom of its 
punctual nuclearity, like to the lung at the core of 
oneself. (Ibid)
However, even this nucleus "has to continue to be tom from itself' 
(Ibid). For Levinas, subjectivity is this "suffering of suffering, the 
ultimate offering of oneself, or suffering in the offering of oneself' 
(OBBE 54). Subjectivity is "a passivity more passive still than any 
passivity" (OBBE 50), that produces, "the exposure to wounding 
and enjoyment, an exposure to wounding in enjoyment, which 
enables the wound to reach the subjectivity of the subject 
complacent in itself and positing itself for itself (OBBE 64).
The lurid terms Levinas employs to describe "Proximity", and 
the related 'states' of obsession, hostage, persecution, etc., raises 
the question as to whether his ethics is, not to put too fine a point
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on it, frankly pathological. A Freudian interrogation of his work, 
therefore, naturally suggests itself. Perhaps the central role 
masochism plays in his texts, particularly in OBBE, may be traced 
back to an undisclosed interest that has its source in an 
unconscious need, namely the need for punishment, and that as a 
consequence the outwardly supererogatory nature of infinite 
responsibility inwardly conforms to a secret desire for self­
gratification through self-mortification?
At first sight it would appear that Levinas' categorical terms 
may be directly assimilated to the structural typology of Freud's 
metapsychology. An interpretation along these lines would 
doubtless make the there is correspond to the death-drive; equate 
enjoyment with the Id or pleasure principle; and render the "face" 
synonymous with the superego or ego-ideal. This would then 
warrant the re-interpretation of Levinas' description of the ethical 
encounter - as the masculine Other calling into question a desiring 
subject directed towards feminine alterity - as a phenomenological 
reformulation of Freud's hypothesis that it is the internalisation of 
the Oedipal prohibition which effectuates the transition to the 
stage of morality.
In addition, a Freudian reading promises to provide us with a 
key with which to unravel the dynamics of the Levinasian text. 
According to Freud’s account of the Oedipal complex, the law of the 
father checks the desiring subject's projection of its aggressive and 
libidinous instincts on to the body of the female Other. The 
subsequent internalisation of the parental law results in the 
formation of the subject's superego. The superego in turn receives
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its repressive force from the introversion of the subject's life and 
death instincts. These are then turned against the libido itself. 
The inscribing of the incest taboo within the psychic economy of 
the infant brings about his or her auto-castration and facilitates 
the transition to the next stage of psychic development. However, 
if the trauma of the prohibition is for some reason not successfully 
abreacted than it is likely to resurface at a later stage as an 
unconscious sense o f guilt, which may, in turn, function as the 
latent source of an obsessional neurosis. Such a neurosis often 
takes the form of an insatiable desire for self-punishment and self­
affliction, which may provide the subject with its only form of relief 
from the torment of an overactive and tyrannical superego.1 /
Freud investigates this phenomenon further in a short text 
entitled: "The Economic Problem of Masochism" (1924). Freud 
notes that the existence of masochism cannot be explained in 
terms of an economy of pain and pleasure, since the positive 
embracement of unpleasure plainly contradicts the principle of 
hedonism. 2/ From this consideration Freud infers that 
masochism is connected with what is 'beyond the pleasure 
principle', i.e. the death Instinct. He proceeds to classify 
masochism in accordance with three forms: (a) Erotogenic - as a 
condition imposed on sexual excitation, (b) Feminine - as an 
expression of a Feminine nature and (c) moral - as a norm of 
behaviour. We shall briefly examine each of these three types of 
masochistic behaviour.
Erotogenic masochism derives from the residue of the death- 
instinct which has not been transposed outwards on to objects but
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has been introjected and defused throughout the libido. This 
manifests itself as "feminine masochism". Freud restricts his 
discussion to the appearance of this kind of masochism in men, 
where it finds expression largely in fantasies of punishment and 
debasement that signify a regression to infantile life. The 
masochistic ego "wants to be treated like a small and helpless 
child, but, particularly like a naughty child" and this places "the 
subject in a characteristically female situation."^/ Significantly 
Freud also notes that:
A  sense o f guilt, too finds expression in the 
manifest content of masochistic fantasies: the 
subject assumes that he has committed some 
crime (the nature of which is left indefinite) 
which is to be expiated by all these painful and 
tormenting procedures.^/
Thus, the inculcation of a baseless sense of guilt provides the 
transition to the moral form of masochism.
Erotegenic and feminine masochism therefore, according to 
Freud, denote the "pleasure-in-pain" that results from the binding 
of an introverted portion of the death-instinct with the libido. This 
explains the connection between the expression of libido and the 
experience of guilt, such that the libido may only seek expression if 
it is either accompanied by, or takes the form of, a punitive self- 
retribution. The expiation of the guilt simply is the desire for 
punishment by another, prototypically from the parent.
Now Levinas appears to reproduce this Freudian schema 
connecting the death-instinct and the libido with pleasure and pain
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In his account of ethical signification when he links "wounding in 
enjoyment" with the there is and desire. It may be objected in 
Levinas' defence that he explicitly stresses the non-erotic nature of 
the ethical assignation in OBBE. Yet, Freud has, so to speak, 
'anticipated' this attempt to sever the connection between the libido 
and the moral law in his account of moral masochism.
Indeed the definitive feature of this third form of masochism 
is that it has "loosened its connection with what we recognise as 
sexuality ".5/ Unlike the two previous forms of masochism - the 
erotogenic and the feminine - it is indifferent as to source of its 
punishment.
All other masochistic suffering carry with them 
the condition that they shall emanate from the 
loved person and snail be endured at his 
command. This restriction has been dropped in 
moral masochism. The suffering itself is what 
matters; whether it is decreed by someone who is 
loved or who is indifferent is of no importance.
(p. 240)6/
A moment ago we noted how the auto-castration of the 
desiring subject7/ is effected through the introjection of the 
parental authority into the ego. The superego therefore retains 
essential features of the subject’s parents - strength, severity, the 
inclination to supervise and to punish. In addition, it also contains 
a residue of the transposed libidinal cathexis. which now reappears 
in the ego in a sublimated form, thoroughly concatenated with the 
authoritarian conscience. This latent sexualization o f the superego 
may Inhibit the process of moral development which ought to 
proceed by the progressive intériorisation of non-parental 
superegolc substitutes. This is checked in the case of moral
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masochism, however, which acts to re-sexualize the moment of 
moral sublimation and so brings about a fixation of the subject, 
manifesting itself as a compulsive repetition of the Oedipal stage. 
Freud laments:
This is to the advantage of neither the morality 
nor the person concerned. An individual may, it 
is true, have preserved the whole or some 
measure of ethical sense alongside o f his 
masochism: but alternately a large part of his 
conscience may have vanished into his 
masochism. Again masochism creates a 
temptation to perform 'sinful' actions, which 
must then be expiated by the reproaches of the 
sadistic conscience (as is exemplified in so many 
Russian character-types) or by chastisement 
from the great parental power of Destiny. In 
order to provoke punishment from this last 
representative of his parents, the masochist 
must do what is inexpedient, must act against 
his own interests, must ruin the prospects that 
open out to him in the real world and must 
perhaps destroy his own real existence.®/
In the light of this Freud excursus, Levinas' affirmation of the 
"proximity" of pain and enjoyment, and the pulverisation of the ego 
in the ethical assignation - "election in persecution" - appears to 
represent an infantile regression to the feminine and moral forms 
of masochism as a direct consequence of an unresolved Oedipal 
complex. On this reading Levinas' whole philosophy may be viewed 
as an example of an obsessional neurosis writ large. Far from 
being "ethical", Levinas' philosophy of the Other, were it be 
enacted, would result in the self-destruction of the subject, and a 
fortiori, the moral subject.
Now, it is our contention that Levinas' notion of "proximity" is 
not reducible to the Freudian category of "moral masochism". 
However, in what follows, we will not defend Levinas directly from
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his would-be Freudian critic, but, by way of a detour through 
Hegel's system. First we aim to show, on the basis of the Spirit of 
Christianity and its Fate: The Phenomenology of Spirit. The Science 
of Logic: and the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, that Hegel 
provides a more profound and far-reaching understanding of the 
relationship between guilt and punishment than that which may be 
derived from Freud's metapsychology. In particular, Hegel's 
account demonstrates, contra Freud, that an ethics of self-sacrifice 
cannot be explained simply in terms of the symptomatic expression 
of an unresolved Oedipal complex, but must primarily be 
comprehended as an infinite response to a Trans-Oedipal 
accusation against the self. In this, absolute sense, self-sacrifice is 
a necessary moment, one may even say the penultimate moment, 
in the emancipatory movement of self-overcoming, and deliverance 
from, the negative formation of the subject.
In the course of establishing the Hegelian case vis a vis 
Freud, we shall indicate how Levinas' ethics also transcends the 
limited perspective provided by the Freudian hypothesis. This, in 
turn, will enable us to show that Levinas shares with Hegel a 
notion of infinity that surpasses the standpoint of a philosophy of 
"original finitude". Therefore, our encounter with Freud provides 
the tertlum comparationls around which we shall seek to establish 
our thesis that Hegel's and Levinas' philosophical works are 
immanent to one another.
Finally, on these grounds, we proceed, in the last two 
chapters of this section, to a direct comparison between Hegel and 
Levinas themselves. This takes the form of a reading of Chapter III
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and Chapter IV of OBBE respectively that relates Hegel's 
speculative Christology to Levinas' notions of "proximity" and 
"substitution". Our aim here is to determine the elements of 
identity and non-identity between their respective understandings 
of the relation between infinity and subjectivity. This will then 
provide the systematic framework for the immanent critique of 
Levinas' social and politiceli thought that forms Part Two of our 
study.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE
1/ Sigmund Freud. The Pelican Freud Library (ed) James 
Strachey. Hardmondsworth. Volume One: Introductory 
Lectures on Psychoanalysis 1974. Lecture 13. Lecture 20.
2/ Sigmund Freud. The Pelican Freud Library (ed) James 
Strachey. Volume Eleven. On Metapsvchologv 1984 p. 413: 
"The existence of a Masochistic trend in the instinctual life of 
human beings may be justly described as mysterious from 
the economic point of view. For if mental processes are 
governed by the pleasure principle in such a way that their 
first aim is the avoidance of unpleasure and the obtaining of 
pleasure, masochism is incomprehensible.
3/ Ibid p. 416.
4/ Ibid.
5/ Ibid.
6/ Ibid p. 420.
7/ Ibid.
8/ Ibid p. 425.
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CHAPTER TWO
GUILT AND ATONEMENT
In EE, Levinas illustrates the nature of the there Is with 
reference to the scene of the return of Banguo's ghost In 
Shakespeare's Macbeth. Levinas' point is that the there is (il y  a) is 
not synonymous with the death-drive; it is rather suspended 
between being and nothingness, a "nothing-interval" which cannot 
pass on and which "returns" in every negation. 1/ Now, it is not 
accidental, in our view, that Levinas refers here to the exact same 
passage from Macbeth which Hegel alludes to in The Spirit of 
Christianity and its Fate. Hegel's attack on Judaism and Kant in 
that work is precisely an assault on the positivity of the moral law - 
or the superego in Freudian parlance - from the point of view of the 
unity of infinite life. In the Spirit of Christianity. Hegel observes 
that law and punishment cannot be reconciled.^/ Although when 
a penal sanction is exacted on a felon the positive law is satisfied, 
the reverse does not hold; the felon remains in a state o f bad 
conscience even after he has suffered his punishment, since the 
law remains over and against him as an 'alien power'. Hegel 
anticipates Freud when he says that the bad conscience o f the 
trespasser may lead him to transgress again so as to bring further 
punishment on himself:
The oppression and grief of a bad conscience 
may drive him once more to a dishonesty ie it 
may drive him to running away from himself and 
therefore from law and Justice; he throws himself 
into the busom of the administrator of abstract 
Justice in order to experience his goodness, in 
the hope that he will close his eye and look at 
him other than he is. (ETW 227-228)
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Hegel uses this example to illustrate a basic distinction he 
draws between punishment as the cancellation of the transgression 
of the law and punishment as a fate. With respect to the former, 
he observes, the punishment of the transgression bestows 
universality upon the transgressive deed. Though the criminal act 
has "smashed the matter of the law", its universal form is 
reinstated by the retribution exacted in the enforcement of the 
penal sanction. Both the transgression and the punishment 
constitute deeds, but the former is particular and the latter 
universal, and, as such, they remain in an unreconciled opposition 
to one another. Thus, although the law has in a sense brought the 
deed into being, the cleavage between law and punishment 
remains.
By contrast, the law of Fate permits the unification of the 
trespasser with his punishment and hence allows for the 
forgiveness of the transgression. As Hegel notes "in the hostile 
power of fate, the universal is not severed from the particular in the 
way in which the law, as universal, is opposed to man or his 
inclinations as the particular" (ETW 229). The law of Fate, 
therefore, refers to a single, infinite-life, which is not negated but 
only alienated by the taking of one life by another. This is 
illustrated by the return of Banquo's ghost:
Destruction of life is not the nullification of life 
but its diremption and the destruction consists 
in its transformation into an enemy. It is 
immortal, and, if slain, it appears as its terrifying 
ghost which vindicates eveiy branch of life and 
lets loose its Eumenides. The illusion of the 
trespass, its belief that it destroys the other's life 
and is enlarged thereby, is dissipated by the fact
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that the disembodied spirit of the injured life 
comes on the scene against the trespass, just as 
Banquo's ghost who came as a friend to Macbeth 
was not blotted out but immediately thereafter 
took his seat, not as a guest at the feast, but as 
an evil spirit. The trespasser intended to have 
do with another's life, but he has only destroyed 
his own, for life is not different from life, since 
life dwells in the single Godhead. (ETW 229)
In short, whereas the penal law creates the deed by 
bestowing upon the particularity of the transgressive act the 
universality its commission violates, in the punishment of fate the 
transgressive deed creates the law; hence its rectification is not 
alien to but at one with the transgressor who perpetrates it.
Hegel acknowledges that a reconciliation with fate appears 
impossible since in the limit case of murder it "seems to require a 
cancellation of annihilation" (ETW 230). However, fate enjoys an 
advantage over the penal law insofar as "it occurs within the orbit 
of life, while a crime falling under law and punishment occurs on 
the contrary in the orbit of insurmountable oppositions and reed 
events" (Ibid). What is the nature of the distinction Hegel is 
drawing here between the "orbit of life" and the "orbit of 
insurmountable oppositions and real events"?
We venture that this distinction alludes to the relation 
between infinity and finite being, or, in Levinas' terms, the 'relation 
without relation' (TI80) between infinity and totality or Saying and 
the Said. The "orbit of life" in which fate rules, therefore, denotes 
the primal diremption of infinite-life. That is to say, the 'orbit of 
life' is in creation but outside representation, ie outside 
'oppositions and real events'. Hence, phenomenality carries within
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itself a double trace: the trace of creation and the trace of absolute 
alterity in creation.
The word Fate (Schicksal) has a mythical ring to it and this is 
no doubt why Hegel abandoned it in his mature work. Essentially, 
however, it refers to the paradox of a guilt incurred prior to any 
actual crime or transgression. Here we see Hegel's direct affinity 
with Levinas' notion of an irrecusable responsibility prior to any 
free decision on the part of the subject (OBBE 136-140). The 
punishment exacted on the existent is coeval with the primordial 
transgression of its being. The fact of finite existence denotes a 
severance from the Other, one may even say, metaphorically 
speaking, the "murder" of the Other. But we must be precise about 
what we mean by the "Other" in this context. Here the term 
"Other" signifies that which is Other-than-life, as it were, the 
'obverse' of life, a pure transcendens. Hence, it is not to be equated 
with absolute nothingness. Rather negation must be understood 
as an internal modification of the primary "fact" of creation. 
Perhaps the following formulation may serve to clarify our point: 
the Other is the Other to life or creation while the Other to creation 
is death and negation. The Other-to-life and life taken together 
constitute infinite-life.^/
Hence, insofar as the primary act of creation constitutes an 
absolute separation from the Other, then, from the very "beginning" 
or ab-originally, the self is afflicted with a bad conscience. This 
primordial sense of guilt cannot be attributed to the Oedipal 
complex since it clearly precedes it. Paradoxically, the self is guilty 
even before it is a self. On this point, Hegel and Levinas are in
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complete agreement. The both hold to the notion of infinite-life as 
set out above.
For Hegel, the expiation and atonement of this primordial 
guilt is accomplished through a dying-to-self that brings the 
subject into relation with the absolute heteros or pure 
transcendens on the "hither-side" of the negative, and thereby 
releases it to re-accomplish the already-accomplished 
reconciliation with divine alterity. Hegel contends that this 
redemptive movement receives its most complete representational 
expression in the Christian myth of the incarnation, death and 
resurrection of Christ. In the penultimate section of the 
Phenomenology Hegel provides the following speculative 
commentary on the crucifixion; stated from the point of view of its 
phenomenological experience in consciousness:
The death of the Mediator is the death not only 
of his natural aspect or of his particular being- 
for-self, not only of the already dead husk 
stripped of its essential Being, but also of the 
abstraction of the divine Being. For the Mediator 
in so far as his death has not completed the 
reconciliation, is the one-sidedness which takes 
as essential Being the simple element of thought 
in contrast to actuality: this one-sided extreme of 
the self does not yet have equal worth with 
essential being; this it first has as Spirit. The 
death of this picture thought contains, therefore, 
at the same time the death of the abstraction of 
the divine being which is not posited as Self. 
That death is the painful feeling of the Unhappy 
Consciousness that God Himself is dead. (Phen. 
Para 785)
The death of all representations of God, then, is necessarily a 
moment o f absolute sorrow and grief. In Freudian terms it would 
signify not merely the death of the subject's natural parents but
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also the destruction of Its internalized parental superego or ideal- 
father. Thus it constitutes a complete break-up of the natural self; 
a traumatic loss which leaves the subject utterly bereft and 
inconsolate. By the same token, however, the nullification of all 
finite representations of the absolute occasioned by this "in­
breathing of spirit" (Ibid) brings the self into relation with the pure 
negativity of its being and thereby confirms it in its absolute 
subjectivity as an infinite power of withdrawal from every 
determinate content. On the other hand, the death of the abstract 
concept of God as an object standing over and against or "above" 
the self is at one and the same time the rebirth of the immediacy of 
God in [human] Spirit. The 'death of God' therefore completes the 
transition from substance to subject, that is to say, from an 
external to, as it were, an internal relation to the absolute. The 
absolute no longer exists in an empty 'beyond' outside the self but 
is present within, the now redeemed, spiritual self.
Hegel nonetheless maintains that at this stage of the 
development of religious consciousness the self has only attained 
to an implicit reconciliation with the absolute Other, since it merely 
understands the significance of the redemptive event in intuitive 
terms as a purely negative self-relation. Hegel sums up this 
deficiency by drawing the following parallel:
Just as the individual divine man has a father in 
principle and only an actual mother, so too, the 
universal divine mem, the community, has for its 
father its own doing and knowing, but for its 
mother, eternal love which it only feels but does 
not behold in its consciousness as an actual 
immediate object. (Phen. Para 787)
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In other words, consciousness has become, as it were, its 
own "father", insofar as it is no longer dependent on illusory ego- 
ideals for its own existential self-certitude, but it nonetheless 
remains in a state of disseverence from the divine, which is 
expressed as an eternal love for its "mother". As we shall see 
Hegel’s gendering of the relation to the absolute at this point is of 
no little significance. Now in the first instance consciousness does 
not seek to think the nature of this continued diremption but to 
feel it through the development of a devotional subjectivity which 
commemorates iAndenken) the incarnation in the religious cultus 
and through the sacraments. At first sight it would appear that the 
réintroduction of media at this point to once again represent the 
absolute to the self would be tantamount to a refusal to live with 
the truth that god is dead by seeking refuge in the erection of new 
ego-ideals. However, for Hegel, this would represent only a one­
sided understanding of the truth of the matter; for the reversion to 
representation is a necessary movement towards a conceptual and 
therefore genuine reconciliation between the human and the 
divine; merely staying with the absolute in its pure immediacy 
would constitute the most regressive self-relation possible.4/
To fully see why this is so we must leave the relation of 
religious consciousness to the incamational event expounded in 
the Phenomenology and examine the same relation from the other 
side, so to speak, that is, from the standpoint of the Absolute Idea, 
as it is stated by Hegel in his Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Religion. In a critical passage, Hegel first restates the experience of 
the speculative Good Friday from the point of view of
consciousness:
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God has died, God is dead - this is the most 
frightful of all thoughts, that everything eternal 
and true is not, that negation itself is found in 
God. The deepest anguish, the feeling of 
complete irretrievability, the annulling of 
everything that is elevated are bound up with 
this thought. (LPR III: 323)
But Hegel continues:
However, the process does not come to a halt at 
this point; rather a reversal takes place: God, 
that is to say, maintains himself in this process 
and the latter is only the death of death. God 
rises again to life, and thus things are reversed. 
The resurrection is something that belongs just 
as essentially to faith [as the crucifixion]. After 
his resurrection Christ appeared only to his 
friends. This is not an external history for 
unbelievers; on the contrary this appearance 
only occurs for faith. The resurrection is 
followed by the glorification of Christ and the 
triumph of his ascension to the right hand of 
God concludes this history. (LPR III: 323-324)
In this philosophical reconstruction of Christian dogmatics, 
Hegel configures the myth of the incarnation in accordance with 
the logical development from the Idea of God, its extemalization in 
representation and appearance and its return to itself in universal 
self-consciousness or Spirit. Within this triadic schema the 
appearance of the Son of God represents the negation of the Idea of 
God or the Father and the death of Christ signifies the negation of 
this negation or the death of death. In Hegel's words, Christ has 
"come out of the state of death" in order "to put death to death". 
The Son of God therefore has taken on finitude and humiliation in 
all its forms:
This humanity which is itself a moment in the 
divine life, is now characterised as something 
alien, not belonging to God. This finitude
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however, on its own account (as against God) is 
evil, something alien to God. But he has taken it 
[upon himself] in order to put it to death by his 
death. As the monstrous unification of these 
absolute extremes, this shameful death is at one 
and the same time infinite love. (LPR III: 324)
Our point in citing this passage is to show that the "death of 
God" involves a double movement of which consciousness is aware 
of only one side: the loss of its natural self and its continued 
diremption from the Other. The reverse side of this process, of 
which it is capable of only a partial apprehension through religious 
symbolism, is the return of the infinite into itself. (This is 
expressed figuratively as the return of the Son to the right-hand of 
the Father.) This converse moment however is absolutely 
necessary since it is only on condition that there "is" an absolute 
otherness into which the "son" can return that there can be love 
under the aspect of agape and not merely a natural self-love. The 
finitized infinite, so to speak, must return into itself or else it would 
abolish rather than redeem the flnitude of the finite by condemning 
it to the misery of am infinite but empty freedom. Contrariwise, the 
infinitized finite must, as it were, return to the world if it is to bear 
witness®/ to its redemption and freedom, since it is only in being 
for others that the self has f r e e d o m .® /
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
1/ EE. Chapter IV.2: Existence without Existents pp. 57-64.
2/ Cf: ETW. The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate. Particularly 
section III: The Moral Teaching of Jesus: Love as the 
Transcendence of Penal Justice and the Reconciliation of 
Fate pp. 224-252.
3/ Michael Rosen in Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism 
demonstrates how Hegel repudiates the Platonic, neo- 
Platonic and Augustinian attempt to conceive the mystery of 
the creation in terms of a "light-metaphysics" on the grounds 
that it reduces the mystery to a representational mode of 
thought. As Rosen himself puts it: "When we try, in like 
fashion, to find metaphors out of which to construct an 
image of Hegel's cosmology the system appears to be 
paradoxical and contradictory. Yet, crucially, for Hegel this 
is just the point. The progress of Thought is something that 
cannot be pictured, and so long as we try to do so we shall 
find ourselves falling back into the impasses of the 
traditional cosmologies" (p. 84). It is somewhat surprising 
therefore that given Rosen's own insightful understanding of 
Hegel's approach to the problem of creation that he goes on 
to maintain that Hegel has "not abandoned the traditional 
neo-Platonic enterprise" (86). Rosen arrives at this 
conclusion by hypostalislng the Idea and then attributing to 
Hegel the notion that this immanent Idea 'particularises' 
itself through Images and copies of its own absolute form;
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the very Idea in other words that, as he himself points out 
only a few pages earlier, Hegel was so critical of in (other) 
representatives of the philosophical tradition.
In fact, Hegel maintains that in pure Thought consciousness 
is able to transcend the standpoint of the Understanding and 
think the relation between being and negation (creation or 
becoming) on the one hand and absolute alterity on the 
other, with the result that the latter overarches and 
"incorporates" the former. In the Lectures on the Philosophy 
of Religion (1824) Hegel expresses this speculative relation in 
figurative terms as follows: "Christ has risen. Negation is 
thereby overcome, and the negation of negation is thus a 
moment in the divine nature" (LPR III: 220).
4/ Emil Fackenheim in The Religious Dimension in Hegel's 
Thought eloquently sums up Hegel's position on this point: 
"Philosophy cannot, next, accept a divine presence in the 
religious relation and yet simply reject religious 
representation. The religious content, while true, would 
reduce itself to the emphest of truths - a sheer empty 
Presence manifest in or to a sheer feeling equally empty. In 
Hegel's time, as in ours, demythologising philosophies sought 
simply to destroy myth and symbol. Hegel's own philosophy 
is not among these. In his view, myth and symbol do not 
cover but rather uncover religious truth.
5/ Cf: Peter Hodgson's editorial footnote to LPR III: 254-255 on 
Hegel's use of the expression "witness of Spirit":
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"The expression Zeugnis des Geistes contains an 
ambivalence or double meaning in Hegel. On the 
one hand, it can refer to the witness of the Holy 
Spirit or the Spirit of God by which authentic 
faith is awakened in human subjects; on the 
other hand, it can refer to the witness of our 
spirit to spirituell truth".
We find a similar "double meaning" mutatis mutandis in 
Levinas' notion of saying (le dire):
Infinity is not announced in the witness given as 
a theme. In a sign given to the other, by which I 
find myself tom up from the secrecy of Gyges, 
"taken by the hair" from the bottom of my 
obscurity in the saying without the said of 
sincerity, in my "here I am" from the first present 
in the accusative, I bear witness to the infinite. 
The infinite is not in front of its witness, but as it 
were outside, or on the "other side" of presence, 
already past, out of reach, a thought behind 
thoughts which is too lofty to push itself up 
front. "Here I Am, in the name of God" without 
referring myself directly to his presence. (OBBE 
149)
6/ LPR.III: 133: "Singularity exclusively is for others: (it is] 
immediacy and the return from the Other into itself. The 
singularity of the divine idea, the divine idea as one human 
being, is first brought to completion in actuality to the extent 
that it initially has many single individuals confronting it, 
whom it brings back into the community and therein it is 
[present] as actual, universal self-consciousness".
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CHAPTER THREE
GOOD INFINITY
In paragraph 801 of the final chapter of the Phenomenology. 
"Absolute Knowing", Hegel states:
Time Is the notion itself that is there and which presents 
itself to consciousness as empty intuition: for this reason 
spirit necessarily appears in time just so long as it has not 
grasped its pure notion, ie. it has not yet annulled time. 
[Phen. Para 801]
Four paragraphs later Hegel announces that Spirit has 
grasped its notion and time has been annulled. Accordingly, the 
Phenomenology is spoken of in the past tense; the ladder has done 
its work:
Whereas in the Phenomenology of Spirit each moment 
is the difference of knowledge and truth and is the 
movement in which the difference is cancelled, science 
on the other hand does not contain this difference and 
the cancelling of it. On the contrary, since the 
movement has the form of the notion, it unites the 
objective form of truth and the knowing of itself in an 
immediate unity. [Phen. Para 805]
In saying that time has been completed or annulled, Hegel is, 
of course, not claiming that it has come to a finish in the sense of 
reaching a determinate end or terminus: his conclusion is rather 
that the formative possibilities inherent in time and history have 
been conceptually comprehended in their totality, and, as a result, 
infinite otherness and time - the medium of the finite - are 
implicitly reconciled in absolute cognition.
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From a Hegelian point of view, "absolute knowing" - pure 
self-recognition in absolute otherness - transcends the "ontological 
difference" as formulated by Heidegger. 1/ That is to say, from a 
notional standpoint, the distinction drawn by the latter between 
being ÍSeinl and beings tSeiendesl corresponds to the logical 
difference between pure being or Becoming and its ontical 
differentiation in and through determinate negation. However, for 
Hegel, negativity is not the ultimate determinans. The absolute 
qua negatio negans "returns" into an infinite alterity beyond being 
and quantitatively determined time. In Being and Time. Heidegger 
maintains per contra that the notion of the infinite is parasitical on 
the primacy of the historicity of being. In Heidegger's own words: 
"only because primordial time is finite can 'derived' time 
temporalize itself as infinite".^/ On this basis, he later maintains 
that Hegel's absolute idea is an ontotheological concept that rests 
upon an inversion of authentic temporality: '"spirit' does not fall 
into time: but factical existence 'falls' as falling from primordial 
authentic temporality".3/ Heidegger contends that Hegel "levels 
o f f  time, reducing it to a formal dialectical model that conceives it 
in purely quantitative terms as something simply 'there' in the 
sense of being immediately "present to hand”. He concludes that 
Hegel's system represents the culmination of Western philosophy 
as a metaphysics of presence which understands the question of 
being and time in terms of the selfsameness of being and 
essence. 4/
Where does Levinas stand with respect to Heidegger's 
characterisation of Hegel's concept of time? Evidently, at one level, 
he simply carries over Heidegger's ontological interpretation of
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Hegel into his own work. Take, for example the following passage 
from OBBE:
For Sartre, as for Hegel, the oneself is posited on the 
basis of the for-itself. The identity of the I would thus 
be reducible to the turning back of essence upon itself. 
The I or oneself would seem to be its subject or 
conditions, the oneself taking on the figure of an entity 
among entities, would in turn be reducible to an 
abstraction from a concrete process of self- 
consciousness, or from the exposition of being in 
history, or in the stretching out of time, in which, 
across breaks and recoveries, being shows itself to 
itself. Time, essence as time, would be the absolute in 
return to itself. (OBBE 103)
Levinas attempt to couple Hegel with Sartre in this passage 
is instructive; for it shows that he extends Heidegger's 
characterisation of the tradition to include not only Hegel but also 
Sartre and indeed Heidegger himself. But this simply won't wash. 
For Sartre, in Chapter One of Being and Nothingness, explicitly 
contradistinguishes his own "Phenomenological Ontology" from 
Hegel's system: "when Hegel writes Being and Nothingness are 
empty abstractions and the one is empty as the other”, he forgets 
that emptiness is emptiness of something. Being is empty of all 
determination than identity with itself, but non-being is empty of 
being. In a word we must recall here against Hegel that being is 
and nothing is not."5/ Sartre then proceeds to commend
Heidegger's project of a fundamental ontology as a philosophical 
advance over Hegel's "logicist" interpretation of Being. Heidegger, 
he declares, "does not fall into the error of Hegel, viz "he does not 
preserve a being for non-being, not even abstract being, nothing is 
not; it nihilates itself."®/
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Sartre's analysis is clearly oriented by the substantialist 
interpretation of the Absolute Idea he inherited from Heidegger. 
Although it is indeed the case that Hegel in Chapter One of the 
Science of Logic, "Being", maintains that nothing is not the 
contradictory of being but its opposite, his point is not that being 
and non-being are identical but that they are ontologicallv 
correlative: being cannot be thought apart from non-being and 
vice-versa. It follows therefore that thought or the unity of being 
and nothing (ie becoming) is not reducible to either side of this 
ontological polarity. Furthermore, "becoming" in its externality, 7/ 
constitutes the relation between infinite alterity, or the 
extemalness o f the notion, and temporality in its immediacy, prior 
to all ontical determination. Therefore, in refusing to characterise 
non-being as pure nihilation Hegel is indicating that both being 
and nothing are relative to the pure transcendens of infinity. We 
see then that Hegel and Levinas stand on the same side of a 
philosophical divide that separates a philosophy of infinity from a 
philosophy of original finitude (represented inter alia by Heidegger, 
Sartre, Derrida, and Freud).
Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this study to offer a 
full defence of the interpretation set out above, since this would 
involve extensive reference to the whole of the Science of Logic. In 
lieu of this we shall follow in outline the movement from 
determinate being to the notion of the true infinite as set out by 
Hegel in Book One, Section One, Chapter Two of the Logic. This 
section presents, in the realm of immediacy, the essential moments 
o f the transitive relation between infinity and being, which is 
restated in all its concrete determinateness in the final chapter of
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the Logic on the Absolute Idea, (the speculative unity of being and 
essence). On this basis, we shall then proceed to show how 
Levinas' notion of diachrony falls within Hegel's concept of time.
When Hegel states therefore that Becoming is the unity of 
being and nothing, we see that the "is" in question is not reducible 
to the purely negative self-transition of the one term into the other, 
for this negative movement is inseparable from its non-negative 
return into "otherness". The end of the Logic is to render this 
element of otherness fully transparent to Thought. This 
constitutes the whole eros of the Logic (perverse as this sounds), 
which drives the Notion forward to its consummation in the 
Absolute Idea. The forward movement is equally a return to its 
ground since its result is the complete articulation of what has 
been presupposed all along, ie pure self-recognition in absolute 
otherness. The "identity" therefore that remains constant 
throughout the categorical transitions effected in the logical 
development is a dirempted concept which is the "unity" of the 
alterity and negativity or of the passive and active "dimensions" of 
thought when it is purely present to itself. Hence, the definition of 
the speculative Notion as the identity of identity and difference is a 
misnomer, for, strictly speaking, this is a Schellingian notion that 
is accounted for within the Logic of Essence. The true Notion, and 
this is made explicit in the conclusion of the Logic, is the identity 
and non-identity of identity and difference.®/ This abstract logical 
formulae is the essential basis of Hegel's ethical theory.
We take up our discussion of infinity at the point where 
Hegel introduces the notion of flnitude.®/ The category of flnltude
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is grounded in the idea of the limit fGrenze) which, in turn, is 
entailed by the notion of a "something". The "something" is the 
negative self-relation of a bearer and its quality: the something 
simply in itself is the other in its own self, since it is the "other" 
which provides it with its own limit (SZ 1 1 8 ). 10/ Hegel deepens 
this notion to show that "something" can only be said to be in itself 
insofar as it has returned into itself out of being-for-another. 
Insofar as the "something" is now defined as what is not it is open 
to external influences and therefore may be said to have a 
constitution. The constitution holds together two moments: on the 
one hand, it is the passive moment which defines what it is, and on 
the other hand it is the active determination iBestimmungl which 
defines not only what it is not, but also what it is not vet. In other 
words, the something has placed within itself a striving for its own 
nullification for "alternation is posited in the something" (SL 125). 
This is what finitude means.
In finitude the something and its limit are intrinsically 
interrelated. Every finite something fulfils its inner vocation at the 
moment it destroys itself and passes over into another something. 
Finite things are; but their self-relation is such that they are driven 
to transcend their own limit. The distinctive feature of a finite 
being as opposed to a mere something is that whereas the latter 
merely alters the former perishes. Finite beings:
... are, but the truth of this being is their end.
The finite not only alters, like something in 
general it ceases to be; and its ceasing to be is 
not only a possibility so that it could be without 
ceasing to be, but the being as such of finite 
things is to have the germ of decease as their 
being-within-self: their hour of their birth is the 
hour of their death. (SL 129)
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However, the very idea of the finite contains its opposite. 
Since it is an eternal truth that all finite things must pass away we 
have arrived at our first negative definition of infinity. For the 
thought of the transitory nature of all things is not itself transitory. 
This is the "justice" o f infinite being.
Yet, this notion of infinity is clearly conditioned by the notion 
of the finite to which it is opposed. This in turn produces the 
reflection that the infinite ought not be dependent on the finite, a 
reflection that is self-generated by the category of finitude moving 
beyond its own limit and this in turn gives rise to the notion that 
ceasing to be ought to cease to be. The notion that finitude itself 
ought to be cancelled therefore leads to the deduction of the first 
moral categories in the realm of Being. This is indicated within 
Hegel's deduction by a shift from the Idea of limit fGrenze) to that 
of limitation and the replacement of the notion of the just infinite 
by that of the Ought fSollen).
It is evident that this movement reflects, in historical terms, 
the shift from the philosophy of Kant to that of Fichte. 11 / The 
notion of limitation refers to the self-limitation of the Anstoss 
posited by the Infinite Ego. The activity of the Infinite Ego is 
checked and blocked by the wholly passive Anstoss. which is the 
result of the ego's self-posited act, reflected back into itself. 
Nonetheless to the extent that the ego requires an "other" for its 
own activity it is not completely independent. Thus the ego does 
not wholly determine the non-I but rather demands that it conform 
to the conditions of its self-legislated moral law. 12/ Though this is
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an infinite demand that can never be realised on account of the 
finitude of the subject, the ego must nevertheless not cease striving 
iStrebenl to accomplish it. Hegel believes he has here located the 
logical basis of the contradiction in the "moral point of view", which 
cannot be serious in its stated aim of eliminating heterononomy 
within the self, since if it were successful it would eliminate moral 
striving as such; hence it must a priori rule out the possibility of 
attaining ethical fulfilment. Accordingly, the infinite ought also 
remains conditioned by the finitude to which it is opposed. 
Therefore, the negation of the "just infinity" of transitoriness has 
led to the re-emergence of the finite in a new form: "Thus in ceasing 
to be, the finite has not ceased to be; it has become in the first 
instance another finite which, however, is equally a ceasing-to-be 
as a transition into another finite, and so on to infinity" (SL 136). 
Thus we arrive at Hegel's celebrated notion of the 'bad infinite'.
However, this bad infinity also harbours its own other within 
itself. The very alternation between ought and limitation coalesces 
into a unity which when negated through its own immanent 
development unites the finite with its own opposite and so 
demonstrates that the finite is In the infinite and not opposed to it. 
Again, in historical terms, this represents the development in 
German Idealism from Fichte to Schelling. Although we have 
arrived at the notion of the infinite qua infinite, it is a purely 
negative infinite, or an indeterminate void. Hegel notes that in 
relation to this negative infinite all determinations sire posited as 
varnished and sublated within it, hence this "affirmation as 
qualitative, is immediate self-relation, is being; and thus the 
infinite is reduced to the category of a being which has the finite
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confronting It as an other; Its negative nature is posited as simply 
affirmative hence as the first and immediate negation" (SL 139). In 
Christological terms this moment corresponds to the death of God, 
as it were, the Saturday between Good Friday and Easter Sunday.
However, this is not the true infinite, since it stands counter- 
posed to the totality of the finite. This in turn gives rise to a 
spurious infinity as Thought alternates between the idea of the 
infinite and the idea of the finite as two separate qualitatively 
distinct moments. Each therefore has the other in its own self and 
this entails that insofar as the infinite is a negation of the finite or 
the finite is a negation of the infinite, the finite reappears in the 
infinite itself as its other "because it is only in its connection with 
the other that the finite is” (SL 142). We see here that Hegel is as 
much opposed to the idea of there being a limit relating the infinite 
to the finite as Levinas. Hegel is quite explicit on this point with 
respect to the merely affirmative infinity; he states that "what we 
have here is an abstract transcending of a limit, a transcending 
which remains incomplete because it is not itself transcended" 
(Ibid). But how is it possible to transcend self-transcending 
limitation in order to arrive at the notion of a true or good infinite?
Hegel provides two clues to his answer to this question that 
are buried in the details of his deduction. First, he states that 
though the Understanding is satisfied with the resolution of the 
spurious infinity it remains nonetheless entangled in
"unreconciled, unresolved, absolute contradiction" (SL 139). Hegel 
immediately adds however, "it can only be brought to a 
consciousness of this fact by the contradictions into which it falls
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on every side when it ventures to apply and to explicate these its 
categories." In other words, it is through the experience of falling 
to ground of its own contradictions that consciousness may be 
brought into relation with the true nature of the infinite. Second, 
when detailing the bad faith of the proponents of the affirmative 
infinity, Hegel, and he has Schelling in mind, states that for them 
"This infinite has the fixed determination of a bevond which cannot 
be reached, for the very reason that it is not meant to be reached, 
because the determinateness of the beyond, of the affirmative 
negation is not let go" (SL 142). Entry into relation with the true 
infinite will therefore require an identification with absolute or 
affirmative negation, but equally it will be necessary to "let it go”.
Hegel goes on to anticipate Derrida's point that to state the 
infinite is already to flnitize it: 13/
In saving what the infinite is, namely the 
negation of the finite, the latter is itself included 
in what is said; it cannot be dispensed with for 
the definition or determination of the infinite.
One only needs to be aware of what one is saving 
in order to find the determination of the infinite 
in the finite. (SL 143)
But whereas Derrida reads the fact that the infinite can only 
be expressed as infinite in a univocal manner, Hegel notes the 
opposite also holds: we may equally say that the finite can be 
expressed as a negation of its own negation. The point is that both 
terms imply one another. If we say that the infinite is the negation 
of the finite then we have two flnites - the in-finite and the finite or 
a finltized infinite: conversely if we say that the infinite is a
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negative modification of the finite (which appears to be Derrida's 
position in VM) then we have an infinitized finite.
Hegel is not saying that there is a true infinite being 
somewhere beyond the oscillation between these two forms of 
infinity; on the contrary, his point is that the true infinite is in the 
movement between them. From a Hegelian point of view, Derrida’s 
claim that the very fact that the notion of the infinite can only be 
expressed in negative terms indicates the primacy of 'original 
flnitude' and appears as a prime example of the simple affirmative 
infinity outlined above. The 'notion' of differance - the 'middle 
voice' outside of passivity and activity, which may only signify itself 
as a trace of itself, corresponds in outline with the infinite 
withdrawal or "in-breathing" of spirit, symbolically witnessed as the 
death of God and logically accounted for as the 'infinitized finite'. 
Hegel contends that this "infinite" negative withdrawal from the 
finite necessarily bestows a determinateness on the negative pole of 
the relation. It is important to note that this 'determinateness' 
does not derive from the term of the relation - since ex hvpothesi it 
has no "term" - but from the relation itself.
Hegel's maintains that we must not stop at the negative pole 
and celebrate it as if it were the true infinity, as Derrida 
recommends in his essay on Differance. when he says of Differance 
that "we must affirm it - in the sense that Nietzsche brings 
affirmation into play - with a certain laughter and dance." 14/ On 
the contrary, the negative-pole must be negated in turn. But how 
is this negation to be accomplished? Are we required to trample all 
over those laughing, dancing, self-affirming beings?
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In fact, Hegel has in mind something far more peaceable. 
Hegel's point is that insofar as the self remains related to the 
negative it retains a negative relation to its own self. The final 
transition to the true infinite is accomplished when the self simply 
"lets go" of the negative ground of its own being. The subject which 
has come to identify its subjectivity with absolute negativity, and 
has thereby negated all determinateness, must now negate this 
negation. As Hegel expresses it:
It is therefore only negation which sublates itself 
in the negation. Thus infinity on its side is 
determined as the negative of flnitude, and 
hence of determinateness in general, as the 
empty beyond; the sublating of itself in the finite 
is trie return from an empty flight, a negation of 
the beyond which is in its own self a negative.
(SL 146)
The self by 'letting go' of its negative self-ground does not 
retreat back into determinate being, but rather opens itself to enter 
into "relation" with otherness in the negative. As a result, the 
contradiction between the infinite and the finite is resolved through 
"the negation of the qualitative determinateness of both" (SL 145), 
and the infinite is no longer beyond or outside the self, for: "it is 
and is there present before us" (SL 149). To borrow a phrase from 
Levinas we may say the self is now 'in' proximity to it. It is in this 
sense, and only this sense, that Hegel speaks of the infinite 
returning into itself and the straight line of infinity having been 
closed in a circle (Ibid).
How might we respond to a Derridean objection that 
Differance is outside of negativity as such, and hence to speak of
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negating it or "letting go" etc., is pure nonsense since all such 
'logical' operations presuppose and reproduce it? Of course, at this 
level of metaphysical rarefaction there is simply no non question­
begging way of conclusively deciding between these two points of 
view. We can only proffer two reasons why we think it is necessary 
to consider the Hegelian notion of the true infinity primary: First, 
Hegel's statement that any assertion to the effect that a limitation 
cannot be transcended is self-refuting since any one who makes it 
must "be unaware that the very fact that something is determined 
as a limitation implies that the limitation is already transcended" 
(SL 134) is not merely a formed truism. Reason is not satisfied 
until it has thought itself through to its end. Hegel’s 
understanding of the infinite is more intellectually fulfilling since it 
has the virtue of completeness. Second, Hegel's understanding of 
the infinite is to be preferred because of the ethical and practical 
implications that follow from it, which we shall consider at length 
in part two of this study.
The relationship of infinity to being is concretely experienced 
in time. It is in this sense that Hegel terms time the Other-of-the- 
Notion. The isomorphism between the Logic and the Philosophy of 
Nature can be seen in the juxtaposition of the following two 
statements: in the Logic Hegel states that being and nothing are 
the unity of becoming, and adds:
But in so far as being and nothing, each 
unseparated from its other, is. each is not. They 
are therefore in this unity but only as vanishing, 
sublated moments. (SL 105)
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In Paragraph 258 of the Encyclopaedia, where time Is 
referred to as "Intuited becoming" we find this parallel statement:
In it is the being which, in that it is, is not, and 
in that it is not, is.
In the Zusatz to the same Paragraph, Hegel further adds that 
time "is the pure form of sensibility or intuition, it is the insensible 
factor in sensibility" (Ibid). This conforms to Levinas' notion of time 
as a "passive synthesis" (OBBE 52).
Time then is the externalized equivalent to the moment of 
becoming in its pure immediacy. It is not a 'container', according 
to Hegel, in the Kantian sense: it is rather the element of life, "The 
Chronus which engenders all and destroys that to which it gives 
birth" (Ibid). Time therefore is in Hegel's words "the existent Notion 
itself' (PhSp Preface para. 46). However, we may see from our 
account of the Notion set out above, that Kojeve is misinterpreting 
Hegel when he reads this statement to mean that the Notion and 
time are identical. *5/ Hegel is quite explicit on this point, for he 
defines the Concept as the 'power over time':
Spirit is above time, because it is in itself the 
Notion of time in and for itself, it is the eternal 
unbreached by time. (Ibid)
The Notion as the power over time is the absolute present 
which is progressively concretized, in accordance with the 
enrichment of pure externality in and through its immanent 
development in the immediate and reflective forms of nature and 
spirit.16/ But it is vital to note that the 'absolute present' is itself
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dirempted into a transcendent and immanent pole: into pure 
alterity and non-quantitative temporality.
Hegel states the relation between the absolute present and 
temporality as follows:
Eternity lEwigkeitl is not before or after time, it 
is prior to the creation of the world, nor is it 
sequel to its disappearance, it is the absolute
i»resent, the now, and it has no before or after.Ibid)
This reference to "Eternity" lends credence to Heidegger's 
contention that Hegel's system is the culmination of ontotheological 
tradition that interprets the "present”: as a nunc stans. But as we 
have seen Hegel's notion of the present (Gegenwart) is nothing of 
the sort. Ironically, Marcuse while still studying with Heidegger 
was one of the earliest Hegel scholars to pick up on this. In his 
early works on Hegel's ontology, Marcuse cites the following lines 
from Paragraph 258 in which Hegel states that the Idea in time 
though "inherently a process, it is not within the process, it 
contains its double aspect, as in itself without process" and then 
astutely adds that the Idea "is without process (prozesslos) ... 
Precisely because it is alive only as process, it is without process, 
that is to say, it will not become 'part' of the process." 17/ This 
directly contradicts Kojeve and is much closer to Hegel's 
meaning. 1®/ In other words, the absolute present is not a fixed 
instant above time; it is 'co-terminus' with temporality but not 
identical to it. However, Marcuse, in his desire to assimilate Hegel 
to a compound of Dilthey and Heidegger, failed to take account of 
the non-negative dimension of Hegel's notion o f the "now”.
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For Hegel then, time in its pure externality is both Other 
than-the-Notion, and contrary to what Heidegger says, not-vet 
sublated in quantitative duration; that is to say, it initially remains 
outside the 'orbit' of reciprocity and opposition. It is therefore 
evident that notwithstanding the fact that Levinas follows 
Heidegger in his overt characterisation of Hegel's concept of time, 
his own notion of diachrony is essentially congruent with Hegel's 
basic understanding of the nature of temporality.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1/ Martin Heidegger. Being and Time. Translated by John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983) 
Section 4.
2/ Ibid. Section 331.
3/ Ibid. Section 436.
4/ Werner Marx Heidegger and the Tradition. Translated by 
Theodore Wesel and Murray Greene. (Evanson, Illinois. 
Northwestern University Press 1971).
5/ John Paul Sartre. Being and Nothingness. An Essay in 
Phenomenological Ontology. Translated by Hazel Bames 
(London, Methuen, 1968) Introduction p. 15.
6/ Ibid.
7/ ie in nature.
8/ In the final chapter of the Science of Logic The Absolute Idea. 
Hegel sums up the whole preceding development of the Logic. 
Formal thinking, he contends, can only get as far as thinking 
the relation of the infinite to the finite in a one-sided fashion. 
Thus it asserts the proposition that the infinite is the finite 
and thereby neglects the sense in which the infinite is not 
the finite; or else it falls into the opposite error of
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maintaining that the finite is the infinite (ie in-finite). 
Speculative thinking, however, stays with the contradiction 
and thinks the contradiction. In this way, it discovers that 
the negative of the infinite is not simply the negative but "the 
negative of the negative" and is therefore "as contradiction, 
the posited dialectic of itself’ (SL 835). The result is that we 
arrive at the first immediate universal or the "turning point of 
the movement of the Notion" (Ibid). Now this first negative is 
not an immanent substance - subject. This would be to 
hypostatise the Idea. It is rather the unity of absolute 
otherness and absolute negativity or the sublation of the 
Notion and Object. The second negative, the negative o f the 
negative (the synthetic moment) is the otherness of the 
Other: life and spirit, in and “through which a subject, a 
person, a free being, exists” (SL 836).
We find confirmation of our interpretation in the following 
passage:
In this turning point of method, the course of 
cognition at the same time returns into itself. As 
seif-sublating contradiction this negation is the 
restoration of the first immediacy of simple 
universality; for the other of the other, the 
negative of the negative, is immediately the 
positive, the identical, the universal  If one 
insists on counting this second immediate is, in 
the course of the method as a whole, the third 
term to the first immediate and the mediated. It 
is also, however, the third term to the first or 
formal negative, and to absolute negativity or the 
second negative: now as the first negative is 
already the second term, the term reckoned as 
third can also be reckoned as fourth, and 
instead of a tripllcitv. the abstract form may be 
taken as quadruplicltv: in this wav, the negative 
or difference is counted as a duality. The third 
or fourth is in general the unity of the first and
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second moments, of the immediate and the 
mediated. (SL 836)
This is to say, the negation of the finite and its "return" to the 
infinite constitutes a "second immediate". But this second 
immediate, as the third term to infinite otherness and its 
negation, is equally the unity of these two antecedent 
moments. Since it is only in this third term that absolute 
alterity and finitude obtain their completion it may equally be 
said to be the first term upon which the two prior moments 
are predicated. However, this restoration of the first 
immediate, precisely because it represents the unity of 
absolute alterity and negative abstraction, is itself dirempted 
into a moment of identity and a moment of non-identity. 
Thus it may be reckoned as the "fourth term" which 
constitutes the identity (absolute alterity) and non-identity 
(absolute negativity) of identity (being) and difference 
(nothingness). Hence, the negative or difference is counted 
as a "duality": once as the Other to absolute alterity and once 
as the Other to pure being.
Slavoy éièek in For they know not what they do. Enjoyment 
as a political factor maintains, quite rightly in our view, that 
the moment of "non-dialecticisable excess" - posited, in 
different guises, by a variety of postmoden thinkers - far from 
eluding the system is in fact a crucial aspect of "(its) very 
dialectical movement" (P. 179): for the "moments of this 
process could be counted as three or four, with the subject 
as the surplus-moment which 'counts for nothing"' (p. 180). 
However, éièek's Lacanlan perspective leads him to interpret
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this "surplus moment" in a one-sided fashion as the "excess 
of the pure nothingness of self-relating negativity" (p. 179) 
thereby ignoring Hegel's corresponding stress on pure 
alterity.
9/ The following discussion of Book One. Section One. Chapter 
Two of the Science of Logic "Determinate Being" is indebted 
to Piotr Hoffman's study Violence in Modem Philosophy 
(Chicago and London. University of Chicago Press 1989), 
particularly Chapter II Section II.
10/ Jacques Derrida in "Violence and Metaphysics: an Essay in 
the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas" in Writing and Difference 
translated and introduced by Alan Bass (London, Routledge 
1990) mobilises this section of the Logic against Levinas as 
follows. Speaking in the name of Parmenides Derrida states
(p. 126):
"(1) The infinitely other, he would say perhaps, 
can be what it is only if it is other, that is other 
than. Other than must be other than myself. 
Henceforth, it is no longer absolved of a relation 
to an ego. Therefore, it is no longer infinitely, 
absolutely other. It is no longer what it is. If it 
was absolved, it would not be the other either, 
but the same. (2) The infinitely other - cannot 
be what it is - infinitely other - except by being 
absolutely not the same. That is, in particular, 
by being other than itself (non ego). Being other 
than itself, it is not what it is. Therefore, it is not 
infinitely other etc."
However, Derrida homogenises the movement of the Notion 
in Hegel's Logic by reading the co-determination of the 
something and the other in "Determinate Being" as
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paradigmatic of its entire development. Derrida therefore 
fails to see that the negation of being in essence is quite 
distinct from the determinate negation of something by its 
other; and that the negation of essence in the Notion stands 
at an even greater remove still. Consequently, he is led to 
misunderstand the infinite - finite relation in Hegel's thought 
as resting on an ontological continuity between the two 
"terms" of this relation, as is evidenced in his critique of 
Levinas from a soi-disant Hegelian standpoint:
The "False-inflnity", a Hegelian expression which 
Levinas never uses, nevertheless seems to us, 
perhaps because it is Hegelian, to haunt 
numerous gestures of denunciation in Totality 
and Infinity. As it was for Hegel, the 'False- 
inflnity for Levinas would be the indefinite, 
negative form of infinity. But since Levinas 
conceives true alterity as nonnegativity 
(nonnegative transcendence), he can make the 
other the true infinity, and make the same (in 
strange complicity with negativity) the false 
infinity. Which would have seemed absolutely 
mad to Hegel (and to all the metaphysics 
expanded and rethought in him): how can 
alterity be separated from negativity, how can 
alterity be separated from the "false infinity"? Or 
inversely, how could absolute sameness not be 
infinity' (p. 119).
In this passage, Derrida, in the name of Hegel, subjects 
Levinas to a merely dialectical criticism. Thus he simply 
begs the question against Levinas by a priori denying the 
possibility of a me-ontology while, at the same time, reducing 
Hegel's speculative discourse to the standpoint of a 
philosophy of reflection. It is precisely because Hegel's 
speculative logic sublates dialectics that it is able to directly 
engage with Levinas' philosophy and subject it to a genuinely 
Immanent critique.
84
11/ SL 136: "The philosophy of Kant and Fichte sets up the 
ought as the highest point of the resolution of the 
contradictions of Reason; but the truth is that the ought Is 
only the show point which clings to flnitude and thus to 
contradiction."
12/ Fichte The Science of Knowledge. Editor and translated by 
Peter Heath and John Sachs Cambridge. Cambridge 
University Press 1982 p. 191: "The check (Anstoss) 
(unposited by the positing self) occurs to the self insofar as it 
is active, and thus is only a check (Anstossl insofar as there 
is activity in the self; its possibility is conditioned upon the 
seifs activity: no activity of the self, no check." For a 
commentary on Fichte's notion of Anstoss see Frederick 
Neuhouser Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge. 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 49-53. Levinas 
explicitly distances himself from Fichte in OBBE when he 
refuses the notion that "all suffering due to the action of the 
non-ego is first a positing of this action of the non-ego by the 
ego" (OBBE 123-24). Robert R. Williams's stimulating 
attempt to demonstrate a Fichtean dimension in Levinas' 
thought (cf: Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other. 
(New York, State University of New York, 1992) is ultimately 
unconvincing to the extent that it relies on interpreting 
Levinas' philosophy of ethical transcendence as a 
transcendental ethical philosophy. Hegel's full immanent 
critique of the Fichtean standpoint is executed in the
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"Doctrine of Essence". Chapter One. "Illusory Being." (See 
Gillian Rose Hegel Contra Sociology pp. 192-196).
13/ Jacques Derrida in "Violence and Metaphysics" p. 114 
attempts to impale Levinas on the following contradiction: 
either the absolutely Other is absolutely Other, in which case 
nothing can be said of it, or else something can be said of it, 
in which case it is not absolutely Other. He concludes from 
this that "Infinity cannot be understood as Other except in 
the form of the in-finite" (Ibid) and, later, "Infinite alterity as 
death cannot be reconciled with infinite alterity as positivity 
and presence (God). Metaphysical transcendence cannot be 
at once transcendence towards the other as Death and 
transcendence towards the other as God" (Ibid p. 114). Here 
Derrida loads the argument by construing infinite alterity as 
determinate positivity and determinate presence. Yet his 
own notion of differance brings him to the threshold of 
conceiving an indeterminate, nonnegative "presence" bevond 
absolute negativity; a possibility he attempts dogmatically to 
exclude by identifying absolute negativity (Death) with 
infinite alterity.
14/ Jacques Derrida "Differance" pp. 129-160 in Speech and 
Phenomena and Other Essays on Hussel's Theory of Signs 
translated with an Introduction by David B. Allison. 
(Evanston. III. Northwestern University Press. 1973) The 
full quotation reads as follows:
"There will be no unique name, not even the
name of Being. It must be conceived without
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nostalgia: that is it must be conceived outside 
the myth of the purely maternal or paternal 
language belonging to the lost fatherland of 
thought. On the contrary, we must affirm it - in 
the sense that Nietzsche brings affirmation into 
play - with a certain laughter and with a certain 
dance" (p. 159).
15/ Alexander Kojeve. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel 
editor A. Bloom. (New York and London - Basic Books 1969) 
p. 154.
16/ It is crucial to note that for Hegel power IMachtl denotes a 
nonviolent relation to otherness. To illustrate this we cite the 
following passage from the Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Religion where Hegel draws a distinction between power 
IMachtl and Force IGewaltl as the difference between genuine 
faith based on freedom and mere belief based on positive 
evidence. His cue is a discussion of the spiritual veracity of 
miracles:
It is the Spirit (that verifies) the power (machtl of 
the Spirit, by its truth as Spirit over Spirit. [It is 
the genuine force over spirit ie a power by which 
there is left to spirit all its freedom). Miracles is 
merely a force (Gewaltl over natural connections 
and hence only a force exerted on the 
consciousness that is bounded within the 
consciousness of these limited causal 
connections. [LPR III: 146)
17/ Herbert Marcuse. Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of 
Historicity. (Cambridge. M.I.T. Press, 1987) pp. 149-150.
18/ For an interpretation closer to Hegel's self-understanding of 
the relationship between the Concept and time see John 
Burbidge "Concept and Time in Hegel" in Hegel on Logic and
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Religion: The Reasonableness of Christianity (New York. 
State University of New York Press, 1992) Chapter VIII.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ABSOLUTE RECOGNITION
We noted above that in the Spirit of Christianity and its Fate. 
Hegel makes a distinction between punishment incurred by Fate 
and punishment occasioned by the transgression of the penal law, 
viz, that with respect to the law of Fate the deed creates the law in 
the sense that it is "caused by guilt without a crime" (ETW 232), 
whereas in the case of a merely human misdemeanour, the 
imposition of a legal penalty creates (or universalizes) the deed. We 
also noted that this distinction between fate and law corresponds 
to two different temporal orders: the 'orbit' of infinite life and the 
'orbit' of real events.
As said, Hegel, in the Spirit of Christianity maintains that 
whereas the penal law may "correct" the transgression that 
occasioned it, such that the trespass will then be "forgotten", it 
does not have the power to expunge the deed, and hence the 
offender will continue to suffer with a bad conscience and may 
even commit further crimes in order to atone for an all-consuming 
sense of guilt. On the other hand, a transgression against fate is 
an injury to life and "life can heal its wounds again" (ETW 230). 
Hence, although atonement for a fatal injury against life requires 
the paradoxical "cancellation of annihilation" (Ibid) it is nonetheless 
possible to expiate and be forgiven for this offence; whereas it is 
impossible to reverse a single deed qua empirical event. However, 
if life is forgiven then the memory of the empirical deed will lose its 
power to oppress.
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Hegel maintains that when the self knows Itself to be in a 
primordial state of bad conscience: "then the workings of his fate 
commences, and this feeling of a life disrupted must become a 
longing for what has been lost. This deficiency is recognised as 
part of himself, as what was to have been in him and is not" (ETW 
230-231). Now it might appear from this statement that Hegel is 
subscribing to a version of the myth of Aristophanes of which 
Levinas is consistently critical.1 / Hegel explicitly precludes such 
an interpretation by immediately adding:
This lack is not a not-being but is life known and 
felt as not-being. (ETW 231)
The kind of self-knowledge that Hegel has in mind in regard 
to the commencement of fate is the same as that which Levinas 
speaks of in TI with respect to the transition from enjoyment to 
work and representation. The I attains an inchoate recognition of 
itself qua I through its initial encounter with the strange otherness 
of the other. Therefore, Hegel is making essentially the same 
distinction Levinas draws between Desire and need (TI 34). The 
Desire for the absolutely other is predicated upon a subject which 
having satisfied all its material needs and so accomplished a 
condition of self-sufficiency, is propelled further to seek an 
absolute recognition of its selfhood.
These parallels between Hegel and Levinas are not so 
surprising in view of the fact that the deduction of the "Interiority”, 
or the 'pre-ethical prerequisites o f the ethical relation' in TI, is 
modelled on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. In TI, the subject-in-
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enjoyment or "atheist will", is broken from its Edenic world by a 
Desire for-the-other beyond material satisfaction and by the threat 
of the there is. Although Levinas holds these two "phenomena" 
analytically apart, they evidently form a compound. Moreover it is 
clear that this episode in TI represents Levinas' re-telling of the 
transition from Desire to self-consciousness via the master-slave 
dialectic set out in the Phenomenology. We shall return to this 
theme in Part Two. Here we shall concentrate on outlining Hegel's 
account of the transition from desire to absolute knowing.
In the Phenomenology Hegel introduces the concept of desire 
in the first part of the section "self-consciousness". The preceding 
section Consciousness deals with the movement of theoretical 
consciousness from sense-certainty' to 'perception' to its 
conclusion in 'Force and Understanding’. This culminates in the 
inversion of the inverted world and the 'inclusion' of both the 
sensible and the supersensible world in the Notion of 'Infinity'. We 
know from our interpretation of the notion of the true infinite 
above, that infinity here does not signify a pure immanence but, 
the holding together of absolute otherness and absolute negativity 
in relation to the totality of immediate and reflected 
determinations. As such, infinity equals infinite-life, and the 
transition from consciousness to self-consciousness is equally the 
transition from the theoretical notion of the Infinite to its practical 
embodiment in concrete existence.
Life in its immediate mode is pure time Itself, which unfolds 
as the pure restless self-moving process of the coming to be and 
ceasing to be of living things. Life simply is the separation of
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organic nature from inorganic nature and the cancellation of this 
separation ad infinitum. Levinas follows Hegel here, as in much 
else in TI, when he states that the lived duality of the body consists 
in a simultaneous distance from and immersion in the elements 
which he describes as a "mastery in dependence" (TI 114). 
Furthermore, both Hegel and Levinas stress the anteriority of being 
to reflection. Levinas' critique of the Husserlian notion of 
constitution is parallel with Hegel's description of Kant’s critical 
philosophy as a "subjective idealism".2/
In the Phenomenology. Hegel shows how the alternating 
process of alimentation gives rise to a rudimentary consciousness 
that comes to see the other as an independent being standing over 
and against itself. In accordance with the logical movement the 
first self consciousness emerges which knows itself as the other to 
its other. From thence there is a further transition through which 
this minimally self-conscious being is led to find satisfaction in 
another self-conscious being, rather than in a merely inanimate 
object. This sets the stage for the celebrated master-slave dialectic.
Hegel beings his discussion of the struggle for recognition by 
first stating the optimal conditions for mutual recognition in order 
to underline the distorted and one-sided nature of the recognition 
that results from the initial "trial by death". An individual self- 
consciousness may only attain to independence through another 
self-consciousness when both self-consciousness's in question 
"recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another" (PhSp 
Para. 184). Hegel therefore implies that genuine mutual 
recognition is only possible when an individual self-consciousness
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is capable of acting on principles that Eire universally valid for all. 
This in turn presupposes a community of persons based on 
relations of abstract right. Now Hegel makes it clear that in the 
original struggle for recognition these conditions do not remotely 
appertain. Here two individuals confront each other who have "not 
yet accomplished the movement of absolute abstraction, of effacing 
all immediate being" (Phen. Para. 185). The immediate form of 
recognition requires that self-consciousness be for the other what 
the other is for it, and this entails a further double development, an 
action on its own part and an action on the part of the other. The 
action required from the other is that the other seek its death; and 
the action necessary on its own part is that it be prepared to stake 
its own life.
It is the moment of intentionality involved in the duel which 
is all-important. It is absolutely necessary that the death of the 
other be willed. It is this irreducible intent that breaks the cycle of 
the natural process by introducing absolute negativity into the 
realm of infinite life. Levinas makes essentially the same point 
when he states that "The Other is the sole being I can wish to kill" 
(T1 198). It is precisely because self-consciousness has staked its 
own life and has thereby transcended all its natural 
determinations, that it can find no satisfaction from simply killing 
the other, for it would then still be related to the other qua natural 
being, and not qua self-consciousness. The same reasoning lies at 
the basis of Levinas' seemingly paradoxical statement that murder 
is an ethical impossibility.^/ The simply "abstract" negation of the 
other, would in a strange sense, leave the resistance of the other's 
will absolutely inviolate. It is this non-violated will that returns in
9 3
the negation to haunt the homicide. The desired outcome of the 
struggle for recognition therefore is that the other not succumb to 
an external negation but "carry out the negation in itself' (Phen 
Para. 175). This is the truth of Levinas' perspicacious remarks on 
the nature of hatred:
Hatred does not always desire the death of the 
Other, or at least it desires the death of the 
Other only in Inflicting this death as a supreme 
suffering. The one who hates seeks to be the 
cause of the suffering to which the despised 
must bear witness. To inflict suffering is not to 
reduce the Other to the rank of an object, but on 
the contrary to maintain him superbly in his 
subjectivity. In suffering the subject must know 
his reification, but in order to do so he must 
precisely remain a subject. Hatred wills both 
things. Whence the insatiable character of 
hatred; it is satisfied precisely when it is not 
satisfied, since the Other satisfies it only by 
becoming an object, but it can never become 
object enough, since at the same time as its fall, 
its lucidity and witness are demanded. In this 
lies the logical absurdity of hatred. (TI 239)
Hegel gives no details of the actual combat between the two 
self-consciousness' but the outcome is evident: the victorious 
consciousness enslaves the vanquished self-consciousness. The 
latter chooses enthralldom to death.4/ In this sense, the master is 
the personification of death while the slave may be said to be the 
personification of life or creation. However, in the course of the 
combat both master and slave have negated the sphere of natural 
immediacy. Even in their initial state master and slave constitute 
an unacknowledged unity of opposites; and this eventually 
becomes transparent as these two states of activity and passivity 
are transmuted in the course of the phenomenological Journey 
through Spirit.
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Hegel maintains that the asymmetry of the master-slave 
relation entails that, on the one hand, the master receives no 
recognition in the slave, since the latter is a total dependent, and, 
on the other, that the slave evidently receives no recognition by the 
master, nor does it receive any satisfaction in its work, since it is 
alienated from it. However, despite the fact that there is no 
genuine intersubjective recognition between the master and the 
slave, there is nonetheless an important relation of non­
recognition. For the slave embodies the truth of the antecedent 
struggle to the death:
For the consciousness has been fearful, not of 
this or that particular thing, or just odd 
moments, but its whole being has been seized 
with dread: for it has experienced death the 
Absolute Lord. (Phen. Para 194)
In this absolute experience it discovers the basis of its own 
subjectivity in absolute negativity: for it has been "quite 
unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being, and everything 
solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations" (Ibid). 
Furthermore, the slave in its service to the master, through work, 
and specifically through fabrication, continually re-enacts this 
liberation from elementad life. The master, on the other hand, 
sinks back into a natural existence insofar as it merely lives to 
consume the produce of the slave in a life of enjoyment and 
pleasure, and so loses its consciousness of absolute fear.
In work, the slave's negative relation to the object, which is 
externalized and set over and against it, gradually replaces its 
dependence upon the master. The slave becomes aware that its
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"being-for-self' as absolute negativity is not deposited in the 
master, but belongs to itself, precisely at the moment when it 
ceases regarding its work as simply as alienation of its labour and 
comes to see it as the self-expression of its own essential 
subjectivity.
However, the emancipated slave must not simply 'forget' its 
existential relation to absolute negativity. As Hegel expresses it:
If consciousness fashions the thing without that 
initial absolute fear, it is only an empty self- 
centred attitude: for its form or negativity is not 
negativity per se and therefore its formative 
activity cannot give itself consciousness of itself 
as essential being. (Phen. Para 196)
Hegel's point here is that freedom cannot be attained 
through work alone. Although work is absolutely essential for the 
emancipation of self-consciousness from servitude and for the 
attainment of conditions that will enable reciprocal and genuine 
mutual recognition, the accomplishment of freedom in addition 
requires an absolute recognition not merely qua person but also 
qua "essential being" or self. However, to receive absolute 
recognition it is necessary first to be recognised as a person. The 
individual, then, must, as it were, internalize the 'master' and 
make it into an integral part of its own subjectivity:^/ and having 
attained this universal self must then "let go", and thus be 
reconciled with the Other (the power over life and death).
We noted above that the 'lack' to which the subject is 
responding under the law of Fate is not a finite but an infinite
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desideratum. Hence reconciliation with the Other is equally an 
absolute self-recognition:
In fate, however, the man recognizes his own life 
and his supplication to it is not a supplication to 
a lord but a reversion and approach to himself.
(ETW 231)
To have felt the insufficiency of life is quite a different fear to 
the fear of (penal) punishment: "The former is fear of a separation, 
an awe of one's self: fear of punishment is fear of something alien" 
(Ibid). It is one's response to this former fear that established one's 
fate.
Indeed the whole of the Phenomenology of Spirit may be read 
as so many ideal-typical responses to the law of fate. The master- 
slave dialectic only represents an initial rejoinder. Its conclusion is 
enacted in the final section of Spirit: "Conscience, the beautiful 
soul, evil and its forgiveness". We will not attempt a full analysis 
here, but simply detail its essential continuity with the Spirit of 
Christianity.
The notion of self-certain conscience develops in opposition 
to the formed Kantian moralist. Conscience does not need to 
universalize its maxims since it knows itself already as a universal 
self. To the universal moral point of view this represents a hubris 
that can only be accounted for by self-interested motives. By the 
judgement of universal morality is hypocritical in this respect since 
its condemnation of the noble active conscience is motivated by an 
embarrassment that its own failure to act is being thrown into 
sharp relief. Conscience finally confesses its imperfections and
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weaknesses, but this is not reciprocated on the part of the hard 
hearted judge. In despair, conscience withdraws into itself, 
renounces the world and suffers the fate of a "beautiful soul". But 
its infinite withdrawal from the world only brings destruction upon 
itself and it "pines away" in delirium and "yearning". In the Spirit 
of Christianity this whole dialectic is played out in terms of a 
contrast between the Pharisees and the moral teachings of Jesus, 
with this important difference: in the early work Jesus is presented 
as the original beautiful soul, who isolates himself from life and 
hence wills the fate of his own death, so that the promise of the 
reconciliation with life remains unfulfilled; in the Phenomenology 
however the confession of the beautiful soul is eventually matched 
by the judging consciousness, with the result that:
The breaking of the hard heart and the raising of 
it to universality, is the same movement which 
was expressed in the consciousness that made 
confession of itself. The wounds of the spirit 
heal and leave no scars behind. (Phen. Para 
669)
This confirms that "Spirit" is lord and master over every deed 
and actuality, and can cast them off and make them as they never 
happened" (Phen. Para 668). Finally, the mutual confession of the 
beautiful soul and judging consciousness reveals the absolutely 
Other:
The reconciling Yea in which the two Ts let go 
their antithetical existence, is the existence of 
the T  which has expounded into a duality, and 
therein remains identical with itself, and it its 
complete extemalization and opposite, possesses 
the certainty of itself: it is God manifested in the 
midst of those who know themselves in the form 
of pure knowledge. (Phen. Para 671)
9 8
Hegel never subsequently abandoned this standpoint. We 
find essentially the same stated in his 1827 Lectures on the 
Consummate Religion:
It is characteristic of the region of flnitude that 
all individuals remain what they are. If they 
have done evil then they are evil: evil is in them 
as their quality. But already in the sphere of 
morality, and still more that of religion, spirit is 
known to be free, to be affirmative with itself, so 
that its limitation, which extends to evil, is a 
nullity for the infinitude of spirit. Spirit can 
undo what has been done. The action certainly 
remains in the memory, but Spirit strips it away. 
(LPR III: 324-325)
Hegel states, then, that in the realm of flnitude the doctiine 
of moral imputation holds according to which individuals may be 
held accountable only for their intended actions, but in the realm 
of 'infinitude', no such restriction applies.
If we turn once again to Levinas we find mutatis mutandis a 
similar formulation of the nature of pardon:
The paradox of pardon lies in its retroaction: 
from the point of view of common time it 
represents an inversion of the natural order of 
things. It involves several aspects. Pardon 
refers to the instant elapsed; it permits the 
subject who had committed himself in a past 
instant to be as though the past instant had not
{>assed on. Active in a stranger sense than orgetting, which does not concern the reality of 
the offence forgotten, pardon acts upon the past, 
somehow respects the event, purifying it. But in 
addition, forgetting nullifies the relations with 
the past, whereas pardon conserves the past 
pardoned in the purified present. (XI 283)
To conclude our present discussion we shall relate the 
reflections set out above on Freud's account of the aetiology of
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moral masochism to Hegel's, as it were, phenomenological 
deduction of conscience. This will then set the stage for a direct 
encounter between Hegel's and Levinas' concept of the ethical. To 
summarize our previous interpretation, we recall that Freud 
maintained that the formation of the superego resulted from a 
projection of libidinal energy, cathected with the death instinct, 
onto the parental other, and the subsequent introversion of this 
self-externalized drive in the form of a tyrannical conscience. This 
manifests itself as a soi-disant 'unconscious sense of guilt' which is 
in fact a need for punishment. Self-induced affliction represents 
the only form of relief the subject is able to obtain from the 
otherwise unbearable anxiety produced by the lived contradiction 
which constitutes its psychic economy, namely, that the direct 
expression of its most basic drives is pari passu an indirect form of 
auto-violence. Moral masochism is merely the most refined and 
devious form that this self-torture may take.
However, it would be by no means far-fetched to consider 
Hegel as a forerunner of Freud. Hegel was one of the first 
philosophers to understand the destructive capacity inherent in am 
overactive superego. His whole philosophy of freedom and 
redemption is bound up with the idea of stating the conditions for 
an ethical release from the enforced servitude of an over- 
scrupulous conscience, both from its inner bondage and from its 
external projection in the form of the moral violences of 
sanctimoniousness, hypocrisy, hard-hearted judgement and self- 
righteousness. Hegel's "genealogy of morals” is wider in extent that 
Freud's and more radical in terms of its proposals for transcending 
the "moral point of view".
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We argued above that Hegel held to the view that as a result 
of a primed transgression against infinite-life or the Other, the 
immediate self emerged as, on the one hand, other-to-inflnite life, 
and on the other hand, other-to-determinate being in the world of 
"real events and oppositions". This is confirmed by the following 
extract from the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion which take 
the form of a speculative commentary on the myth of the fall:
On the one hand, it is the antithesis of evil as 
such, the fact that it is humanity itself that is 
evil: this is the antithesis vis-a-vis God. On the 
other hand, it is the antithesis vis-a-vis the 
world, the fact that humanity exists in a state of 
rupture from the world: this is unhappiness or 
misery, the cleavage viewed from the other side.
(LPR III: 447)
Hegel is here essentially restating his contention first 
outlined in the Spirit of Christianity that the primal transgression 
establishes a "causality of fate". As Hegel expresses it in the earlier 
work "A fate appears to arise only through another's deed; but this 
is only the occasion of fate. What really produces it is the manner 
of receiving and reacting against the other’s deed" (ETW 233). In 
the Philosophy of Religion Hegel announces two basic reactions to 
the original transgression, which all subsequent forms of moral 
consciousness may be referred:
The first reaction and self-chosen fate is one that seeks to 
atone for the infinite anguish of being posited as the antithesis of 
God by an acknowledgement that the one's own self is 
fundamentally evil, and to seek to repent for this in a life devoted to 
moral purity, self-humiliation and remorse. The second reaction
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and assumed fate Is a response on the part of the subject not to 
the anguish of separation from God, but to the fact of being-posited 
in antithesis to the world: this response takes the form of 
withdrawal into self, and results in an affirmation of the essential 
nothingness of its own subjectivity, since it defines itself over and 
against all the attributes and determinations which may potentially 
be predicated of it.
For Freud, the moral neurotic is simply providing itself with 
a rationale to satisfy its subconscious need for punishment by 
inducing itself to believe that it has committed serious 
transgressions in regard to trivial matters, or by actually engaging 
in crime to incur guilt and so find an object for its anxiety. On this 
account the real source of the neurotic's behaviour may be traced 
to an unresolved Oedipal complex. Hegel has provided one of the 
most vivid descriptions of such a self-mortifying subject in his 
description of the "Unhappy Consciousness", which has, ditto 
Freud, dispossessed itself of its own desire by projecting it onto an 
Unchangeable beyond and internalizing it as a hostile censor 
within itself:
Consciousness is aware of itself as this actual 
individual in the animal functions. These are no 
longer performed naturally and without 
embarrassment, as matters trifling in themselves 
which cannot possess any importance or 
essential significance for Spirit; instead, since it 
is in them that the enemy reveals itself in his 
characteristic shape they sire rather the object of 
serious endeavour, and become precisely 
matters of the utmost importance. This enemy, 
however, renews himself in his defeat, and 
consciousness in fixing its attention on him, far 
from freeing itself from him, really remains for 
ever in contact with him, and for ever sees itself 
as defiled; and since at the same time this object 
of its efforts, instead of being something
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essential, is of the meanest character, instead of 
being a universal, is the meanest particular, we 
have here only a personality confined to its own 
self and its own petty actions, a personality 
brooding over itself, as wretched as it is 
improverished. (Phen. Para 226)
Hegel goes on to detail how this miserable consciousness is 
led to renounce all its enjoyments and possessions to the point of 
even repudiating its own subjectivity altogether and giving its 
whole person over to organized religion to be disposed of as a thing.
Despite these strong similarities in Hegel's and Freud's 
analysis they have opposed notions of how unhappy consciousness 
or obsessional neurosis may be transcended. Hegel, contends that, 
this defective consciousness is ultimately surmounted through the 
sublation of the opposition between otherness and negativity 
constitutive o f the self. For Freud, the very notion of absolute 
alterity could only count as a sublimation, and a fairly negative one 
at that. Freud was extremely doubtful as to whether there can be 
any reconciliation, so to speak, between the Ego and its primary 
drives, as the following extract from Bevond the Pleasure Principle 
makes evident:
No substitute or reactive formations and no 
sublimations will suffice to remove the repressed 
Instincts persisting tension; and it is the 
difference in amount between the pleasure of 
satisfaction which is demanded and that which 
is actually achieved that provides the driving 
factor which will permit at no halting at any 
position attained, but in the poet's words 
f’ungebandigt immer vorwärts dringt" (Presses 
ever forward unsubdued). The backward path 
that leads to complete satisfaction is as a rule 
obstructed by die resistances which maintain 
the repressions.®/
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Rather than attempt per impossibile to abreact the primary 
repressed instincts, Freud commends a movement forward through 
the progressive adaptation of substitute non-parental ego-ideals, 
and the surrender of the non-fulfillable goal of complete 
satisfaction.
Now, Hegel would agree with Freud that it is of course 
necessary to move forward through several stages of moral and 
cognitive development, ascending from simple group identity to a 
moral orientation in terms of a universal and public discourse of 
rights and entitlements. Moreover, the Phenomenology, 
demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical character of this advance, 
that is to say, it details how it may equally be viewed as a 
movement backwards or a "retreat into ground"; an excavation, as 
it were, of all the accumulated dross of the reactive and negative 
dimensions of the historical and cultural formation of the Western 
psyche.
This said, however, it is nevertheless clear that Hegel and 
Freud have radically opposed views as to the nature of the end of 
this movement of recollection. For Hegel, as said above, the result 
is a reconciliation between the self and absolute otherness.
The absolution of the self from the primordial fault allows it 
to detach expiation for the absolute guilt entailed by its very 
existence from, the relative guilt, or rather "guilty-feelings", 
attendant upon those transgressions of the moral law which may 
be imputed to it.7/ This in turn releases the self from the tyranny 
exercised over it by a domineering conscience while preserving it
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from elevation into an arbitrary, untrammelled and totalizing will- 
to-power. Unbound itself, the spiritual self has the capacity to let 
others loose from the "category mistake" of attaching absolute 
significance and gravity to relative moral faults. It does not 
therefore bring about the cancellation o f the moral law but rather 
effectuates its aufhebung or fulfilment in Spirit (Geist).
In contrast, Freud's metapsychology (and indeed the 
philosophy of "original finitude" as a whole) is predicated on a 
negative concept of freedom. On this view, freedom is essentially 
limited to a consciousness of necessity. Through the process of 
perfectly recollecting the experience of its own formation, the 
subject abreacts the residual fixations that have impeded its full 
self-actualisation. In other words, by infinitely withdrawing from 
the totality of determinations bearing upon it, the self is free to 
recast them anew. The subject therefore defines itself in antithesis 
to the world. But it is not free to "abreact" the ultimate negativity 
of its own being. Hence the goal of freedom is the object of an 
infinite striving which cam never be ultimately accomplished, for, as 
we have seen above, Freud postulates am unbridgeable hiatus 
between desire amd satisfaction. In short, Freud's metapsychology 
falls into a bad infinity. Freedom is "finite freedom"; it consists in a 
self-resignation to non-fulfilment or the least unfulfllment. There 
cam be no absolute satisfaction.
Levinas, on the other harnd, bids us to respond to the 
summons to face amd suffer the negative amd thereby enter into am 
absolute relation - "a relation without relation" fTI 80) - with the 
wholly other beyond being amd non-being. Nonetheless in the
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midst of this absolute relation the self and the other remain 
dysymmetrical. It is only once the subject has transcended the 
ontological order that the other is revealed to it in its absolute 
alterity. Thus the self is posited in absolute antithesis to God. As 
an elected being it assumes the power to pardon; but it is not itself 
pardoned by the other. On the contrary, its calling (or "fate") is to 
be accused by the other and to expiate for this primordial 
accusation by suffering for others, bearing their fault as well as its 
own. This "suffering of suffering" (OBBE 196 FN 26) is not a Sollen 
"which is always asymptotic" (OBBE 193 FN 35) but a "living 
infinity"; in Levinas' words; "it is life without death, the life of the 
infinite in its glory, a life outside of essence and nothingness" 
(OBBE 142).
This "living infinity" takes two forms in Levinas' work. First 
it describes life within the "infinite time" of the ethico-religious 
community or the good society. Second, it refers to the ethical 
witness within-the-world of the primordial (or an-archic) 
responsibility for the other that is concretely enacted in the "society 
of infinity". Roughly speaking, Levinas provides a deduction of the 
ethico-religious community in TI and an exposition of ethical 
witness in OBBE. Levinas therefore is not expounding a bad 
infinity (a merely flnitlzed infinite), equally, his notion of the ethical 
relation does not conform to the "shape" of the "unhappy 
consciousness". The response to the ethical summons liberates the 
self from the negative power of death and frees it to enjoy life and 
the elements of life, albeit within the confines of a community 
dedicated to ethical service. It is important to note that the 
analyses presented in OBBE presuppose the prior accomplishment
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of the ethical relation as set out in TI. We shall demonstrate below 
(in Part Two) that TI may equally be said to presuppose the results 
of OBBE.
However, Levinas’ Ethics falls short of the true infinite as 
Hegel defines it. To see how this is so we now turn to examine 
Levinas' notions of "proximity" and "substitution" in the light of 
Hegel's speculative Christology.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR
1/ CF: TI 62; 254.
2/ See above. Part Two. Chapter Nine.
3/ TI 199.
4/ On this point, I find myself in essential agreement with 
Robert Bemasconi's reading of the master-slave dialectic in 
'Levinas Face to Face - with Hegel' in Journal for the British 
Society for Phenomenology. Vol 13, No 3, Oct. pp. 267-76.
5/ See Gillian Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology p. 130. "The future 
belongs to the master. For in the future societies the master 
will become master and slave, but not know that he and 
others are slaves. They will not be called master and slave 
for that relationship is transparent. They will be called 
'persons'."
6/ Sigmund Freud. 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' in The 
Pelican Freud Library (ed) James Strachcy. Volume Eleven. 
On Metapsvchology p. 315.
7/ Paul Tillich. The Courage To Be (London and Glasgow, 
Collins, 1952) p. 159-162. For the distinction between 
existential anxiety and neurotic guilty feelings.
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CHAPTER FIVE
HYPOSTASIS
The descriptions contained in the Chapters III and IV of 
OBBE, on Proximity and Substitution, are presented at a level of 
analysis which presupposes the initial reduction of the Said to the 
Saying. This partly explains why much of the content of both 
chapters is interchangeable. However, we must be careful not to 
allow the element of repetition, which is a central feature of 
Levinas' style, to obscure the fact that there is an important 
difference of emphasis between them. In broad terms, their 
difference may be stated thus: Proximity describes the primordially 
passive and as it were, "uninflected", ethical condition: 
substitution, on the other hand, depicts the, so the speak, non­
affirmative affirmation or iteration of this aboriginal and absolutely 
passive condition. We shall attempt to demonstrate this distinction 
and its critical implications through a commentary on each chapter 
in turn.
Levinas introduces the notion of proximity with reference to 
two other terms, those of "psyche" and "maternity". Both of these 
expressions are to be found in TI, where they are presented in 
isolation from one another. In the earlier work, "psyche" denotes 
the "interval of separation" occupied by the "atheist will", "prior to 
both affirmation and negation of the divine" (TI 59), while 
"maternity" signifies the "recourse" to a transcendent 'past', 
concretely produced through the procreation of children (T1 278).
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In OBBE, these two descriptions are fused into a singular notion of 
the other-in-the-same:
The one-for-another has the form of sensibility or 
vulnerability, pure passivity or susceptibility, 
passive to the point of becoming an inspiration, 
that is, alterity in the same, the trope of the body 
animated by the soul, psyche in the form of the 
hand that gives even the bread taken from its 
own mouth. Here the psyche is the maternal 
body. (OBBE 67)
This transformation of the usage of the two terms bears out 
our contention that OBBE condenses the results of the stratified 
analyses of TI. In TI the movement is from the unredeemed time of 
the "psyche" to the redeemed time of the child; by contrast, in 
OBBE the non-erotic ethical relation made possible by the union of 
will and feminine alterity is present from the beginning.
At one level, the evocation of the maternal figure is evidently 
analogical. Levinas is saying that the ethical self stands in the 
same 'relation' to the Other as a pregnant woman is placed with 
respect to her expected child: Just as the mother must both endure 
all the pain of purturition and accept this pain as wholly her pain, 
so, too, the ethical subject must assent to its non-chosen 
obligation to the Other, to the point of taking responsibility for the 
Other's responsibility for inflicting suffering upon itself. Yet, it 
would nonetheless be an error to interpret Levinas' use of the 
notion of maternity simply in analogical terms; for it must not 
finally be read either analogically, metaphorically or literally but as 
an overdetermination of all these discursive tropes. To construe 
the term as an analogy or a metaphor is to rob it of all its affective 
force, while to interpret it in literal terms would be to return it to
n o
ordinary discourse where it would be subject to empirical 
qualification. The whole point of Levinas' use of the superlative 
style, is to obviate the temptation to collapse the essential element 
of undecideability into either its figurative or literal pole, and to 
induce the reader to stay with the diachronic aporia. This is why 
all along we have felt justified in insisting that Levinas' discourse is 
essentially Hegelian in provenance. Indeed, in what follows, we 
shall explore a clearly discernible parallel between Levinas' 
statement of the relation between proximity, substitution and 
infinity, and Hegel's account of the movement, within "Revealed 
Religion", from the "appearance" of God, to the death of God and 
"His" re-birth in the spiritual community. However, though the 
lines of their development are parallel, they do not ultimately 
converge, and it is the element of divergence between Hegel's and 
Levinas' respective understanding of the speculative relation which 
will provide us with a critical insight into the essential deficiencies 
of Levinas' notion of ethical transcendence.
According to Levinas, then, proximity is the union of psyche 
and maternal body and as such it:
... is not a metaphor, but, if we can put it thus, a 
designation of the irreducible paradox of 
intelligibility: the other in the same, the trope of 
for-the-other in its antecedent inflexion. (OBBE 
70)
We may elucidate Levinas' point by saying that this psychic- 
maternal compact is the conjunction, as it were, of pure thought, 
i.e. a trans-intentional mode of cognition, and pure being, i.e. a 
trans-apperceptive intuition of formless sensibilia. Proximity or the
I l l
"other-in-the-same" Is, therefore, the speculative unity of 
transcendence and immanence in the incarnate subject.
Now, lest it be said that we are here inadmissibly subsuming 
Levinas’ categories under a Hegelian "grid", let us follow the way in 
which Levinas himself presents the notion of the maternal-psyche 
in the chapter Three of OBBE. In Levinas' own words:
The sensible-maternity, vulnerability, 
apprehension - binds the node of incarnation 
into larger than the apperception of the self. I 
am bound to others before being tied to my own 
body. (OBBE 76)
Thus the self is ethically bound to the Other even prior, so to 
speak, to its entry into being. In this respect, the maternal-psyche 
is a "pre-birth" and a "pre-nature" (OBBE 75). Yet, Levinas is 
equally insistent that the element of alterity definitive of the self 
"has also to contain a passage to the physico-chemical 
physiological meanings of the body" (OBBE 70). Hence proximity is 
at one soul and soma, preternatural and natural, transcendent and 
immanent, the union of that which is farthest and infinitely near.
As said, in our view, a precedent for Levinas' notion of 
proximity is to be found in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, in the 
penultimate section entitled the Religion of Revelation (die Offenbar 
Religion). Hegel states:
Of this Spirit which has abandoned the form of 
substance and enters existence in the shape of 
self-consciousness it may therefore be said - if 
we wish to employ the relationships derived from 
natural generation - that it has an actual mother 
but an Implicit father. (Phen. Para 755)
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Before we proceed to relate this passage to Levinas' 
understanding of the maternal-psyche we must first place it within 
its overall context. In the section on "Religion" in the
Phenomenology. Hegel is presenting what may be described as a 
noumenologv o f consciousness, since religious consciousness has 
implicitly transcended the standpoint of the Understanding 
fVerstand) from its very inception.!/ Hegel is claiming here that 
within the overall history of religious consciousness, the notion of 
the transcendent-immanent unity is first apprehended in its 
speculative, i.e. non-representational, form in the "phenomenon" of 
the historical Jesus. According to Hegel, this is the historically 
contingent yet logically necessary "moment" when the absolute 
Other is directly and intuitively apprehended, not through the via 
media of symbol and mythus, but as immediately incarnate in the 
world. However, we must keep distinct the question of the veracity 
or otherwise o f Hegel’s speculative reconstruction of the history of 
religion, on the one hand, from the separate question of the logical 
content that manifests itself for the first time in the Christian 
dogma of the incarnation, on the other. In our view, the 
phenomenological reconstruction of the history of religion and 
religious consciousness is a transitive knowledge, and, as such, is 
infinitely revisable; while the movement towards the conceptual 
unification o f the transcendent and immanent is a logical 
necessity, and, therefore, an intransitive knowledge which, as 
such, cannot in any sense be constructed but only more deeply 
discovered. In other words, there is no inconsistency involved in 
accepting the philosophical validity of Hegel's notion of speculative 
necessity and at the same time dissenting from his particular
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reconstruction of the recollection fErlnnerungl of Spirit. This is 
why, notwithstanding Hegel's "Christology" and Levinas' "Judaism", 
an immanent Hegelian reading of Levinas is not ruled out ab initio.
We contend, therefore, that, from a logical point of view, 
Levinas' conception of the maternal-psyche incarnate in the ethical 
subject corresponds mutatis mutandis to Hegel's notion of an 
implicit Father (i.e. pure thought, pure transcendensl and an 
actual Mother (i.e. pure materiality) incarnate in a singular being. 
We may develop this parallel still further. At Paragraph 758 in the 
Phenomenology. Hegel deepens his speculative commentary on the 
incarnation when he states that insofar as:
Spirit is immediately present as a self-conscious 
Being, ie. as an actual man, that the believer is 
immediately certain of spirit, sees, feels and 
hears the divinity. Thus this self-consciousness 
is not imagination, but is actual in the believer. 
Consciousness, then, does not start from its 
inner life, from thought, and unite within itself 
the thought of Goa with existence: on the 
contrary, it starts from an existence that is 
immediately present and recognizes God therein. 
(Phen. Para 758)
This whole passage may be faithfully explicated in Levinasian 
terms: the other-in-the-same is immediately present or in 
"proximity”, not as the object of an intentional act or a flgurate 
conception, but as there, while, paradoxically, remaining absolutely 
other. To use Hegel’s phrase, the self has an immediate intuition of 
the Other as the "content-less object of sensuous consciousness". 
(Phen. Para 757).
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For Hegel, this, shall we say, non-empirical immediacy, 
represents the first stage of speculative knowledge or the Notion 
implicit. He spells this out at Paragraph 761:
This unity of Being and essence, of Thought 
which is immediately Existence, is both the 
thought of this religious consciousness, or its 
mediated knowledge, and equally its immediate 
knowledge: for this unity of Being and Thought 
is self-consciousness and is itself immediately 
present, or the thought unity has at the same 
time this [existential) shape of what it is. (Phen. 
Para 761)
Is not Levinas' central notion of the face to face an instance 
of this self same logical moment? Take, for example, the following 
formulation of the 'face' in OBBE:
A face is a trace of itself, given over to my 
responsibility, but to which I am wanting and 
faulty. It is as though I were responsible for his 
mortality and guilty for surviving. A  face is an 
anachronous immediacy more tense them that of 
an image offered in the straight-forwardness of 
an intuitive intention. (OBBE 91)
Levinas' statement that the face (existence) is a trace 
(thought, psyche) of itself (absolute otherness), or that it is am 
"anachronous immediacy" that has a presence more present than a 
sense perceptum, is exactly equivalent to Hegel's notion of the 
immediate Notion: the speculative unity of Thought (alterity) and 
existence (subject) in a singular being.
Perhaps it will be objected that we are pushing our analogy 
too far; after all, has not Levinas explicitly precluded the idea that 
the relation between the other and the same can be read as a 
coincidence between substance and subject? (OBBE 103)2/
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Moreover, Is It also not the case that the reason why Levinas 
introduces the term "obsession" in OBBE, is precisely to rule out 
any notion of a symmetry between the infinite Other and the finite 
self? Witness the following statement:
The subject affected by the Other cannot think 
that the affection is reciprocal, for he is still 
obsessed by the very obsession that he would 
exercise over him that obsesses him. (OBBE 84)
Levinas pointedly precedes this statement with the preamble
that: "obsession ....  is not a notion that could be introduced here
to express, according to a well-known ritual, proximity as the unity 
of identify and difference", but rather denotes "difference as non- 
difference" (OBBE 83) and therefore appears to anticipate and 
preclude precisely the interpretation we are seeking to foist upon 
his work.
These elements of asymmetry and non-coincidence are 
integral to Levinas' whole notion of ethical individuation; for it is 
the absolute moment of non-reciprocity which is the basis of each 
individual's irrecusable obligation to the other, or as Levinas puts it 
"in the responsibility which we have for one another, I have always 
one more response to give, I have to answer for his very 
responsibility" (OBBE 84). In sum, then, Levinas' objections to the 
speculative construal of his work are essentially threefold, (a) that 
Hegelian speculation is based on an immanentist fusion of 
substance and subject without remainder, (b) that this necessarily 
destroys the essential asymmetry of the infinite-finite relation, and 
(c) this in turn altogether vitiates the me-ontological basis of ethical 
responsibility. We shall address the first two points here while
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leaving the last to our consideration of Levinas' treatment of the 
nature of "substitution" below.
The first thing to be said in defence of Hegel's speculative 
Notion is that Levinas' criticism to the effect that it is immanentist 
and totalising relies on a patent misreading of Hegel's notion of 
"self-consciousness", insofar as it presents the latter as a species of 
intentionality or "consciousness-of'. Yet the whole of Hegel's 
phenomenological labours are devoted to demonstrating that the 
self cannot achieve a full sich-verhalten through representation or 
reflective thinking, but must transcend this standpoint in an 
absolute direction. Quentin Lauer succinctly sums up Hegel's 
stance as follows:
The absolutely self-conscious object is also the 
object of self-consciousness, since that means 
that to be fully conscious of self is to be 
conscious of the divine. For Hegel, then, 
religious consciousness is indispensable in the 
march toward adequate self-consciousness; it is 
at once consciousness of the divine and 
consciousness that to be adequately conscious of 
self is to be conscious of the divine - without 
self-consciousness ceasing to be human.3/
When this "relation" between the infinite and the finite is 
raised to the level of pure speculative thought and the last vestiges 
of figurative conception are sublated, then the absolute Other is no 
longer an "object", standing over and against a subject, but is 
immediately present as spirit. But this does not mean that the 
divine and human are now synonymous; on the contrary, the 
otherness of the absolute Other has not been negated; rather it has 
been thereby concretised. It falls to Hegel himself to give the most
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compelling description of this accomplishment. In the 1821 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Hegel writes:
I raise myself in thought to the absolute ... thus 
being infinite consciousness; yet at the same 
time I am finite consciousness ... Both aspects 
seek each other and flee each other ... I am the 
struggle between them.4/
We see therefore that Levinas' first two objections to 
speculative thinking are essentially baseless. First, Hegel's 
understanding of the relation between substance and subject 
preserves the notion of transcendence in and through its 
conceptualisation via an immanent critique of all forms of 
representational thought. Second, the necessity to think the 
absolute does not, as Levinas avers, wholly negate the asymmetry 
of the absolute with respect to the finite, since the possibility of 
thinking the absolute is necessary to maintaining its very 
exteriority. Speculative thought stays with the aporia presented by 
this paradox.
There are two cardinal aspects of Levinas' notion of proximity 
which we cite as conclusive evidence of our claim that he is 
providing a speculative account of the absolute ethical relation 
which has been foreshadowed in Hegel's reconstruction of the 
religion of revelation. The two aspects in question are Levinas' 
redeployment in Chapter III of OBBE of the terms "hypostasis" and 
"fraternity".
The term "hypostasis", like the notion of "insomnia" is one 
which Levinas' utilises throughout his philosophical career. In
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OBBE, however. It appears to undergo a radical modification vis a 
vis its earlier incarnation in EE. In EE "hypostasis" designated a 
pure act of self-positing through which the "I" liberates itself from 
the there is and literally comes into being by providing itself with a 
base and a position amidst the elements;5/ in OBBE, it refers to 
the unchosen assignation of the self to undergo a primordial or 
"an-archic" responsibility for-the-other, that is antecedent to its 
ontological condition as a substantial or self-reflective being. 
However, as we have shown, the radicality of the transformation of 
the term is largely in appearance only, since it represents a fusion 
of categories which have previously been deduced in isolation from 
one another (in TI and the early works and essays) rather than a 
wholesale repudiation of these prior analyses.
Incidentally, Levinas would no doubt concede, as would 
Hegel, that the personal pronoun "I", along with other indexical 
expressions such as "here" and "there”, can have no reference to an 
object which is not the function of a contextualising speech 
situation. Levinas' point, and one again in this respect he is here 
in accord with Hegel, is that the symbolic structures through which 
the social self is constructed presuppose an underlying pre- 
linguistic ethical matrix of meaning and responsibility for their 
orientation and sense. Levinas expresses the point thus:
The exception of proximity to a rational order, 
tending in principle to a system of pure 
relations, is the hypostasis of the relationship 
into a subjectivity obsessed with a non- 
reciprocatable obsession, by the neighbour. This 
obsession is not reducible to an intersection of 
these relations, which would count by virtue of 
its "universal essence". Subjectivity counts by 
virtue of hypostasis, showing itself in the said, 
not to be sure under a name, but nonetheless.
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like entities, as a pro-noun. It is both the 
relation and the term of the relation. But it is as 
subject to an irreversible relation that the term 
of the relation becomes a subject. (OBBE 85)
The last sentence in this extract brings us to the nub of the 
real difference between Hegel and Levinas, for what divides our two 
thinkers is not that Hegel is an "immanentist" and Levinas a 
"transcendentalist", or that Hegel is an ontologist and Levinas a 
me-ontologist etc., all these distinctions refer to the level of 
representational thinking which both thinkers claim to have 
surpassed; the philosophical difference at stake here is between 
two different conceptions of the same speculative "relation" of the 
infinite to the finite. Levinas' use of the term "hypostasis", 
particularly in the form in which it is presented in OBBE, provides 
the clue to just how close he is not merely to the speculative form 
of Hegel's discourse but also to its content.
The origin of the term "hypostasis" reflects the pervasive 
influence of classical Greek philosophy on the early Church 
Fathers. The notion was used to formulate the orthodox statement 
of the relation between God and Christ at the Council of Chalcedon 
in 451, which declared that in Christ there is one Person (Divine) 
and two natures (one divine and the other human).®/ This 
formulation was arrived at by a long and tortuous route which 
partly revolved around the extent to which Aristotle’s philosophy of 
substance could be made to serve the exigencies of Christian 
dogma. In Metaphysics Z, Aristotle treats the notion of substance 
as an equivocal and aporetic category. On the one hand, 
substance denotes primary ousia, that is to say, an indivisible 
"thisness" ftode til which subsists in itself I'kath’ hauto) and which
120
therefore constitutes the substance or subject (hupokeimenon) 
which underlies accidental qualities and attributes and in which 
they inhere; on the other hand, it also refers to the essence of 
"whatness" (quiddity) of an entity insofar as it defines the to ti en 
einai. literally its "what-it-was-to have been", the past tense here 
specifying the eidos which renders it actual in proportion to the 
extent that it functions as a predicamental of a species or genus. 
These three elements or aspects of substance - qua "whatness" 
(existential, qua subsistence (subjectum) and qua definition 
(essentia) - correspond to three different levels of hypostasis. 
Aristotle designates the first two as primary ousia while he refers to 
the third, nominal notion of substance, as secondary ousia.
Boethius is credited with having "dignified" the notion of 
hypostasis-as-subject when he gave the classical definition of 
"person" as the individual substance of a rational nature (rationalis 
naturae individua substantia).7/ This reformulation of 
hupokeimenon as rational Individual or person placed the 
Aristotelian 'theory of being' at the disposal of Christian 
philosophical theology. The results are evident in the 
Chalcedonian definition. On the one hand, the doctrine of the "two 
natures" presents the relationship between Father and Son as that 
between primary ousia (thisness, tode tl) and secondary ousia 
(divine essence. Logos) in a single divine-and-human nature: on the 
other hand, the ontological analogy Implicit in this formulation, 
which suggests that Father is related to the son of man as the 
individual man is related to the human species, is corrected by the 
spiritual analogy explicit in the terms used. Just as in a natural 
filial relation father and son (ideally) relate to one another on the
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basis of mutual love and respect, so, the relation between the two 
divine "natures” stands as a perfected example of the filial bond, 
one which attains to an absolute love, through a unity and 
distinction in two persons.
This brief stretch of the genesis of the term hypostasis 
throws some light on Levinas' use of the term and its relationship 
to the notion of fecundity, both in the Chapter under consideration 
and in his work as a whole. First, we note that there is a certain 
symmetry between the evolution of the term hypostasis from EE to 
OBBE, and the general transformation the notion has undergone 
within the philosophical tradition. As we have just seen, in 
Western thought the notion of hypostasis passed from denoting a 
primary ousia or hupokeimenon and ended designating the union 
of the divine-and-human in the incarnate Christ; the parallel being 
that in Levinas’ works the term hypostasis to begin with denotes 
the auto-posited independent subject, and ends, in OBBE, 
indicating the union of the "other-in-the-same" in an incarnate 
ethical subject.
Of course, defenders of Levinas will be quick to point out the 
patent disanalogy involved here. It will be protested that the notion 
of hypostasis in Patristic thought is an eminently onto-theological 
concept, depicting the union of the ens infinitum, deus with the 
ens infinitum, creatura. and, as such, it is, as it were, simply by­
passed by Levinas' me-ontological re-working of the term. 
However, this objection serves to bear out our general thesis that 
Hegel is Levinas' precursor here in developing a post-critical 
philosophy of the Infinite. As we have already seen. Hegel breaks
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with the substantialised notion of the divine-human relation as 
conceived by the early Fathers and the Scholastics (which, it must 
be said, even in its ontological form of presentation is nonetheless 
a speculative doctrine) by re-conceptualising it as a spiritual 
relationship. In essence, this is also Levinas' mode of procedure. 
It is no argument against Hegel that he draws upon ontological 
concepts to express the speculative content of the Notion, for this 
reflects the universal constraint imposed by the finitude of human 
language; the very same constraint that obliges Levinas to adopt 
such traditional concepts as "hypostasis" and to draw upon natural 
generational terms like "paternity" and "flliality" in order to 
communicate his notion of ethical transcendence.
In this last respect, however, there is a significant divergence 
between Hegel and Levinas. Hegel quite explicitly states that the 
speculative truth of religion, even of the "consummate" religion, 
ultimately transcends its representational form and content. 
Consequently, Hegelian speculation is not absolutely bound to the 
given forms of symbolic media through which religious truth has 
been historically transmitted down the ages; this, of course, is not 
to say that the symbolic inheritance is a matter of indifference; but 
only to point out that speculative thought, in the last analysis, has 
the spiritual power to subiate iaufheben) religious rite and 
representation; moreover, this is a power which extends to the 
annulment of the gender-specific characterisation of religious 
dogmas, including the Trinity and the incarnation. Hegel does not 
draw this inference in his treatment of the "consummate religion" 
in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion because there he is 
engaged on a speculative-logical reconstruction of the history of
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theological science and consequently he presupposes the flgurate 
conceptions which the tradition has bequeathed up until the time 
of the delivery of his lectures in Berlin in 1824, 1827 and 1831. In 
a similar vein, Hegel's notorious remarks in the Philosophy of Right 
(16 Zusatz) with respect to the role and status of women in relation 
to marriage, family, education and society are another instance 
where Hegel's method of logical reconstruction of received forms, 
this time of the tradition of political science, lead him to endorse 
conclusions which clearly contradicted his own notion of 
speculative rationality.®/ The elimination of such contradictions 
from the System does not entail its wholesale repudiation; on the 
contrary, the application of speculative reason to Hegel's own 
works is an essential element of the 'labour of the negative' 
required to bring about its completion.^/
By contrast, Levinas' presentation of the ethical relation 
retains an ineliminable element of fixed biological determination, 
which renders it impervious to speculative reconfiguration. Thus 
in TI, Levinas states that sexuality provides the "example" of the 
way in which ethics is "accomplished before being reflected on" (T1 
120), and this is a point that is fundamental to the understanding 
of the production of "infinite time" through the engenderment of the 
child in 'fecundity' as may be illustrated by this comment by 
Levinas on the relation between fecundity and flliality:
If biology furnishes us the prototypes of all these 
relations, this proves to be sure, that biology 
does not represent a purely contingent order of 
being, unrelated to its essential production. (TI 
279)
124
In OBBE, however, Levinas takes a different tack. Here the 
notion of "fraternity" is conceived without reference to eros and the 
family. Here, "Fraternity" may be stated only in an indirect form 
"for when it becomes conscious, that is, thematized, the indifferent 
approach destroys this kinship" (OBBE 82). In the non-erotic 
ethical relation, then, the self is placed in an unconditional 
obligation to the other, or as Levinas puts it:
I am bound to him before any liaison contracted.
He orders me before being recognised. Here 
there is a relation of Kinship outside of all 
biology ’against all logic'. It is not because the 
neighbour would belong to the same genus as 
me that he concerns me. He is precisely Other.
The community with him begins in obligation to 
him. The neighbour is a brother. (OBBE 87)
We see therefore that here the ethical relation is conceived 
"outside of all biology" whereas in TI sexual difference is a 
necessary moment in the production of fraternity.
In keeping with our general interpretation of the interrelation 
between TI and OBBE, we will show above that the later statement 
does not supersede but rather complements the earlier 
formulation. If, for the minute, we consider Levinas' notion of 
fraternity as set out in OBBE by itself, that is in its pure non- 
biologically conditioned sense, then it is apparent that it 
corresponds mutatls mutandis to Hegel's speculative account of 
the appearance of the sensuous presence of the God-man, "the 
monstrous compound, which directly contradicts both 
representation and understanding" (LPR III: 457), which is to say, it 
instantiates the Immediate identification of the absolute Other in 
the same or self, wholly in the passive mode. Logically speaking, it
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is the reception of the union of thought (the unity of active and 
passive transcendens or "maternal-psyche") in an absolutely 
indeterminate, and hence "infinite", subjectivity. This is the 
"moment" where Hegel and Levinas' philosophical thought is 
completely convergent. It is essential to understand this if we Eire 
to comprehend the real differences between the two thinkers. 
These differences are fundamentally disclosed in Levinas' 
presentation of the notion of Substitution in Chapter IV of OBBE 
and it is to their consideration that we now turn.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE
1/ Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's
Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 541-542 "Even before absolute 
knowledge, religion is already the moment in which 
phenomenology is transformed into noumenology, in which 
absolute spirit reveals itself as such, "makes itself manifest 
to itself in manifesting itself to man".
2/ Cf: OBBE p. 103: "The reduction of subjectivity to
consciousness dominates philosophical thought, which since 
Hegel has been trying to overcome the duality of being and 
thought, by identifying, under different figures, subject and 
substance.”
3/ Quentin Lauer S.J. A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology 
(New York, Fordham University Press) pp. 258-259. See also 
Lauer's explication of Hegel's concept "what Hegel is saying is 
that the human spirit adequately conscious of itself is 
conscious of an object which is divine, which is not to say 
that 'human' and 'divine' are synonymous" (p. 258).
4/ LPR I Spiers and Sanderson p. 65. Cited in Fackenheim p. 
31.
5/ Cf: EE, Chapter V. Here, Levinas defines the "hypostasis" as 
"the transmutation, within the pure event of being, of an 
event into a substantive" (p. 73).
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6/ (ed). H. Bettenson. Documents of the Christian Church.
(London, Oxford University Press) p. 51. For a discussion of 
the theological evolution of the concept of hypostasis in early 
Patristic thought see J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 
especially Chapter XII “The Christological Settlement” 
(London, Adam and Charles Black, 1977).
7/ See Henry Chadwick. Boethius: The Consolations of Mvstic. 
Logic and Philosophy (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981) p. 193.
8/ See above. Part Three. Chapter Four.
9/ What Hegel says of the Logic in the ‘Introduction’ to the 
Science of Logic may be applied to the system as a whole: "I 
could not pretend that the method which I follow in the 
science of Logic - or rather which this system in its own self 
follows - is not capable of greater completeness, of much 
elaboration in detail, but at the same time I know it is the 
only true method" SL 63.
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CHAPTER SIX
DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE
Levinas poses the following question and comment at the 
beginning of Chapter IV of OBBE on substitution:
How in consciousness can there be an 
undergoing or passion whose active source does 
not, in any way, occur in consciousness? This 
exteriority has to be emphasised.
From our reading of Levinas hitherto, we know that the 
"active source" of this "exteriority" is neither nothingness qua 
nothingness nor an immaterial substance: but the "maternal- 
psyche", the unity of pure sensibility and pure thought incarnate in 
the ethical subject. Now it is the modality of the approach to this 
exteriority that Levinas sets out to communicate in the chapter in 
question. That is to say, substitution describes, so to speak, the 
iteration or re-saying of the unassumable ethical obligation detailed 
in the antecedent analysis of Proximity.
Levinas' favoured term for what we have designated as the 
"iteration" of the primary ethical condition is that of "recurrence". 
He introduces this "concept" in the following way:
The recurrence to oneself refers to the hither- 
side of the present in which every identity 
identified in the said is constituted. It is already 
constituted when the act of constitution first 
originates. (OBBE 105)
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The "oneself' that Is arrived at as a result of this 'reversion' is 
evidently not that of a merely sentient being stripped of its 
cognitive faculties. Levinas is not describing a regression to a 
child-like state. As he expresses it, later in the same chapter, this 
"flight out of concepts" i.e. representations, is not a descent into 
"the naivety or blindness of non-thought" (OBBE 126). To the 
contrary, it is a reduction to the alterity of the created state, which 
requires an imageless conceptuality to positively produce its 
accomplishment.
This recurrence to the 'pre-original' state is, according to 
Levinas, dirempted into two "moments". On the one hand, it is a 
recoil to the hypostasis or "pro-noun", without mask or personae, a 
predicateless and hence: "pre-synthetic, pre-logical, and in a 
certain sense atomic, that is, in-dividual, unity of the self, which 
prevents it from splitting, separating itself from itself so as to 
contemplate or express itself' (OBBE 107). Yet, on the other hand, 
this very movement by which the absolute ipseity of the subject is 
confirmed is at one and the same time the moment of its 
disintegration and fragmentation in which it is exposed to "the 
anguish of contraction and break-up" (OBBE 108), and through 
which it is opened to receive the other beyond itself.
The "coincidence" of these moments is nothing less than the 
"union" of activity and passivity in their absolute sense, and the 
redemption of passivity by activity. Levinas' own formulations 
confirm our interpretation. Levinas describes the approach to 
absolute passivity thus:
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The active source of this passivity is not 
thematizable. It is the passivity of a trauma, but 
one that prevents its own representation, a 
deafening trauma, cutting the thread of 
consciousness that could have welcomed it in its 
present, the passivity of being persecuted. The 
face of the neighbour in its persecuting hatred 
can by this very malice obsess as something 
pitiful. (OBBE111)
Levinas' essential point here is that the approach to absolute 
passivity transfigures the primary accusation against the self into 
an unconditional love for others. This is perhaps the critical 
moment in the whole of Levinas' oeuvre. Here the self passes from 
proximity to substitution, "from the outrage undergone to the 
responsibility for the persecutor, from suffering to expiation for the 
other" (Ibid). The reversion to passivity assumes the "active" 
moment of transcendent exteriority; the self does not merely 
endure its own creaturely status but Iterates it, and thereby 
expiates for the other. In Levinas' words, this is "the ab-solution 
that reverses essence" (Ibid).
The parallel with Hegel's speculative re-telling of the myth of 
the incarnation is evident. We will explore this parallel on two 
levels. First we shall examine the relationship between Hegel's 
account of the "death of god" and Levinas' treatment of 
"substitution". Second, we will recapitulate this relation from the 
point of view of Hegel's Logic, that is to say, from the Notional 
'standpoint', free from all representational residue.
In the previous section we maintained that there is a 
connection between Hegel's statement of the Initial appearance of 
the God-man or Das 1st, prior to His crucifixion, and Levinas'
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notion of proximity, the immediacy of the "other-in-the-same". We 
now suggest that there is a further convergence between the two 
thinkers, that is to say, Hegel's presentation of the speculative 
significance of the death of the God-man, and Levinas’ description 
of the expiation for proximity in substitution, represent two 
separate elucidations of the same redemptive movement. Since we 
have already reviewed Hegel's account of the "death of God" above, 
we shall proceed by providing a brief summary of the cardinal 
moments of Hegel's presentation which will then serve us as an aid 
to a comparison with Levinas on substitution.
Levinas' statement that the expiation for the other in 
substitution effects an "ab-solution which reverses essence" is 
foreshadowed in Hegel's reading of Good Friday, when he says that 
"With the death of God ... the reversal of consciousness begins" 
(LPRIII: 322). Christ was the God-man who had human nature 
"even unto death" (Ibid). Hegel adds:
Death is the most complete proof of humanity, of 
absolute flnitude; and indeed Christ has died the 
aggravated death of the evildoer: not merely a 
natural death, but rather a death of shame and 
humiliation on the cross. In him humanity is 
carried to its furthest point. (Ibid)
The significance of the humiliation suffered by Christ is that 
it represents not merely an extreme case of human abjection but 
an absolute identification with the separatedness or "evil" of the 
created human condition. Thus Hegel states:
This flnitude, however, on its own account (as 
against God) is evil, it is something alien to God. 
But he has taken it (upon himselfl in order to 
put it to death by his death. As the monstrous
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unification of these extremes, this shameful 
death is at the same time infinite love. (LPR III: 
324)
The death of God therefore is a universal expiation; in his 
dying for us, we are implicitly released from the anxiety and 
negativity of death, into life. But only on condition that we also die 
to ourselves, that is, surrender all intentional relations to the 
absolute other as object and "relate to the other as absolute" (Ibid). 
The death of "God" is therefore the prerequisite for our rebirth in 
spirit. In Hegel's words:
The death of the natural has in this way a 
universal significance: flnitude and evil are 
altogether destroyed. Thus the world has been 
reconciled; by this death it has been implicitly 
delivered from its evil. In the true understanding 
[Verstehen] of death, the relation of the subject 
as such [to death) comes into view in this way. 
Here any merely historical view comes to an end; 
the subject itself is drawn into the process. The 
subject feel the anguish of its own estrangement 
which Christ takes upon himself by putting on 
humanity, while at the same time destroying it 
by his death. (LPR III: 305)
We are now in a position to locate the precise point at which 
Hegel and Levinas converge and diverge. As we shall see, the 
iteration and proximity in substitution is the speculative unity of 
identity and absolute otherness. In other words, the "recurrence" 
of the self to the hither-side of itself, is, at one and the same time, a 
response to the "contraction" of the infinite withdrawal of the Other 
which makes the absolute autonomy of the self possible in the first 
instance. 1 / As Levinas expresses it:
Then the recurrence to oneself cannot stop at 
oneself, but goes to the hither-side of oneself; In 
the recurrence to oneself there is a going to the 
hither-side of oneself. A does not as in identity
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return to A, but retreats to the hither-side of its 
point of departure. (OBBE 114)
Here we see the analogue to Hegel's account of the infinite's 
identification with and withdrawal from the finite. In the 1827 
Lectures. Hegel cites Corinthians 2 5:18-19, "In His death Christ 
has borne the sins of the world and has reconciled God [with the 
world] (LPRIII: 324). Likewise, for Levinas, the reversion to the 
"hither side" represents an absolute moment of individuation that 
possesses a universal significance:
The ipseity, in the passivity without arche 
characteristic of identity, is a hostage. The word 
I means here I am. answering for everything and 
for everyone. (Ibid)
The ethical self is therefore the absolute embodiment o f a 
universal expiation for the primary separation of our createdness. 
As this "sub-jectum: it is under the weight of the universe 
responsible for everything" (OBBE 116).
Franz Rosenzweig in the Star of Redemption interprets the 
words "Here I am" as the confession by the self that it has hitherto 
been unloved.2/ in contrast, Levinas reads it as signifying the 
subject's assent to its divine moral assignation. In TI this was 
expressed as denoting the "extreme consciousness" in which the 
subject though claimed by death yet has time to be against death 
by being for-the-other (TI 239). In the chapter on substitution 
Levinas states that the response to the ethical call is an approach 
which "inasmuch as it is a sacrifice, confers a sense on death. In it 
the absolute singularity of the responsible one encompasses the 
generality or generalization of death. In it life is no longer
134
measured by being, and death can no longer introduce the absurd 
into it" (OBBE 129). In other words, by means of an absolute 
expiation for creation, both individually and universally, the ethical 
self transcends the reciprocity of ego and alter ego that conditions 
intersubjective relations at the level of being and essence. As a 
result:
Impassively undergoing the weight of the other, 
thereby called to uniqueness, subjectivity no 
longer belongs to the order where the alternative 
of activity and passivity retains its meaning. We 
have to speak here of expiation as uniting 
identity and alterity. (OBBE 118)
May we read Levinas' formulations as a speculative 
restatement of the "death of death" and of the reconciliation 
between the divine and the human? We must be careful not to beg 
the question with respect to the issues at stake here by 
inadmissibly importing pre-philosophical conceptions taken from 
Levinas' confessional texts. When approached from a purely 
philosophical point of view we shall see that Levinas both affirms 
and denies the actuality of redemption and reconciliation, as does 
Hegel. The difference between them may be reduced to their 
respective understanding of the nature of the "relation" between the 
affirmative and negative poles of this absolute aporia.
To answer our question, then, we must first ascertain 
precisely what Levinas means by designating substitution as an 
expiation uniting identity and alterity. The following statement by 
Levinas may further illuminate the process under discussion. The 
"recurrence" from ego to self leaves the subject at the point where:
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At the limit of passivity, the oneself escapes 
passivity or the inevitable limitation that the 
terms within relation undergo. In the 
incomparable relationship of responsibility, the 
other no longer limits the same, it is supported 
by what it limits. (OBBE 115)
The self therefore expiates for creation by "returning" to the 
pure sensibility "before" and "beyond" all apperception, and thereby 
substitutes itself for the Other without quitting the locus of its own 
incarnation. This is an infinite movement in which all limits are 
superseded. As Levinas puts it, this absolute patience has "effaced 
the distinction between being accused and accusing oneself' 
(OBBE 125).
To avoid unnecessary misunderstanding on this critical point 
we must analyse further the meaning of the term 'substitution'. 
Clearly, Levinas does not mean by it that I become the other 
person, in the sense of duplicating their identity. Nor is it a case of 
"leaping-in" rather than "leaping-ahead" in Heidegger's sense.3/ 
Finally, it is not an act of altruism borne from a freely given 
commitment on the part of the I. Perhaps the notion of 
substitution may best be described as an act of grace. In Levinas’ 
words: "The ego is not an entity 'capable' of expiating for the others: 
it is the original expiation. The expiation is voluntary for it is prior 
to the will's initiative (prior to the origin)" (Ibid). 'Grace' is the only 
word that will suffice to describe a voluntary act that does not arise 
from a finite volition but from an Infinite resolution.4/ The 
assumption o f absolute responsibility is, according to Levinas, 
"without deliberation" (OBBE 120). That is to say, it is the result of 
an unmotivated, spontaneous and gratuitous acceptance of the 
burden of answering for the universal susceptibility for pain and
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suffering, even to the point of accepting responsibility for the 
responsibility all the others bear for the primary diremption 
brought about by the creation ex nihilo.
We may say therefore, without exaggeration, that the notion 
of substitution signifies the appearance of the speculative Christ- 
motif in Levinas' philosophy. Substitution is the reversion to 
oneself which is equally a transcendence of the self towards the 
absolute Other and the reception of the absolute Other in the self. 
This "transitivity" has already been described by Levinas in TI in 
terms of the 'overflowing' of the "idea of infinity" in consciousness, 
such that the subject encounters an ideatum which surpasses its 
idea (TI 49). It is the "event" of the absolute recognition of the self 
in absolute otherness wherein the subject finds itself by losing 
itself (OBBE 11). By taking on or iterating the an-archic, "passive 
synthesis”, the ethical subject overcomes the separation between 
alterity and death, such that death ceases to be absolute; for "in 
this trauma the Good reabsorbs or redeems the violence of non­
freedom” (OBBE 123). Henceforth, life has a meaning beyond 
death. As a consequence, in substitution the self is not called 
upon to die for the Other, only to bear witness to him; but it is the 
overcoming of death in principle which renders it ethically 
necessary and meaningful to sacrifice one's own life in preference 
to murdering an innocent.
We see therefore that in all essentials Levinas' account of 
substitution appears congruent with Hegel's speculative 
commentary on the death of Christ. However, we have, of course, 
so far only dealt with one side of Levinas' treatment of the infinite
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"recurrence". For we must never allow ourselves to overlook the 
fact that Levinas does not waver in his insistence upon the 
asymmetry of the ethical relation: the substitution of the self for 
the Other cannot bring about the substitution of the Other for the 
self. Indeed, in OBBE, he is perhaps even more emphatic than 
usual on this point:
My substitution - it is as my own that 
substitution for the neighbour is produced ... No 
one can substitute himself for me, who 
substitutes himself for all. (OBBE 126)
This statement marks the critical juncture where Hegel and 
Levinas divide. We may express their essential divergence thus: for 
Hegel, redemption and reconciliation are identical terms; whereas 
for Levinas, redemption is synonymous with non-reconciliation. 
We shall now offer an explication of this distinction.
In the previous chapter we traced Hegel's speculative 
commentary on the doctrine of the incarnation. According to 
Hegel's speculative reconstruction of the sacred narrative the death 
of Christ on the cross signifies the coincidentia oppositarium of the 
infinite and the finite, inasmuch as it is a representation of the 
actual culmination of a double movement wherein the flnitized 
infinite has "overarched" absolute finitude and then withdrawn 
back into the pure transcendens of the infinite, leaving behind, as 
it were, an inflnltized finite, which, by virtue of retaining a trace of 
the infinite within itself, is implicitly reconciled with both the 
infinite and the world. As a result, the finite self is, in principle, 
spiritually released from the power of death to a life of freedom. In 
Hegel's words, the crucifixion symbolises the "in-breathing of
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Spirit, whereby substance becomes Subject, by which its 
abstraction and lifelessness has died, and substance therefore has 
become actual and simple and universal self-consciousness" (Phen. 
Para 785). The crucifixion therefore is the salvific crisis which 
accomplishes the absolute forgiveness of finitude via the negation 
of absolute negativity; in short, it is the event through which "the 
wounds of the Spirit heal" (Phen. Para 669), once only and 
thereafter every day in the witness of the ethico-spiritual Kingdom. 
As Hegel expresses it: "death becomes transfigured from its 
immediate meaning viz the non-being of this particular individual, 
into the universality of the Spirit, who dwells in his community, 
dies in it, and is daily resurrected" (Phen. Para 7 8 4 ).5/
We have already noted how Hegel, in the Phenomenology, 
presents the appearance of the God-man as the unity of an implicit 
father (transcendence) with an actual mother (immanence). 
However, Hegel goes on to say that the death of God and his daily 
resurrection in the Spiritual life of the redeemed community brings 
about a radical inversion of the initial transcendent-immanent 
relation; henceforth, the community has its own "deeds and 
knowing" for its actual father, while its previously ultramundane 
mother is, so to speak, "de-actualised"; for she is transfigured, via 
her elevation into the ethereal beyond, into a transcendent 
archetype of eternal (i.e. maternal, non-erotic) love. This 
development, in turn, re-introduces a fresh diremption between 
transcendence and finitude. The fate of freedom is thus 
determined: it consists in overcoming the newly arisen antithesis 
between an implicit mother and an actual father. The end of 
freedom therefore is the accomplishment in universal self-
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consciousness of a fully transparent relation to absolute alterity 
such that the finite self will come to have both an actual father and 
an actual mother.
In deliberate contrast to Hegel, Levinas refuses the "moment" 
of the overarching or intersection of the infinite and the finite. For 
Levinas, there is no coinicidentia oppositorium. and hence there is 
no reconciliation; the lesion remains exposed. This is the whole 
meaning of "substitution", for, in Levinas' words, "when this 
relation (i.e. substitution) is really thought through, it signifies the 
wound that cannot heal over of the self in the ego accused by the 
Other to the point of persecution, and responsibility for its 
persecutor" (OBBE 126) (emphasis added). Levinas' view therefore 
is that the non-reconciliation of the divine and the human is 
necessary to the production of the ethical relation. If the 
movement unto the Other were to hike a reciprocal form then the 
redemptive "relation" would assume a soteriological rather than a 
genuinely ethically transcendent character. That is to say, it would 
remain primarily oriented towards personal salvation from which 
moral duties would then be derived, as it were, at second remove. 
Ethical transcendence, on the other hand, is being for the Other ab 
initio, and hence it is presupposed by the merely moral or pious 
self. The non-coincidence of the self and the Other in the midst of 
their proximity is the essential element that makes the ethical 
relation possible. Levinas succinctly states his understanding of 
this dynamic thus:
The fact that in its Goodness the Good declines 
the desire it arouses while inclining it toward the 
responsibility for the neighbour, preserves 
difference in the non-difference of the Good,
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which chooses me before I welcome it. (OBBE 
123)
To sum up; for Hegel the infinite must identify with the finite 
and then withdraw in order to permit the self to be for itself in 
absolute otherness; for Levinas, on the other hand, the finite must 
make an infinite approach to the Other, an approach which is 
maintained in the measure that the moment of reconciliation is 
refused, since the refusal of reconciliation prevents the full 
coincidence between substance and subject which would negate 
the "non-indifference in difference" essential to the production of 
the ethical relation. Of course, Levinas seriously distorts Hegel's 
notion of the unity of substance and subject by representing it 
purely monologically, and thereby ignoring the latter's stress on the 
non-coincidence of the terms. When Hegel's notion of the unity of 
substance and subject is correctly read as a speculative 
proposition, then, the difference separating him from Levinas is not 
so chasmic as first appears. Hence it is not that the system 
constitutes an immanent totality while Levinas' philosophy is a 
philosophy of absolute otherness. Rather, the System presents the 
speculative unity of the infinity and totality, while Levinas' 
philosophy presents the speculative non-unitv of the infinity and 
totality.
That is to say, for Hegel, the redemptive relation has been 
accomplished and Is accomplished through its re-accomplishment; 
whereas, for Levinas, the redemptive relation never has been 
accomplished since it "is" accomplished ab initio and ab extra prior 
to Being itself, and so an-archically accomplishes itself through its 
incessant non-accomplishment or in the very failure of its
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accomplishment. A speculative interrogation of these differences 
might well conclude that there really is nothing to separate these 
two positions once they Eire elevated to the level of pure thought. 
Although Hegel speaks of the redemptive relation having been 
accomplished, he also adds that this singular reconciliation was at 
once dirempted; thence it follows that the work of re-accomplishing 
the accomplished redemptive relation is an infinite goal, and one 
that we must necessarily fail towards as we seek to perfect it. This 
would appear to be essentially compatible with Levinas' view that 
the ethical relation calls for the infinite witness of ethical service to­
others which succeeds to the extent that it approximates to its end 
without ever fully accomplishing its goal.
However, this would be a superficial conclusion since from a 
speculative standpoint it is by no means a matter of indifference 
that for Levinas the ethical relation is oriented by a trace "in" the 
finite of an infinite that never has been, while, for Hegel it is 
oriented by a trace or spiritual memory "in" the finite self of an 
infinite reconciliation that has been and has then been withdrawn. 
This is a conceptual rather than a merely representational 
distinction. We shall now seek to show how Levinas' formulation of 
the ethical relation commits him to a philosophically incoherent 
position in so far as it results in what we shall call a speculative 
contradiction. We will then go on to demonstrate in part two and 
three of the present study how this Notional inconsistency has 
deleterious consequences for Levinas' account of subjectivity, his 
notion of ethical community, and his conception of the relationship 
between ethics and politics.
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We must first clarify what we do not mean when we charge 
Levinas with falling into speculative contradiction. We are not 
saying that Levinas' use of ontological language to convey a 
meontological and transfinite conceptuality entails eo ipso that the 
form of his philosophical presentation fatally vitiates its content. 
This is the Derridean objection which Levinas is able to meet. 
Indeed, as said, it is Levinas' claim that his notion of 'ethical 
language' is able to overcome the constraints imposed upon 
philosophical expression by natural language that qualifies his 
philosophical work as a species of speculative discourse.
To back up our contention on this point we shall cite 
examples from the text of OBBE where Levinas explicitly affirms 
the capacity of his own philosophical language to transcend the 
limitations of the finite categories of the understanding, or, in his 
own parlance, the Said. In the chapter on Proximity, writing with 
respect to his use of the first-person indexical to signify the 
irrecusable nature of the ethical assignation, Levinas states that "It 
is indeed true that this I has already become a universal in the 
present exposition itself. But I am capable of conceiving a break 
with this universal" (OBBE 139). Despite appearances to the 
contrary, Levinas is not arguing in the circle here since the "I" 
which appears in each of these two sentences has a different point 
of reference corresponding to a distinction between the noumenal 
and the phenomenal self. Levinas, following Hegel, is maintaining 
that the noumenal self may be conceived. This is why Levinas is 
able to state that "the ethical reduction to saying, "the 
indescribable is described" (OBBE 53). Moreover, Levinas contends 
that his own text concretely reproduces and articulates this
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transcendence of finite terms. OBBE he asserts "has exposed the 
signification of subjectivity in the extraordinary everydayness of my 
responsibility for other men" (OBBE 141). He repeats this claim in 
Chapter V of the work:
And still I interrupt the ultimate discourse in 
which all the discourses are stated, in saying it 
to the one that listens to it, and who is situated 
outside the said that discourse says, outside all 
it includes. That is true of the discussion I am 
elaborating at this very moment. This reference 
to an interlocutor permanently breaks through 
the text that the discourse claims to weave in 
thematizing and enveloping all things. (OBBE 
170) (Emphasis added)
We Eire now in a position to formulate the speculative 
contradiction at the heart of Levinas' notion of the ethical. Levinas 
contradicts himself when he holds that, "diachronically" speaking, 
at one and the same time, it is possible (a) to conceive the relation 
between the infinite and the finite and that (b) the conception of 
this "relation” does not bring about an implicit reconciliation 
between the infinite and the finite. In effect, Levinas is 
inadmissibly and inconsistently thinking together the unity and 
difference of alterity and identity and then, as it were, subtracting 
the fact of this thought, as if it were merely his own subjective 
contribution. But it is precisely by thinking the thought of the 
absolute relation that the ethical self is able to transcend the 
psychological and phenomenal conditions and limits of its own 
finitude. In so far as the finite self is able to think the thought of 
the infinite it cannot remain wholly apart from it. We must be 
careful to repeat that the speculative contradiction we are here 
attributing to Levinas does not obtain at the level of the 
Understanding but arises in the realm of pure ideation. In other
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words, we Eire referring to an absolute mode of cognition which has 
transcended the intentional relations characteristic of 
phenomenological consciousness. An example of this is Levinas' 
reformulation of the ontological argument, where consciousness in 
its attempt to think the idea of infinity 'thinks more than it can 
think' and thereby transcends the conditions of its own finite 
cognition to attain to an absolute mode of thought. It must as a 
result be at least partially reconciled with the absolute other.
It seems to me that the only way Levinas would be able to 
resist the force of this conclusion would be if her were to maintain 
that he has access to a special mode of conceptuality which, 
notwithstanding all the formal features it shares with speculative 
discourse, nonetheless articulates a noumenological content in a 
manner which is altogether outside of thought in its Notional 
sense. However, Levinas himself eschews such an intuitionist and 
quasi-mystical stance.®/ He is only too well aware that to adopt 
such a position would be tantamount to renouncing his claim for 
the philosophical intelligibility of his notion of ethics. Moreover, it 
would clearly vitiate the performative meaning of his own texts, 
particularly OBBE, which derive their illocutionary force from the 
way in which "ethical language" does not obviate the philosophical 
lexicon but signifies itself through its received terms.
In conclusion, then, Levinas' claim that the non-coincidence 
of the infinite and the finite is absolutely originary is belied by his 
own analysis and presentation. It is not possible to think the unity 
of alterity and identity as a non-reconciliation since the very 
possibility of the non-identity of these terms is predicated on their
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prior identity and non-identity in thought. Thought is the 
necessary tertium quid in the absolute relation, and Levinas' works 
testify to this fact. We must therefore take the latter's contention 
that the non-reconciliation of the infinite and the finite is "an­
archic" to be derivative. That said, the question still remains as to 
whether or not Levinas' insistence on the non-reciprocity of the 
ethical relation is justified on the basis that the notion of an 
absolute reconciliation would result in a reversion from alterity to 
egoism which would have the effect of negating ethical witness by 
replacing it with a self-centred religiosity?
A Hegelian response to this question would refuse the 
implicit opposition contained within its terms between love of the 
Other and love of self. For Hegel, the possibility of divine love 
presupposes self love, and love of self in turn is predicated on a 
complete socio-historical, political, aesthetic, religious and 
philosophical Bildung. In short, it requires an education in and for 
freedom. But this is precisely what is ruled out by Levinas' notion 
of the ethical. We may say that the Heglian objection to Levinas is 
not that he falls into a 'bad infinity', but that he remains fixated on 
the purely passive moment of the affirmative infinity. That is to 
say, having thought through the infinite "ground" of flnitude, 
Levinas reinstates the hiatus between absolute alterity and the 
finite by refusing to allow the "active" moment of the infinite other 
to overarch the finite self. In short, the divine-human 'encounter' 
is not permitted to release the self; on the contrary, redemption 
takes the form of a reconfirmation in bondage. As Levinas puts it 
in OBBE:
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For subjectivity to signify unreservedly, it would 
then be necessary that the passivity of the 
exposure to the other not be immediately 
inverted into activity, but expose itself in its 
turn; a passivity is necessary, and in the glory of 
the infinite ashes from what an act could not be 
bom. (OBBE 143)
In so far as the Levinasian ethical self is perpetually 
obligated to fulfil the conditions of its own divine election it is not 
in a position to enter into the social, political and historical 
existence necessary for the accomplishment of its full self-potential 
and hence equally necessary for the assumption of an absolute 
relation to the absolute.
Therefore, the speculative-logical criticism that Levinas 
refuses to think Thought through to its end in infinite alterity is at 
one and the same time the centred ethical objection to his notion of 
ethical transcendence. Ironically, Levinas' denial of reciprocity in 
the divine-human relation entails that ultimately there is no 
transcendence of the finite in his philosophy. Finitude is redeemed 
but not set free. Although, following Hegel's description of the early 
Christian community, the Levinasian self may be said to have an 
actual father - the file of illeitv for its "own doing and knowing", its 
iteration in substitution places its relation to its ultramundane 
mother - the 'maternal-psyche' forever outside its reach.
Hence the terms of the ethical relation as Levinas defines it 
foreclose on the possibility of this implicit dimension being made 
explicit, either in the life of the ethico-religious society or in the life 
of the world, in a way that is ruinous to both. The ethical 
community is thereby fated to be corrupted by its rigid antithesis
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER SEC
1/ TI 104: "Infinity is produced by withstanding the invasion of 
a totality, in a contraction that leaves a place for the 
separated being. An infinity that does not close in upon itself 
in a circle but withdraws from the ontological extension so as 
to leave a place for a separated being exists divinely."
2/ Franz Rosenzweig Star of Redemption 178-179.
3/ Martin Heidegger Being and Time Section 122.
4/ In "The Paradox of Morality: an Interview with Emmanuel 
Levinas” Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes, Alison Ainley. 
Translated by Andrew Benjamin and Tamra Wright included 
in (ed) Robert Bemasconi and David Wood. The Provocation 
of Levinas (London and New York, Routledge 1988) pp. 168- 
180, Levinas defines grace as a gratuitous act: The idea of 
the face is the idea of gratuitous love, the commandment of a 
gratuitous act. Commanding love. Commanded love 
signifies recognising the value of love in itself (p. 176).
5/ John Smith, 'Hegel's Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of Spirit 
and the Religious Community' in (ed) D. Christenson, Hegel 
and the Philosophy of Religion (Martinus Nighoff. The 
Hague. 1970).
6/ Cf: TI 77: "The metaphysical relation, the idea of infinity, 
connects with the noumenon which is not a numen. This
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noumenon is to be distinguished from the concept of God 
possessed by the believers of positive religions ill disengaged 
from the bonds of participation, who accept being emerged in 
a myth unbeknownst to themselves."
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PART TWO
THE GENESIS OF THE SOCIO- 
HISTOR1CAL WORLD
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CHAPTER SEVEN
INTRODUCTION: TRANSCENDENCE AND ECONOMIC
JUSTICE
In TI, Levinas stipulates two grounds for the face to face 
relation. First, it is based on a radical symmetry between the 
terms of its "relata". Second, notwithstanding this fact, it is also 
accomplished through the unreserved giving by the I of material 
things to the suffering and needy Other. Indeed, the whole 
substance of Levinas' critique of Buber's dialogical conception of 
the ethical is that it fails to fulfil either of these two conditions. 
The asymmetry of the 1 and the Thou, on the one hand, and the 
material dimension of the ethical relation on the other, are both 
lost sight of in the notion of the "encounter" which reduces the face 
to face relation to the status of an ethically neutral "spiritual 
friendship" (TI 69).1/
We are not concerned with the details of Levinas' relation to 
Buber here.2/ We mention it merely to highlight the importance of 
economic Justice to Levinas' understanding of ethics. Levinas is 
quite emphatic on this point throughout TI. In the opening section, 
he proclaims that the face to face "does not exhaust itself in the 
formalism of abstract thought. It is accomplished in the plenitude 
of economic existence" (TI 60). In so far as the ethical relation 
presupposes giving to others then the ethical self must have 
something to give: "no human or interhuman relationship can be 
enabled outside of economy, no face can be approached with empty 
hands and closed home" (TI 90). In other words, ethics requires
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real generosity, the donation of things: "I speak a word, that In the 
measure that it welcomes the other as other, offers or sacrifices to 
him a product of labour, and consequently does not play above 
economy" (TI 92). In short, the command in the face of the Other 
consists not only in the interdiction: "Thou shalt not kill me", but 
also contains the positive injunction: "Thou must give me bread"; 
as Levinas puts it: "Before the hunger of men responsibility is only 
measured 'objectively'; it is irrecusable" (TI 201). Levinas 
succinctly summarises his understanding of the material element 
in the ethical relation in the following statement: "I can recognise 
the gaze of the stranger, the widow, the orphan only in giving or 
refusing; I am free to give or to refuse, but my recognition passes 
through the interposition of things" (TI 77).
However, is there not a definite tension in Levinas' account 
between the emphasis on absolute symmetry and the requirement 
of material donation and service? If ethical expression is 
necessarily mediated through the 'interposition of things' how can 
it avoid incorporation into a world of phenomena and reciprocity 
where the asymmetry of its point of departure will inevitably be 
negated, since on Levinas' own account all social interaction in- 
the-world is inherently and absolutely reified? In his own words:
action does not express. It has meaning but 
leads us to the agent in his absence. To 
approach someone from works is to enter into 
his interiority as though by burglary: the other is 
surprised in his intimacy like the personages of 
history, he is, to be sure exposed, but does not 
express himself. Works signify their author, but 
indirectly in the third person. (TI 66-67)
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The sincerity of good intentions Is always liable to subversion 
through the Indeterminacy of interpretation. This possibility is 
ramified under conditions of market exchange. As Levinas says, in 
commerce and trade the "Other can dispossess me of my work, 
take it and buy it, and thus direct my behaviour. I am exposed to 
instigation" (TI 227). A hiatus is thereby opened up between the 
producer and his product, with the result that "at a given moment 
the producer no longer follows up, remains behind" ...
This inexpressive character of the product is 
reflected positively in its market value, in its 
suitability for others, in its capability to assume 
the meaning others will give it, to enter into an 
entirely different context from that which 
engenders it. (TI 227)
In short, the problem that presents itself is this: Either the 
ethical relation is entirely divorced from any empirical ethical deed 
(which would contradict Levinas' own insistence that "the 
transcendence of the face is not enacted outside of the world" (TI 
171) or, it is indeed situated within the world, where ex hvpothesi 
it must be subject to alienation and reification.
Levinas however refuses the terms of this disjunction. In 
effect, he maintains that, yes, this either/or would indeed be 
insuperable if being-in-the-world exhausted all human relations; 
but this is not the case for their "exists" within-the-world an "order" 
that is not of the world.
What inward existence lacks is not a being in the 
superlative, prolonging and amplifying the 
equivocations of interlority and its symbolism, 
but an order where all the symbolisms are 
deciphered by beings that present themselves 
absolutely - that express themselves. (TI 178)
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But where is such an order to be found? Levinas' answer to 
this further question is that it is to be found in Religion, in his own 
especial sense of the term. Levinas defines Religion in contrast to 
"politics".
Politics tends to reciprocal recognition, that is 
toward equality; it ensures happiness and 
political law concludes and sanctions the 
struggle for recognition. Religion is Desire and 
not struggle for recognition. It is the surplus 
possible in a society of equals, that of glorious 
humility, responsibility and sacrifice, which are 
the condition for equality itself. fTI 64)
This separation of religion from politics strongly recalls 
Kant's distinction between an ethical kingdom of ends, understood 
as a universal republic of autonomous subjects devoted to moral 
principles, and a political community arising contractually out of a 
state of nature. However, notwithstanding superficial similarities, 
there are decisive reasons why Levinas' account of the relationship 
between ethics and politics cannot be assimilated to a Kantian 
paradigm. For the religious society of which Levinas speaks cannot 
be entered by a shift in perspective from the phenomenal world of 
causality to a noumenal realm of ethical autonomy;4/ since - and 
this again discloses Levinas' proximity to Hegel - the non-formal 
nature of "ethics as first philosophy" demands an institutional 
context for its accomplishment, viz, the family and the "nation" 
conceived as a community of families, incorporating, natural 
resources, labour, property, money, education and political and 
religious institutions. Now, it is by positing the existence of this 
ethico-rellgious community In time but outside of history, that 
Levinas is able to contend that ethical deeds may be expressed in
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the world through the mediation of things without becoming 
alienated in the process.
In the remainder of this study we aim to demonstrate, on the 
basis of a critical Hegelian reading, that the deduction of the 
ethico-religious community set out in TI commits Levinas to an 
essentially pre-modem, particularist, sectarian, patriarchal and 
theocratic notion of community.
We concede that it is by no means obvious from the text of TI 
that Levinas frames his ethics within an institutional matrix. 
Therefore we will have to meet the charge that we are reading into 
Levinas' works a notion of a visible community which is not in the 
texts themselves. Consequently, it is incumbent on us to provide a 
detailed textual substantiation of the interpretation of TI and OBBE 
sketched out above.
Levinas' presentation of the genesis of civil society and the 
state may be analysed in terms of four definite stages. First, the 
elemental realm or "state of nature". Second, the moment o f simple 
production. Third, the constitution of civil society on the realm of 
appearance, and fourth and finally, in the relation between war 
and the state. We shall critically examine Levinas' exposition of 
each of these stages in chronological order.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN
1/ TI 69.
2/ For a comprehensive overview and evaluation of Levinas' 
relationship to Buber, see Robert Bemasconi's essay "'Failure 
of Communication' as a Surplus: Dialogue and lack of 
Dialogue between Buber and Levinas", collected in (ed) 
Bemasconi R and Wood D, The Provocation of Levinas: 
Rethinking the Other (1988).
3/ Immanuel Kant. Metaphysical Elements of Justice,
translated by John Ladd. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill).
4/ Henry Allison Kant's Theory of Freedom. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990) for a statement of a "two 
aspects" theory which treats the noumena-phenomena 
distinction as "two distinct ways in which objects of human 
experience may be "considered" in philosophical reflection" (p 
3-4).
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE TRANSITION FROM THE ELEMENTS TO THE 
WORLD OF REPRESENTATION
Levinas' account of the 'sincerity of Intentions' in EE brings 
to mind Rousseau's vision of the state of nature (in the Discourse 
on Inequality!. In TI, this parallel is further developed and 
concretised. Just as Rousseau holds that the condition of man in 
the state of nature is almost unimaginable from the educated 
perspective of civil society; Levinas likewise maintains that the 
realm of the elements is inconceivable from the reified standpoint 
of Western ontology. 1 / It requires a radical ontological epoche to 
gain access to this, most primordial, state of created life.
Once the reduction is accomplished we gain insight into a 
pre-moral and pre-political world beyond all technical finality. As 
in Rousseau, the state of nature is essentially innocent. All 
privation within this state is predicated on a primary plenitude. In 
Levinas' words:
At the origin there is a being gratified, a citizen of 
paradise. The "emptiness" felt implies that the 
need which becomes aware of it abides already 
in the midst of an enjoyment - be it that of the 
air one breathes. It anticipates the Joy of 
satisfaction, which is better than ataraxy. For 
from putting the sensible life into question, pain 
takes place within its horizons and refers to the 
Joy of living. (TI 144-145)
The elements, therefore, like the solitary individuals^/ that 
populate Rousseau's natural state are occupied by autochthonous
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beings possessed of an essentially benign disposition.^/ Each "I" is 
both immersed in and yet separated from, the "milieu" of the non-I: 
"The non-I feeds enjoyment; the I needs the world that exalts it" (TI 
144). The I, therefore, does not stand in an intentional relation to 
the elements, rather: "Every relation or possession is situated 
within the non-possessible which envelops and contains without 
being able to be enveloped or contained" (TI 131). Thus, the I in 
this paradisal state of "happy dependence" exhibits a primary "love 
of life". Even the disturbances occasioned by want, pain and 
suffering derive their acuteness from the fact that subsistence in 
its original mode is fundamentally "agreeable" (TI 149).4/
One final Rousseauian resonance is that for Levinas the 1 in 
enjoyment is amour de soi. This is implicitly contrasted with the 
factitious amour propre which arises in civil society. 5/ At the 
basis of Levinas' analysis of the relation between enjoyment and 
the elements is the ancient prejudice that 'true' pleasures are 
essentially natural and simple ones.
Eventually the autochthonous self is cast out from this 
Edenic idyll by a compound of desire and fear. On the one hand, 
the I transcends its natural status: "Having recognised its needs as 
material needs, as capable of being satisfied, the I can henceforth 
turn to what it does not lack" (TI 117). On the other hand, the 
separated being has a first experience of "disquietude" within the 
element of enjoyment. The elements are pure, non-predicated 
qualities, they come from nothing, that is to say, "from an apeiron 
distinct from the infinite which is synonymous with "the 
disintegration of becoming, that time prior to representation -
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which is menace and destruction" and which "opens up an abyss 
within enjoyment itself' (TI 141). As Levinas' puts it "the element 
extends into the there is (TI 142). In other words, it is as if the 
Rousseauian state of innocence is overtaken by the Hobbesian 
state of nature.
Levinas makes it clear that the ejection of the separated I 
from its elemental existence is not a contingent occurrence but a 
necessary development. As he puts it: "Within the very interioritv 
hollowed out by enjoyment there must be produced a heteronomy 
that incites to another destiny than the animal complacency in 
oneself (TI 149). Labour is the agency through which this 
alternative destiny is effectuated. In order to escape the impending 
threat of dissolution in the eternal recurrence of the there is the 
separated being sets to work and acquires possessions. To use 
Locke's phrase, it is the "labour of the body and the work of the 
hands"6/ that leads the "atheist will" away from "the immediate 
relation with the non-I" (TI 157) in so far as it converts "the 
nothingness of the future ... into an interval of time in which 
labour and possession are inserted” (TI 146) and so secures the 
passage from "the instantaneousness of enjoyment to the 
fabrication of things" (Ibid), or from animal laborens to homo 
faber.?/
Hence, on closer examination of the text of TI, we see that 
the transition from the elements is in fact subject to a double 
derivation, the nature of which may be made clear by simply 
juxtaposing the following two passages from TI:
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In order that the future arise in its signification 
as a postponement and a delay in which labour 
by mastering the uncertainty of the future and 
its insecurity and by establishing possession, 
delineates separation in the form of economic 
independence, the separated being must be able 
to recollect itself Ise recuelirl and have 
representations. Recollection and representation 
are produced concretely as habitation in a 
dwelling or a Home. (TI 150)
The animal fabricating tools frees itself from its 
animal condition when its momentum seems 
interrupted and broken, when instead of going of 
itself to its goal as an inviolable will it fabricates 
tools and fixes the power of its future action in 
transmissible and receivable things. Thus a 
political and technical existence ensures the will 
its truth, renders it objective (as we say today), 
without opening upon goodness, without 
emptying it of its egoist weight. (TI 242)
The contrast here is between the dwelling as the concrete 
source of recollection and representation and the "political and 
technical" world founded on abstract forms of media. The turn to 
labour by the atheist will therefore results either in its withdrawal 
into the dwelling, where the I is confirmed in its inviolability, or, in 
its transition to a fabricated world where its future is fixed 
exclusively in terms of things. Now, the dwelling is not produced 
by labour; rather, labour is transcendentially conditioned by the 
dwelling. Hence to the extent that homo faber proceeds to 
construct a world in ignorance of its primary orientation in the 
dwelling, it subsists in a realm of phenomena and illusion.
Corresponding to this double movement from the elements, 
out of the primacy of the home on the one hand, or directly into the 
formation of a formless world on the other, there is also a double 
derivation of property in TI. These two deductions roughly 
correlate with an idealist and a materialist theory of property-right.
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Levinas in effect maintains that materialist conception of property 
adequately explains the emergence of the property-form in the 
world, while reserving an idealist deduction of property for the 
other worldly ethico-religious community. We return to this point 
below.
Levinas states that the movement from the state of nature to 
civil society involves a transition from an original communism ("the 
non-possessible which envelops and contains without being able to 
be enveloped and contained") to a derivative state of private 
ownership ("the postponement of enjoyment makes accessible a 
world-being lying escheat, but at the disposal of whoever will take 
possession of it" [TT 157]). Hegel in the Philosophy of Right ($41) 
also contends that there is a justified right to original acquisition, 
but this right is not grounded in the contingent fact that 
possession is a means to the satisfaction of material need but in 
the necessity that a person possess an external sphere for the 
embodiment of his will so that he may recognise and be recognised 
by other persons. Levinas eschews such a derivation of property 
in-the-world, reducing all such property-right to a purely 
instrumental Justification.
In accordance with his overall materialist conception of 
worldly property, Levinas defines labour as a praxis in the Marxian 
sense of the term. That is, he conceives labour as at once an 
epistemological and a practical subject. Through labour the 
elements are aufgehoben. in Levinas' terminology: "appropriation 
and representation add a new event to enjoyment" (TI 139). In 
other words, labour is the power of extemalisation of the will in
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nature via the appropriation and internalisation of objects. The 
primary agent of this formative activity is the hand, which in the 
service of animal laborens is "no longer a sense organ ... but is 
mastery, domination, disposition ... which do not belong to the 
order of sensibility" (TI 161). It is the work of the hand that 
"suspends the independence of the element: its being" (TI 158). 
And a possession is just this: "an existent that has lost its being" 
(Ibid). Therefore, in so far as labour-power has the capacity to 
remove being from change it is also 'the power over time' that 
"posits the product of labour as what remains permanent in time, a 
substance" (TI 160). The appropriative activity of labour executed 
through the hand "delineates a world by drawing what it grasps 
from the elements, delineating definite beings having forms that is 
solids; the informing of the formless is solidification, emergence of 
the graspable, the existent, support of qualities" (TI 161).
In short, labour produces and constructs a stable world of 
forms. Things are named and take on an identity and this in turn 
allows for the repetition, recognition and recollection of phenomena 
over time, essential to both the ontological and the social order:
The world of perception is thus the world where 
things have an identity. The subsistence of the 
world is visibly possible only through memory.
The identity of persons and the continuity of 
their labours project over things the grill through 
which they find again identical things. (TI 139)
However, the stability of this world of forms is of a strictly 
relative character. Since it is based on the formation of matter, the 
ontological edifice "does not close off the return of things to the 
elements" (TI 139). The existence that things possess is entirely
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dependent on the mode in which they are perceived. They do not 
exist "in-themselves" but only as phenomena and appearance. 
Levinas says of the thing: "Strictly speaking it has no identity, 
convertible into another thing it cam become money. Things have 
no face, convertible, ’realisable’, they have a price" (TI 140). Hence, 
things have only a temporary durability, they are equivalent to 
"movable goods" or "furnishings", which lack intrinsic solidity. 
Although private property appears to institute "permanence in the 
pure quality of enjoyment", this too "disappears forthwith in the 
phenomenality of money" (TI 162).
Two "substantial” forms of property stand counterposed to 
property in the commodity-form. On the one hand, there is the 
sacred property which has its origin in the "pagan 'moods', in the 
enrootedness of the earth" (TI 47) and deriving from the II v a: on 
the other hand, there is the dwelling, which we shall analyse 
further below. In keeping with the order of Levinas' presentation, 
however, we shall now go on to detail the immanent development 
whereby labour outside the dwelling is integrated into the illusory 
realm of commodity exchange definitive of civil society.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT
1/ Jean Jacques Rousseau 'A Discourse on the Origin of 
Inequality' The Social Contract and Discourses. Translated 
and edited by GDH Cole (London. Dent. 1973) p. 38: "It Is 
still more cruel that as every advance made by the human 
species removes it still further from its primitive state, the 
more discoveries we make, the more we deprive ourselves of 
the means of making the most important of all. Thus it is, in 
one sense, by our very study of man, that the knowledge of 
him is out of our power."
2/ Ibid p. 59: ... "in this primitive state, men had neither 
houses, nor any kind of property whatever; everyone lived 
where he could, seldom for more them a single night; the 
sexes united without design, as accident, opportunity or 
inclination brought them together, nor had they any great 
need of words to communicate their designs to each other, 
and they parted with the same indifference".
3/ Ibid. p. 72 ... "neither standing in need of his fellow creatures 
nor having any desire to hurt them, and perhaps not even 
distinguishing them from one another ..."
4/ Essentially the same point is made by Hannah Arendt, The 
Human Condition. New York, Anchor Press, 1959, 92-93 
"The 'blessing or the Joy' of labour is the human way to 
experience the sheer bliss of being alive which we share with 
all living creatures
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5/ For the distinction between amour de soi and amour propre. 
see Rousseau's Discourse On Inequality, p. 166 and editors 
Footnote (Ibid).
6/ John Locke, Two Treatise of Government (ed) P. Laslett 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991) Section 26.
7/ The distinction between animal laborens and homo faber is, 
taken from Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition p. 120. 
The analytical terms perfectly fit Levinas' contrast between 
labour in the elemental realm and work in the world of 
representation, reciprocity and exchange.
8/ For example, see TI 166: "The ambiguity of the body, by 
which the I is engaged in the other but comes always from 
the hither-side is produced in labour". For the Marxian 
definition of praxis, see Karl Marx Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts in Writings of the Young Marx on 
Philosophy and Society. Translated by Loyd B. Easton and 
Kurt H. Guddat. (New York, Anchor Books p. 308). For a 
commentary on Marx's analysis in relation to Hegel see 
Georg Lukács. The Young Hegel pp. 547-559.
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CHAPTER NINE
ILLUSION AND APPEARANCE
Central to Levinas' description of the evolution of civil society 
is the inseparable connection between homo faber and the 
philosophy of reflection, (in Levinas terms, "idealist 
representation"). Work and representation have this in common: 
they are both essentially univocal in nature. As such, they are 
isomorphic: "In labouring possession reduces to the same what 
first represented itself as other" (TI 175), while the structure of 
representation is essentially "the non-reciprocal determination of 
the other by the same" (TI 126).
For Levinas, labour, as the "first moment of economy is in 
fact egoist - it is not transcendence; it is not expression " (TI 157). 
It "defines matter without recourse to the idea of infinity" (TI 159). 
Hence it does not reach the other qua other. In Levinas' words, it: 
"grapples with the fallacious resistance of nameless matter, the 
infinity of its nothingness. Thus in the last analysis labour cannot 
be called violence: it is applied to the faceless, to the resistance of 
nothingness" (TI 60). Labour therefore, entirely in terms of Levinas' 
own account, may be faithfully described as the negation, the 
nothingness of matter through its 'internalisation' in a solitary 
subject.!/ This in turn generates the transcendental illusion 
wherein a conditioned being mistakes itself for an originary subject 
constituting being:
Representation is conditioned. Its
transcendental pretension is constantly belied by
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the life that is already implanted in the being 
that representation claims to constitute. But 
representation claims to substitute itself after 
the event for this life in reality. (TI 169)
Now it is not difficult to see that Levinas' entire analysis has 
been to school in Hegel’s Logic. The whole of the "Doctrine of 
Essence" in the Greater Logic consists of a demonstration of the 
manner in which the philosophy of reflection re-posits that which 
has been pre-posited in unreflected being. Levinas' critique of 
"idealist representation" closely parallels Hegel's attacks on Kant's 
"subjective idealism". In the Lesser Logic. Hegel takes Kant to task 
for seeking to reduce the whole of being to the categorial 
determinations of the Understanding:
Still, though the categories, such as unity, or 
cause and effect, are strictly the property of 
thought, it by no means follows that they must 
be ours merely and not also characteristic of 
objects. Kant however confines them to the 
subjective mind, and his philosophy may be 
styled subjective idealism: for he holds that both 
the form and the matter of knowledge are 
supplied by the Ego - or knowing subject - the 
form by our intellectual, the matter by our 
sentient ego. (Enz I: 42)2/
Levinas, therefore, is in essential agreement with Hegel’s 
contention that transcendental philosophy is not originary but is 
itself the emergent result of a primary elevation from being. As 
Hegel famously expresses it. Essence "is past - but timelessly past­
being" (SL 389)3/
In charting this movement from being to essence, Hegel is 
essentially reconstructing, at the level of pure thought, the 
"subjective turn” taken by modem philosophy from Descartes to
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Fichte.4/ The most primitive form of reflection is that of illusory 
being (Schein). Here: "Essence is sublated being. It is simple 
equality with itself, but only in so far as it is the negation of the 
sphere of being in general. Essence thus has immediacy 
confronting it as an immediacy from which it has become and 
which in this sublating has preserved and maintained itself (SL 
394). That is to say, the determination which reflection takes to be 
immediate is in fact not immediate but the re-positing of its own 
presupposition, and hence a "reflected immediacy" (SL 397). 
Locke's analysis of the notion of substance may serve to elucidate 
Hegel's point. In a famous passage in An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding. Locke acknowledges the sceptical 
implications of his corpuscularian ontology. Since we cam have no 
intuition of substance but only of sensible qualities, it follows that 
substance is a "something, I know not what".5/ For Hegel, this 
philosophical conclusion exemplifies the moment of illusory being. 
Reflection constitutes itself through the negation of its own 
presupposition and then relates to the result of its own negative 
activity. It is no longer related to being but to the semblance of 
being:
Consequently, becoming is essence, its reflective 
movement, is the movement of nothing to 
nothing and so back to itself. (SL 400)
However, illusory being (Schein) is not mere illusion, for it is 
the union of guise and disguise - it is both expression and mask.®/ 
In this way, the negated immediate determination of being is 
aufgehoben - cancelled, preserved and elevated - in the sphere of 
reflection.
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Perhaps it will be objected that Levinas has anticipated and 
explicitly precluded our attempt to assimilate his analysis to 
Hegel's logical categories when he states in Section II.E.3 of TI, 
"Phenomena and Being", that: "Being, the thing in itself, is not, 
with respect to the phenomenon, the hidden. Its presence presents 
itself in its word. To posit the thing in itself as hidden would be to 
suppose that it is with respect to the phenomenon what the 
phenomenon is to appearance. The truth of disclosure is at most 
the truth of the phenomenon hidden under the appearances; the 
truth of the thing in itself is not disclosed" (TI 181).
In other words, the "idealist" reduction of the other to the 
same does not simultaneously reveal and conceal the "thing-in- 
itself' (the other qua other). Rather, it simply negates the faceless 
element and relates to its own negation. In its true signification 
"the thing-in-itself' remains absolutely exterior to the powers of 
transcendental apperception and only manifests itself in 
consciousness as the 'idea of infinity'.
Now this reading of Levinas, which we believe to be a faithful 
one, does not contradict but confirms our contention that his 
analysis is, as it were, internal to the categorial development of 
Hegel's Logic. First, Levinas' statement of the relation between the 
element, phenomenon, and representative thinking conforms with, 
allowing for differences in terminology, Hegel's exposition of illusory 
being. Second, Levinas' criticism of the philosophy of reflection 
would only count as a refutation o f Hegel if the latter entirely 
endorsed the reflective standpoint. But as we have seen with
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reference to his critique of Kant, Hegel explicitly rejects the 
ultimacy of this position. Moreover, Hegel demonstrates how the 
deficiencies of illusory being cannot be overcome by somehow 
"lifting the veil of phenomena" or by per impossibile abstracting 
from subjective reflection in order to apprehend the object in its 
purity. There is no backward movement; no possible 'reduction', 
the conceptual movement must continue its own immanent 
momentum forward so as to comprehend the object in the totality 
of its categorial determinations.
The categories of reflection receive their complete articulation 
in the stages of "Appearance" and "Actuality" respectively. The 
stage of "Appearance” repeats the moments of the dialectic of 
illusory being at a higher, that is, more concrete level of 
development. At this higher stage the Notion has got beyond the 
transience of phenomenalism, and the object has attained to the 
"shape of immediate self-subsistence" (SL 500). Here "Appearance" 
is not mere appearance. Finally, the relation between substance 
and appearance is comprehended as "actuality": "the unity of 
essence and existence" (SL 529). "Actuality" therefore encompasses 
and completes the criticism of the totality of ontological thought- 
determinations.7/
However, "Actuality" is not identical with the Notion. The 
transition to "Subjective Logic" reveals the strictly relative nature of 
all ontological determination. The Notion as the unity of Being and 
Essence is not reducible to the status of an ens. not even a 
'supreme' ens. It is beyond Being and Essence whilst being 
"reflected in" Being and Essence.8/ Therefore, the movement of
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categorial determinations always stands in relation to a "third" 
which itself eludes categorial definition. This "third" stands 'in- 
between' the diremption of concepts into universal and particular 
determinations, for it is infinite individuality or the true "thing-in- 
itself' which manifests itself, not to be sure through the negation of 
immediate being, but in the negation of the negation of immediate 
being (SL 596). In short, it is the "concrete individual" or the 
infinite self which is absolutely recognised in its otherness. In 
Hegel's words:
The universal is therefore free power: it is itself 
and takes its other in its embrace, but without 
doing violence to it; on the contrary, the 
universal is in its other, in peaceful communion 
with itself. We have called it free power, but it 
could also be called free love and boundless 
blessedness, for it bears towards its other as 
towards its own self: in it, it has returned to 
itself. (SL 603)
The "return to self' of which Hegel speaks here, does not 
denote a recoil into a finite ego devoid of all determination, but a 
return to the infinite-in-the-self.®/ That is, to the absolute Other 
that overarches and reveals itself within the individual finite being.
In Paul One, we noted how Levinas' understanding of the 
ethical relation falls short of this movement: though the I 
transcends its 'ontological' self towards the infinite: the infinite 
does not overarch and embrace the finite self. Notwithstanding 
this critical difference between Hegel and Levinas, it is apparent 
that Hegel's Notion of the Notion transcends the ontological 
standpoint of the philosophy of reflection, or expressed in Levinas' 
terms, it goes beyond the Totality' and the 'Said'.
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It follows, therefore, that "Doctrine of Essence" exemplifies 
the movement of the absolute method which must:
... combine in our process of enquiry the actions 
of a form of thought with a criticism of them. 
The forms of thought must be studied in their 
essential nature and complete development: they 
are at once the object of research and the action 
of that object. Hence they examine themselves: 
in their own action they must determine their 
limits, and point out their defects. (EL 41. 
Zusatz)
Accordingly, Hegel is not endorsing the standpoint of 
reflection in the Logic, rather he is criticising it; while at the same 
time acknowledging its necessity. This allows for the 
comprehension in pure thought of the intrinsic connection between 
the negative activity of labour and the constitution of a world of 
semblance, form and appearance. Hegel notes how this connection 
is preserved in the very etymology of thinghood: 10/
... the thing is reflection-into-itself: for it is an 
identity which is also distinct from the difference 
ie its attributes. In many languages 'have' is 
deployed to denote past time. And with reason: 
for the past is absorbed or suspended being, and 
the mind is its reflection-into-self. (Enz. I: 125)
The extent to which the overall development of TI reproduces 
the immanent catégorial movement of the sphere of essence is 
reflected in the central division within the work between 
"Interiority" and "Exteriority". As we have already noted, the 
movement of essence is, broadly speaking, from illusory being 
(Scheinl through to "appearance" and "actuality". In Hegel's 
Realphllosophle these categories are socio-historically concretised
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in the transition from simple subsistence production through to a 
commodity economy. Now, in TI there is a parallel evolution. In 
the sphere of "interiority" animal laborens is depicted as an 
essentially solitary being standing in a univocal relation to nature 
and other wills (illusory being), while, as we will shortly see, in the 
sphere of "exteriority", the separated being has transformed itself 
into homo faber. and is approached on the basis of its works 
(appearance).
In TI, the sphere of "exteriority" is continuous with life in civil 
society. Levinas sums up this societal existence in unremittingly 
pejorative terms. He informs us that herein:
Separation is embedded in am order in which the 
asymmetry of the interpersonal relation is 
effaced, where I and the Other become 
interchangeable in commerce, and where the 
particular man, and individuation of the genus 
mam, appeairing in history, is substituted for I 
and the Other. (TI 226)
Within this impersonail world the will is subject to a kind of 
fa turn: "The way a will plays a role in history is has not willed 
mairks the limits of interiority: the will finds itself caught up in 
events that will appeair only to the historian" (TI 228). The will of 
the worker is divorced from its life-activity. This results in an 
ailmost total reification: "since works taike on the amonymity of 
merchamdise, amd anonymity into which, as wage-eaimer, the 
worker may himself disappear" fTI 226), until finally the "Will itself 
thus takes on a meaming of the other, as though it were a thing" (TI 
229).
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Levinas however is careful to note that notwithstanding this 
reduction to a reified and alienated state: "The relation does not 
resemble that which characterises labour: in commerce and war 
the relation with the work remains a relation with the worker" 
(Ibid). That is to say, in "exteriority" the will has transcended its 
solitary existence in simple production and entered into the 
societal sphere of intersubjective relations. But, in so doing it has 
merely exchange one form of solitariness for another: for the 
abstract recognition the will receives as a person still amounts to 
the non-recognition of its concrete singularity as an ethical being.
Now, this whole analysis once again bears the imprint of 
Hegel. It is now generally agreed that Hegel was the first modem 
thinker to fully grasp the inherent dynamic of civil society both in 
its positive and negative dimensions. H  / In his early System of 
Ethical Life. Hegel presents a conceptual exposition of the manner 
in which the industrial revolution and its concomitant division of 
labour and specialisation of tasks had resulted in the overthrow of 
an economy based on the production of use-values and its 
replacement by an economic order geared towards the self­
expansion of capital through commerce. The economic sphere of 
civil society constructs a system of mutual interdependence in 
which each individual no longer labours to satisfy his own 
particular needs but the needs of all and where, conversely, the 
satisfaction of each individual's needs is the work of countless 
others. Since labour is now an abstract category it requires an 
abstract medium to represent it: "money is this materially existing 
concept, the form of unity, or the possibility of all things needed" 
(S.E.L. 249).
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Within civil society therefore the universal and the particular 
will are related to one another only through the abstract medium of 
the cash nexus. Intersubjective relations are situated within a 
system of merely formal recognition. Civil society constitutes this 
"Relative Ethical Life”. In terms strikingly similar to those later 
employed by Levinas, Hegel shows how the diremption of the 
universal and the particular in civil society results in the 
"subsumption” of intuition (particularly) under the concept 
(abstract universal):
Need and labour, elevated into this universality 
then form on their own account a monstrous 
system of community and mutual 
interdependence in a great people; a life of the 
dead body, that moves itself within itself, one 
which ebbs and flows in its motion blindly, like 
the elements, and which requires strict 
dominance and taming like a wild beast. (Ibid)
Hegel therefore anticipated Levinas' rhetorical description of 
the de-personalising tendencies at work within civil society. Where 
they differ, as we shall see, is that Levinas extends the element of 
reification to include the totality of social and political relations 
within the State, while Hegel maintains that the reification of social 
reactions is in principle overcome through the immanent 
development of additional social and political institutions which 
transcend and relativise the sphere of commodity-exchange.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER NINE
1/ Levinas' analysis at this point coincides with Hegel's 
exposition, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, of immediate 
desire, where consciousness relates to the Other qua object 
rather than qua subject "certain of the nothingness of this 
Other, it explicitly affirms that this nothingness is for it. the 
truth of the other; it destroys the independent object and 
thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as true certainty" 
(Phen Para 174). Levinas erroneously makes this description 
of immediate Desire paradigmatic for the movement of the 
Notion as a whole, for example, see TI 36-37: "Hegelian 
phenomenology, where self-consciousness is the 
distinguishing of what is not distinct, expresses the 
universality of the same identifying itself in the alterity of 
objects thought and despite the opposition of self to self .... 
the difference is not a difference, the I, as Other, is not an 
"Other"." Perhaps Levinas' reading is distorted by the 
reception of Hegel in French thought through the prism of 
Kojeve's influential lectures.
2/ For example, in TI 127-128, Levinas states 'To doubt that 
the form that stands out in profiles on the horizon or in the 
darkness exists, to impose on a chunk of iron that presents 
itself a given form so as to make of it a knife, to overcome an 
obstacle or do away with an enemy: to doubt, to labour, to 
destroy, to kill - these negating acts assume objective 
exteriority rather than constitute it. To assume exteriority is
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to enter into a relation with it such that the same determines 
the other while being determined by it."
3/ Hegel's Logic therefore cannot be interpreted along 
constructivist lines as a consistent Kantianism. But neither 
is it a reversion to a pre-critical standpoint. In truth, Hegel 
decisively breaks with the Kantian project first by showing 
that transcendent illusion is not merely a regulative ideal but 
is in fact constitutive of reason itself, in a speculative sense, 
and, second, by rendering the resultant unified concept of 
reason (Notion) relative to an absolute otherness which 
transcends it, yet which is reflected within it (Idea). Thus, in 
Hegel's Logic neither the otherness o f God nor the otherness 
of nature is deemed to be constituted by the synthesizing 
activity of transcendental consciousness. In the words of 
Robert Stem Hegel. Kant and the structure of the Object 
(London, New York, Routledge, 1990), Hegel "frees the unity 
of the object from the synthesizing activity of Kant's 
transcendental subject; for on Hegel's account, (to put it 
simply), the object does not need us, because as the 
exemplification of a substance - universal, it is no longer 
treated or reducible to the kind of atomistic manifold that 
requires this synthesis" (p. 5). Stem's recognition of Hegel's 
commitment to a residual realism allows him to discern the 
true relationship between the Idea, Spirit and Nature in the 
System. In his commentary on Hegel's final syllogistic 
statement of their interrelation in Part III of the 
Encyclopaedia, 575-577, he notes: "Hegel states clearly that 
the role of spirit as mediator is not to determine or structure
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Nature through the Idea itself, but merely to recognise or 
discern ierkennen) this structure as it already exists in 
Nature. For, as Hegel stated in the first syllogism. Nature is 
in-itself the Idea: the task of Spirit as mediator is to make 
this implicit structure explicit, and thereby to enable Nature 
to mediate between itself and Logic. It follows from this that 
the place of Spirit in Hegel's system is not to determine 
Nature itself, but rather to bring to light the extent to which 
Nature is already determined by the Idea. Unlike Kant's 
idealism, therefore. Mind for Hegel is not ontologicallv active, 
in structuring and determining Nature, although it is active 
in determining the structure of the Idea in its otherness. In 
short. Mind brings out the presence of the Idea, even as it 
exists in its other, and in recognising the structure of the 
Idea in this way, it establishes the implicit existence of the 
Idea in nature" (p. 117). Stem sums up his interpretation by 
saying: "for Hegel it is not Mind that brings together Idea and 
Nature but ultimately the Idea that makes possible the unity 
of Nature and Mind" (p. 118). A similar understanding of the 
relationship between Idea, Spirit and Nature is also to be 
found in Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel's 
Thought p. 85. Ironically, Hegel's critique of transcendental 
idealism for subsuming the intuition under the concept has 
been consistently overlooked, and he himself has been read 
as a Fichtean. For example, see Theodor Adomo, Negative 
Dialectics, translated by E.B. Ashton (London, Routledge, 
1973) "The principle of absolute identity is self-contradictory. 
It perpetuates non-identity in suppressed and damaged form. 
A  trace of this entered into Hegel's effort to have non-identity
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absorbed by the philosophy of identity, indeed to define 
identity by non-identity. Yet Hegel is distorting the state of 
facts by affirming identity, admitting non-identity as a 
negative - albeit a necessary one - and misconceiving the 
negativity of the universal. He lacks sympathy with the 
utopian particular that has been buried underneath the 
universal - with that non-identity which would not come into 
being until realised reason has left the particular reason of 
the universal behind” (p. 318). We see the same misguided 
attempt to reduce the Absolute Idea to a "work-model" of 
activity in Levinas (see previous footnote).
4/ Stanley Rosen, GWF. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science 
of Wisdom (New Haven and New York. Yale University Press, 
1974) p. 64.
5/ John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
edited with a Foreward by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1975) II xxiii Section 15, p. 305.
6/ Cf: Daniel O. Dahlstrom, "Between Being and Essence: 
Reflection's Logical Disguises" in (ed) G. de Giovanni, Essays 
on Hegel's Logic. (New York, State University of New York 
Press, 1990) pp. 99-111. "Essence as the reflection on being 
represents the overcoming of being as mere immediacy. 
From the standpoint of Immediately distinctive beings 
fDaseln). essence is other than being. But from the 
perspective of what is essential, being's simple immediacy is 
a guise. Moreover, insofar as the guise is considered a guise
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of being (ie as belonging to, and of the character of seini the 
guise is a disguise."
7/ SL Introduction 63.
8/ Cf: SL 596: "The frequency consideration of the Notion shows 
it to be the unity of being and essence. Essence is the first 
negation of being, which has thereby become illusory being: 
the Notion is the second negation, or the negation of this 
negation, and is therefore being once more, but being that 
has been restored as the infinite mediation and negativity of 
being within itself'. The movement of Hegel's thought 
exceeds the form of his own substantialist terminology. 
Although Hegel speaks of a "restoration" of being in the 
Notion, he is careful to distinguish the supersensible being of 
the latter from the immediate and illusory being found in the 
ontological domain of being and essence. The Notion as 
infinite, supersensible 'being' transcends ontology and, as 
such, constitutes the speculative unity of being and essence. 
See also footnote 9 to Part One, Chapter Three above.
9/ Merold Westphal "Hegel's Theory of the Concept" pp. 3-18 
collected in Hegel. Freedom and Modernity (New York, State 
University of New York Press, 1992). See below. Paul One, 
Chapter Six.
10/ For a discussion of Hegel's concept of the thing, see Gillian
Rose. The Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and Law 
(Oxford and New York, Blackwell, 1984) p. 56.
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11/ Shlomo Avineri Hegel's Theory of the Modem State 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972) 
acknowledges Hegel's originality in this respect, p. 51.
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CHAPTER TEN
ETHICS AND THE STATE
For Hegel, the birth of civil society is at once an historical 
and an eschatological event, insofar as it repeats the 
desacralisation of nature immediately accomplished in the death of 
God and his rebirth in the spiritual community of the elect, in the 
secular world as a whole. Civil society therefore constitutes the 
appearance of the Idea in the realm of actuality. But qua 
appearance it is immediately dirempted into a restless unity of 
centripetal and centrifugal forces.
Economic relations found the infrastructure of civil society - 
the "system of needs" - upon which is built a superstructural 
system of [formal] recognition. This distinction however is an 
analytical one, since within the system of needs both economic and 
social relations instantiate the commodity-form. As a result, the 
universal has a dead existence external to the individual, who does 
not determine his ends for-himself but has them given to him in 
the shape of commodities; a relation Hegel expresses concisely 
when he says, "A need is created not so much by those who 
experience it directly as by those who seek to profit from its 
emergence" (PR 191 Addition). The socialisation of need and desire 
leads to a bad infinity of insatiable wants, in which goods are 
acquired for the sake of their acquisition rather than for any 
intrinsic satisfaction they may offer. This process is. in turn, 
bound to the polarisation of society into extremes of wealth and
want:
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The tendency of the social condition towards an 
indeterminate multiplication and specification of 
needs, means and pleasures - ie luxury - a 
tendency which like the distinction between 
natural and educated needs has no limits 
[Grenzenl. involves an equally infinite increase in 
dependence and want. [PR 195]
Hegel was perhaps the first social theorist to understand that 
poverty, and the attendant creation of what is now known as an 
"underclass", is not an incidental feature of a society ruled by 
capital but is rather endemic to its very structure and operation:^/ 
he vividly sums up the central paradox of civil society (when the 
latter is construed solely as a sphere of economic mediation) thus: 
"despite an excess of wealth, civil society is not wealthy enough - 
i.e. its own distinct resources are not sufficient - to prevent an 
excess of poverty and the formation of a rabble" (PR 245).
Yet the classicalist tone of Hegel's condemnation of excess 
wealth and luxury must not mislead us into thinking that Hegel is 
calling for the restoration of some form of pre-modem polity. On 
the contrary, Hegel expressly affirms the penetration of the money- 
form through all spheres of social interaction to be an agent of 
liberation as well as corruption. He notes that within the modem 
state "money is not in fact one particular resource among others: 
on the contrary it is the universal aspect of them all, in so far as 
they express themselves in an external existence (Dasein) in which 
they can be apprehended as things. Only at this extreme point of 
externality is It possible to determine services quantitatively and so 
in a just and equitable manner" (PR 299). In the Zusatz to the 
same paragraph, Hegel goes on to contrast this state of affairs with
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pre-modem forms of economic justice based on ascribed role- 
allocation, fixed remuneration and ties of personal dependence, 
and to identify the deficiency of such social relations as being their 
lack of "the principle of subjective freedom whereby the individual's 
substantial activity ... is mediated by his own particular will" (PR 
299 Zusatz). In other words, subjective freedom is an appearance 
but by no means a mere illusion. For it is the assertion of the 
rights of subjectivity which brings about the dissolution of all 
traditional bonds: "Civil society tears the individual iindividuum) 
away from family ties, alienates the members of the family from one 
another, and recognises them as self-sufficient persons" (PR 238). 
It "substitutes its own soil for the external inorganic nature and 
paternal soil from which the individual fder Einzelne) gained his 
livelihood" and subjects it "to dependence on civil society and 
contingency" (Ibid).
It is important to note that the Aristotelian dimension to 
Hegel's ethics, which is profound, is reconstructed on the basis of 
the realisation of the idea of freedom in the modem world, and this 
in turn is immediately grounded in the historical transition to a 
civil society based on legal relations of abstract right. Therefore, 
Hegel's critique of the social dysfunctions of excessive wealth and 
luxury is not advanced from a standpoint that seeks to oppose 
putative 'real' needs to supposed false ones. Hegel understands 
that within civil society all needs are artificial', i.e. social. Rather 
his substantive point is the bad Infinity of desire as a means to 
further desires and so on and on, does not derive from any 
intrinsic properties of the objects desired but in the failure on the 
part of the conative subject to integrate the plurality of its desires
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within "a rational system of volitional determination" (das 
Vernünftige System de Willenbestimmungi (PR 19). That is to say, 
specific desires are only a source of unfreedom when they are not 
chosen deliberately as the result of a second order will to will in 
accordance with an overall rationed life-plan. Hegel is therefore not 
opposed to consumption per se. not even to conspicuous 
consumption; only to passive consumption.
The contrast with Levinas' understanding of the relation 
between enjoyment and need at this point reveals the latter's anti­
modem bias. We noted below how Levinas makes an implicit 
distinction between real and illusory pleasures. 'Real' enjoyment 
derives from life in the elements - that is in a lived relation to 
natural goods outside of their reference to any instrumental or 
utilitarian framework. Furthermore, Levinas also maintains that 
the distinctive feature of this elemented enjoyment is its non- 
intentional character. The self-in-enjoyment is passive; it is 
immersed within the elements "from which” it lives. In sum, 
whereas Hegel's account of the aufgehoben of the pre-social egoism 
of the [univocal] desiring subject within a "system of needs" 
mediated by reciprocal formal-legal recognition, demonstrates that 
within civil society the possibilities of enjoyment and pleasure are 
massively augmented rather than attenuated; by contrast, Levinas' 
analysis of the relation between need and enjoyment in the pre­
social "elements" and in civil society respectively, merely juxtaposes 
a soi-disant authentic mode of satisfaction with its supposedly 
etiolated and alienated counterpart. Of course, Levinas is not 
saying that life in civil society is Joyless; but he i§ implying that the 
basis of all 'real' enjoyment that is to be found therein is not
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generated from within its own resources but has its source in the 
pre-social, simple needs of elemental life, which the subject cannot 
actively produce but only passively receive. When Levinas' analysis 
is inserted within the contemporary context of existing power 
relations from which it is abstracted its potentially pernicious anti­
libertarian implications become all too apparent. For what 
authority is to determine what counts as a need if not the desiring 
subject itself?
Hegel however is all too aware of the limitations placed on 
the ideal of a rational self-determination by the economic 
structures that underpin social relations within civil society. 
Liberation from parochialism places individuals at the mercy of 
market contingencies. The complexity and dynamic of economic 
transitions is such that when aggregated they become subject to a 
logic which is beyond the rational calculation and control of the 
economic agents making decisions in the market place. The result 
is that the economic cycle is frequently punctuated by crises of 
overproduction and the collapse of financial markets followed by 
recession and mass unemployment. Moreover, as noted above, 
Hegel understood how this element of 'blind chance" at play in the 
market rapidly produces great disparities in individual fortunes, 
which, once established, quickly become entrenched and self­
reinforcing. The inevitable outcome is a polarisation in wealth, 
income and status and the resultant creation of a whole social 
class that is materially (though not formally) excluded from social 
life and, a fortiori, from civic responsibility. In short, the dialectic 
o f civil society produces a large "underclass" without (substantive) 
rights and, therefore, equally, without duties to the State.
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Hegel proposes no direct solution to the problem of poverty, 
notwithstanding some rather dubious comments expressed obiter 
dicta.3/ This is in keeping with the fundamental aim of the 
Philosophy of Right, which sets out to provide an exposition of the 
concept of Right and to present its full actualisation (PR 1). From 
the Notional "standpoint" the significance of the problem of poverty 
is that it identifies the basic contradiction within the economic 
infrastructure of civil society; viz, that the exercise by all free 
persons of their universal right to enter into contractual 
agreements with other wills results in a social situation where 
some persons lose their capacity to enter into such relations on a 
free and equal basis, which, in turn, contradicts the presupposition 
upon which social relations within civil society are based. As a 
result, the sphere of economic interdependence is not a real but 
only an abstract universal in so far as the totality of individuals 
that comprise it are not all recognised within it, or, more precisely, 
it constitutes a formal system of recognition which actually 
misrecognises the reality of dominance and subordination 
underlying the economic mediation of interpersonal relations. The 
fact of poverty therefore provides an immanent proof, as it were, 
that commodity exchange alone is not a sufficient basis upon 
which to ground social interaction within civil society since it 
contradicts its own formal presuppositions, and this in turn 
demonstrates the necessity for additional institutions to negate this 
negation by cancelling the destruction of personality wrought by 
the social evil of poverty and destitution.
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The additional institutions required, are on the one hand 
those internal to civil society: the administration of Justice, the 
Welfare State and the Corporation, and on the other, the moments 
of the Constitutional State: the legislature, the executive and the 
sovereign. Now a contemporary Hegelian exposition of the State 
would necessarily proceed on the basis of making a distinction 
between the speculative-logical form of Hegel's deduction, which 
retains all its validity, and the institutional content of his 
deduction, which needs to be revised in the light of changes in 
historical circumstances.4/ This clearly entails that the content of 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right may be consistently criticised form 
within the Hegelian System.
Within Civil Society, in addition to the sphere of economic 
mediation, two further institutional structures are required. On 
the one hand, a plurality o f voluntary associations representing 
promotional and sectional interest groups, and, on the other, an 
administrative, judicial and welfare state machinery, providing for 
the legal rights and material and emotional needs of civilians. Two 
points must be noted here; first, from a contemporary perspective, 
voluntary associations within civil society can only partially play 
the role that Hegel reserved for "Corporations" in the Philosophy of 
Right: "estates" in Hegel’s sense of the term have been altogether 
abolished and replaced by "classes", the latter conforming more to 
a Weberian rather than a Marxian definition; two, the 
administrative and welfare state, no matter how broadly defined, 
cannot substitute itself for the politiceli institutions of the state 
proper. The political organs of the State transcend the associative 
and administrative welfare institutions of civil society. Whereas the
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primary function of the Welfare State, taken In Its widest sense, is 
to secure the rights of person, property and well being of all 
members of civil society, the state's raison d'etre is to provide the 
institutional structures necessary for the universal participation of 
all citizens in (sell) government.
Therefore, the extra-economic organisations of civil society - 
both public and private - possess a double function; on the one 
hand they exist, as we have said, to provide for the subjective 
needs of private persons, but on the other hand they are the 
objective means through which the institutions of government may 
be devolved and distributed throughout society so enabling and 
instituting self-government. 5/ Conversely, the political autonomy 
of the state is upheld through direct elections of the legislature and 
the sovereign with the result that civil society is, so to speak, 
sublated in the State. Thus, the state is neither reducible to civil 
society nor is it divorcible from it.®/
In contrast with the richness and depth of Hegel's theory of 
the state, Levinas' treatment of the subject in TI is simplistic and 
banal. Levinas classifies all political regimes under two categories - 
the irrational and the rational. The irrational state supposedly 
derives directly from a pagan participation in the there is. National 
socialism is taken to be its modem exemplar.
The rational state, on the other hand, is said to be founded 
on an identification of will and reason and constitutes a closed 
totality ruled exclusively through formal-legal rationality. This two­
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fold distinction is presented as an exhaustive typology of all states 
and political regimes.
The rational state is an extension of the delay and 
postponement of the there is first introduced through labour and 
work. The state therefore simply extends the alienation of the 
subject, effected through commerce, into the political realm. As 
Levinas expresses it: "Objective judgement is pronounced by the 
very existence of rational institutions... It consists in the 
submission of the subjective will to universal laws which reduce 
the will to its objective signification" (TI 242). He continues: 
"Henceforth, it exists as though it [the Will - AG) were dead”, for its 
subjective existence merely amounts to "the after effect of its 
animality" (Ibid). The fear of the there is now gives way to another 
tyranny, "a tyranny of the universal and the impersonal, an order 
that is inhuman though distinct from the brutish" (Ibid). Levinas 
contends that political and social existence is not merely neutral in 
respect to the ethical relation but positively inimical to its 
expression: "formal reason is incarnate in a being only In the 
measure that it loses its election and is equivalent to all the others" 
(TI 246).
But within this general repudiation of civil society and the 
principle of subjectivity upon which it is grounded, we find an 
alternative, more affirmative, embracement of some of its 
institutional features. For example, Levinas approvingly cites 
Hegel in support of the proposition that "the good will by itself is 
not a true freedom as long as it does not dispose of the means to 
realise itself' (TI 242). In similar vein, he states that "freedom is
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not realised outside of social and political institutions" because "an 
existence that is free and not a velleity for freedom, presupposes a 
certain organisation of nature and society" (Ibid).
These remarks, taken from TI, recall observations which 
Levinas had already had occasion to make in his essay "The Ego 
and the Totality", which may be considered as a draft for TI. In 
this work he states the following:
Justice can have no other object than economic 
equality. It does not come to birth out of the 
very play of injustice; it comes from outside. But 
it is an illusion to suppose that, originally 
outside of economic relations, it could be 
maintained outside them in a kingdom of pure 
respect. (CP 44)
Significantly, Levinas goes on to connect the question of 
justice to a metaphysical analysis of money and exchange value (a 
theme he subsequently drops in TI). He defines money as an 
ethical category. In an analysis which strikingly recall Hegel's 
treatment of the subject in the Philosophy of Right, he states that 
money is: "the abstract element in which is brought about the 
generalisation of that which has no concept, the equating of that 
which has no quantity. It is an ambiguous medium where persons 
tire integrated into the order of commodities, yet where they still 
remain persons, since the order of commodities (which is not 
equivalent to the order of nature) does presuppose persons. 
Persons thus remain inalienable even in the transactions in which 
they sell themselves" (CP 45). Because money is an "element in 
which the person is maintained while being quantified", it does not 
"purely and simply mark the reification of men" (Ibid). In turn, this
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presupposes "men who have time at their disposal, who are present 
in a world which endures beyond momentary contacts, men who 
trust one another and form a society" (Ibid).
The dilemma confronting Levinas then is this: how can 
labour, property, money, contracts, and social and political 
institutions be at one and the same time prerequisites of the 
ethical relation when it is these very same institutions which 
negate the ethical relation qua ethical? As we have seen, it is not 
open to Levinas to follow Hegel seeking to demonstrate that the 
destructive dynamic or civil society may be aufgehoben in the state 
since he views the latter as simply an extension of the egoism of 
civil society. He avoids the dilemma by implicitly maintaining that 
the potential for alienation within civil society is already overcome 
in the life of the ethico-religious community.?/ In effect, Levinas 
displaces what for Hegel is the central ethical contradiction within 
civil society - its capacity to both degrade and elevate the human 
subject - into an opposition between the state, on the one hand, 
conceived as a realm of total reification in which the social 
experience of freedom is pure illusion - and, on the other, the 
ethico-religious community - wherein individuals relate face to face 
in a wholly ethical existence, notwithstanding their interpolation in 
a social world mediated by exchange value.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER TEN
1/ Joachim Ritter. Hegel and the French Revolution. Essays on 
the Philosophy of Right translated by Richard Dlen Winfield 
(Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1982) p. 51.
2/ On this point, see Allen Wood Hegel's Ethical Thought 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 58-60.
3/ PR 245 Zusatz where Hegel admits he has no solution to the 
problem and concludes that perhaps the best remedy "is to 
leave the poor to their fate and to direct themselves to beg 
from the public".
4/ Richard Dien Winfield Reason and Justice (New York, State 
University of New York Press, 1988) attempts to provide just 
such a contemporary reconstruction of the Hegelian Idea of 
the State on the basis o f Hegel's systematic method. Winfield 
successfully identifies the central areas of Hegel's deduction 
of the institutions of the State which are marred by the 
inclusion of arbitrary, natural determinations which have 
been conceptually superseded at a Notional level. However, 
the weakness of Winfield's reconstruction is that his 
emphasis on the Immanent development of the logical Notion 
in the systematic deduction of the State leads him to divorce 
the Notion from its phenomenological genesis. This results 
in an over-formalised and abstract presentation of the 
relation between the state and civil society.
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5/ For a contemporary reconstruction of the State - civil society 
relationship along these lines see Andrew Arato. "A 
Reconstruction of Hegel's Theory of Civil Society" pp. 301- 
320 in Hegel and Legal Theory (ed) Drucilla Cornell; Michel 
Rosenfeld, David Gray Carlson, (London, Routledge, 1991). 
Arato identifies the following antinomy running through 
Hegel's System of Right: "a contradiction between systematic 
philosophy and social theory, expressed politically as the 
antinomy of etatic and anti-etatic positions to be found in the 
doctrines of both civil society and the state. Hegel's social 
theory presents modem society both as a world of alienation, 
and as an open-ended search for integration. His 
philosophical system on the other hand announces that this 
quest has ended in the modem state, though it is never 
entirely clear whether he meant a possible and desirable 
state, or a not-yet existent state but necessary state, or an 
actually existing state" (p. 301).
However, Gillian Rose Hegel Contra Sociology (1981) 
demonstrates that this ambiguity is not the result of 
confusion on Hegel's part, as Arato implies, but is an 
essential element of Hegel's speculative and aporetic 
discourse. In Rose's words: "Just as the theoretical 
distinction between finite and infinite is contradictory, so is 
the practical distinction between morality and legality. Just 
as the theoretical dichotomy implies a unity which is 
present, but not pre-Judged in the two senses of pre-Judge, 
so the dichotomy of morality and legality Implies a unity 
which is present but not prejudged. Sittlichkelt 'ethical life'
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refers to the unity of the realms of morality and legality, and 
the 'absolute' to the unity of the infinite and the finite" (pp. 
46-47). According to Rose, therefore, for Hegel, ethical life is 
'implied' by the prevailing antimonies of modem social and 
political life but is not yet 'actual'. Speculative thinking 
'stays' with this diremption, refusing both an abstract 
utopian solution or an uncritical endorsement o f the status 
quo. As Rose puts it "if ethical life is abstract, then it can 
only be recognised by recognising its abstractions, the 
cobwebs, and their determination. In this way actuality is 
recognised and another indeterminate, non-actuality is not 
posited” (p. 203). The Philosophy of Right therefore is neither 
a functional analysis of the existing state nor is it a 
counterfactual presentation of an ideal political community. 
As Rose cogently argues Hegel "could not 'justify' in a 
Kantian sense the idea of absolute ethical life; we could not 
provide any statement of it apart from the presentations of 
the contradictions that imply it. For an abstract statement 
would make manifest that this ethical world does not exist in 
the modem world. This would be to turn ethical life into an 
abstract ideal, a Sollen. which would be completely 
'unjustified' because not implied by the contradictions 
between political consciousness and its social and historical 
bases. Hegel's solution to this dilemma was to emphasise 
the presence of ethical life, not the task of achieving it. 
Ironically, as a result, the Philosophy of Right has been read 
as a speculative Justification fslc) of a status quo, instead of a 
speculative (dis)guise to commend the unity of theory and 
practice” (pp. 50-51). The critical standpoint o f this study
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attempts to combine a Hegelianism which "emphasises the 
presence of ethical life, and not the task of achieving it" with 
a speculative reading that underlines the lack of identity 
between the rational and the real.
6/ Andrew Arato "A Reconstruction of Hegel's Theory of Civil 
Society" P. 316 argues that Hegel "works out a modem 
republican theory" based on a reconceptualisation of the 
relationship between the state and the public sphere.
7/ Jacques Derrida Violence and Metaphysics notes en passant 
that if Levinas' notion of ethical language is to transcend the 
sphere of violence and negativity, then "the eschatology 
which animates Levinas' discourse would have had to have 
kept its promise already, even to the extent of no longer 
being able to occur within discourse as eschatology, as has 
the idea of peace "beyond history”. The messianic triumph' 
'armed against evils revenge would have to have been 
ushered in' (130). As we shall show in Part Three of this 
work, Levinas contends that, in a certain sense, the 
"promise" has already been kept, insofar as the "infinite time" 
of the ethical community constitutes a middle point between 
the beginning of creation and the "messianic triumph” (cf: TI 
285).
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
WAR AND SELF-SACRIFICE
For Levinas, the absolute singularity of the self is negatively 
attested in war, since war dissolves the social forms through which 
individuals relate to one another as persons in civil society:
In war beings refuse to belong to a totality, refuse law; 
no frontier stops one being by another, nor defines 
them. They affirm themselves transcending the 
totality, each identifying itself not by their place in the 
whole, but by itself. (TI 222)
This statement closely parallels what Hegel has to say about 
the relationship between war and subjectivity in the Philosophy of 
Right.1/
War is that condition in which the vanity of temporal 
things IDingel - which tends at other times to be 
merely a pious phase - takes on a serious significance, 
and it is accordingly the moment in which the ideality 
of the particular attains its right and becomes 
actuality. (PR 324)
However, whereas Hegel understands the significance of war 
through its relation to the Idea of the State, Levinas theorises it in 
terms of its bearing upon the life of the ethico-religious community.
For Hegel, the warrior in the services of the state is a: living 
contradiction: "the supreme self-sufficiency of being-for self, which 
at the same time exists in the mechanical service of an external 
order" (PR 328). The soldier thus embodies the dialectical unity of 
absolute independence and total subservience to the whole. The
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mere fact of risking one's life has no ethical significance in itself - 
to assert the contrary would be to conceive adventurers, murderers 
and robbers as moral agents (PR 328 Zusatz) - but to stake one's 
life for an ethical ideal confers the highest ethical value on courage. 
Such ethical service confers a universal value on the particular 
deed, so that it no longer counts as the action of a particular 
individual but as an action of the State as a whole. Conversely, the 
"object" of this aggressive action - a term faithful to the reification 
of the other inherent in war - is not the particularity of the other 
but his universal signification as a member of the enemy in 
general. Hegel notes how the invention of the gun provides a 
felicitous expression of the impersonality of modem warfare where, 
for the most part, warriors no longer engage in hand to hand 
combat, face to face, but kill one another at a distance.
In short, Hegel understands war as the contradiction 
between absolute individuation and total objectification. On the 
one hand. War demonstrates the essential flnitude of all things: 
property, possessions and, most of all, human mortality. On the 
other hand, this negative absolute individuation is deprived of a 
reflective form, insofar as the will of the soldier is rendered 
mindlessly obedient to the cause of the State. The warrior 
therefore is only implicitly ethical. To become ethically actual, two 
further conditions need to be satisfied. First, the soldier must will 
the will of the State as his own will: which entails that he relate to 
the State not merely in a martial capacity but as a citizen. Second, 
the state must have Just cause for war before the citizen can 
rationally will its prosecution. However, even with these conditions
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in place, the ethical cannot be fully actualised in war since war is 
essentially a means to peace and can never be an end-in-itself.
Whereas Hegel in the Philosophy of Right expounds the 
relation of the individual to war within the context of the external 
relations of the State, Levinas' treatment of the subject is wholly 
abstract. Levinas ignores the collective framework of modem 
warfare and instead views it as a multiplicity of single combats. In 
the fight to the death, warriors are brought face to face, not simply 
with the possibility of their own negation, but with a presence 
"between" being and non-being, that is "beyond being", but, as it 
were, this-side of nothingness. Levinas describes this 
"phenomenon" thus:
In war death is brought to what is moving back, to 
what for the moment exists completely. Thus in war 
the reality of a time that separates a being from its 
death, the reality of a being taking up a position with 
regard to its death, that is, the reality of a conscious 
being and its inferiority, is recognized.
This absolute recognition presupposes the asymmetry of the 
Other with respect to me. While it is a condition of my finitude 
that I may be annihilated by my enemy, I cannot annihilate him. 
The face of the Other expresses am alterity that is absolute. Since 
the Other transcends the limits of my powers, it accomplishes the 
revelation of the idea of infinity in me: In Levinas' words, it 
produces "a transcendence of the Other with regard to me, which, 
being, infinite, does not have the same significance as my 
transcendence with regard to him" fTI 225).
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Now it is the very alterity of the Other revealed in the 
struggle-to-the-death which shows the relative nature of the virtue 
of courage. Even a noble suicide cannot confirm the absolute 
sovereignty of the will. In seeking to escape the designs of the 
Other through suicide I may unwittingly fulfil them. Moreover, the 
meaning of my suicide to posterity may assume a significance 
wholly different to that which I intended it to have. Levinas 
observes how these ineliminable contingencies prove nihilism to be 
the logical extension of Stoicism, since the only way such 
unintended consequences can be ultimately obviated is if  my self- 
destruction were to be made coincident with the destruction of the 
world. This is the desire of Macbeth "who wishes that the 
nothingness of death be as total as that which would have reigned 
had the world never been created" (TI 231).
Hegel in the Phenomenology also notes a connection between 
Stoicism and nihilism. In seeking to gain total independence from 
all worldly determination the Stoic consciousness merely delivers 
itself over to the world as it is. In Hegel’s words, "the Notion as an 
abstraction cuts itself off from the multiplicity of things, and thus 
has no content in its own self, but that given to it" (Phen Para 200). 
Hence, "withdrawn from existence only into itself, it has not there 
achieved its consummation as the absolute negation of that 
existence" (Phen Para 201). Latent in the desire for the abstract 
termination of all existence is a fury at all determination, since the 
latter appears to limit its freedom. Since the stoic consciousness 
cannot succeed in abstracting itself completely from the world it 
turns the world into an enemy which it strives to annihilate.
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Now, for Hegel It is this stoical nihilism - in all its historical 
manifestations - that has to be negated by being faced. This 
necessitates a dying-to-self that brings the subject into "relation" 
with otherness beyond death, Em "encounter" from which it returns 
spiritually reborn into the life of a spiritual community. However, 
this only represents an implicit reconciliation with absolute 
alterity. In order that the implicit accomplishment become explicit, 
it is necessary for the Idea of Freedom to be fully actualised within 
the State and Absolute Spirit. Now, it is in the defence of this 
ethical ideal that the citizen-soldier must risk death.
For Levinas, war also induces Em absolute experience which 
sepsurates the will form its works and threatens it with "betrayal" at 
the hsmds of Em Eilien will. But, in Levinas' words, the "will 
becomes aware of this betrayal and thereby keeps itself at a 
distance from it" fTI 231). The command of the face of the Other is 
an authority before which the self apologises for its spontaneous 
freedom. The apology removes the I from the judgement of history 
smd places it under the direct judgement of God, as Levinas puts it, 
"the will is under the judgement of God when the fesir of death is 
inverted into feair of committing murder" (TI 244). The I is then 
elected into a "religious order" (TI 242) which, contrary to Hegel, is 
entirely divorced from the state and its justice:
In reEility, justice does not include me in the 
equilibrium of its universEdity; Justice summons me 
beyond the straight line of Justice. (TI 243)
However, this transcendent Justice though extrEimundEme is 
not extraterrestiEil. The "inner life" which is the basis of ethical
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election "cannot forgo all visibility" (TI 247). Ethical election takes 
the visible form of participation in the life of the ethico-religious 
community. Hence, for Levinas, "The freedom of the I is neither the 
arbitrariness of an isolated being nor the conformity of an isolated 
being with a rational and universal law encumbent on all" (TI 252). 
The ethico-religious community is the tertium quid that stands 
between these two alternatives. Levinas concludes that "In my 
religious being I am in truth" (TI 253). And what should happen if 
violence should seek to silence the [ethical] subjectivity "without 
which truth could not be produced?" (Ibid). Levinas provides s 
Socratic answer to his own question: it is better to suffer evil than 
inflict it:
The subjectivity could not only accept to be silent, but 
could renounce itself by itself, renounce itself without 
violence, cease the apology for itself. This would not be 
a suicide nor a resignation, but would be love. (TI 253)
However, this raises further questions: what if the ethico- 
religious community as a whole were to be attacked by enemies? Is 
a communal act of self-defence ethically admissible? Indeed, 
would it not be merely admissible but absolutely imperative since 
in defending the ethico-religious community one would be 
defending nothing less that the very possibility of ethics in the 
world? To die in defence of the possibility of goodness, is this not 
the supreme form of ethical self-sacrifice? To our knowledge 
Levinas nowhere directly confronts the implications of his ethical 
pacifism. In what follows we shall attempt to construct a response 
to these questions on the basis of a full statement of his 
understanding of the relationship between the ethico-religious 
community and the State.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER ELEVEN
1/ For sympathetic readings of Hegel on war see D.P. Verene, 
"Hegel's Account of War", in (ed.) D. Verene, Hegel’s Social 
and Political Thought, and Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of 
the Modem State. Chapter 10.

PART THREE
THE ETHICAL COVENANT 
AND ITS CRITICISM
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CHAPTER TWELVE
HEGEL AND LEVINAS IN CONTEXT
A central tenet of the interpretation advanced in this study is 
that the 'face to face' is not reducible to an individual ethical 
imperative but presupposes a whole form of life that exists as an a- 
historical enclave alongside the socio-historical world. In Levinas' 
account, as we shall see, this community is founded on the basis of 
an original ethical covenant that is established entirely 
independently of the emergence of historical societies from out of a 
putative state of nature. The ethical covenant has two essential 
elements. On the one hand, it is based on an absolute and 
asymmetrical obligation on the part of a created self to the absolute 
Other (Lord, Master, Teacher, Father); an obligation moreover that 
is discharged through ethical service to the neighbour. On the 
other hand, it is also founded on an erotic union between the 
masculine self and feminine other which engenders the child and 
so perpetuates the life of the community. For Levinas, these two 
elements presuppose one another; my neighbour is also my brother 
and kinsman, since the erotic union is from the beginning 
contracted under the name of the Father.
We shall now complete our immanent critique of Levinas' 
philosophy by placing his account of the ethical covenant within 
the critical conspectus of Hegel's System.
Before we do this, it is first necessary to consider a potential 
objection to our overall interpretation which threatens to vitiate the
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critical analysis we are seeking to develop. This possible line of 
dissent might proceed by suggesting that we have imported a 
dualism into T1 which is simply not found in the text. Our 
misconception may be traced to an over-hasty dismissal of Levinas' 
adherence to the Husserlian method. No doubt, the objection 
might continue, Levinas radicalised the phenomenological 
deduction by making ethical signification rather than theoretical 
eidos its prime determinant, but nonetheless he retains its formal 
principle of construction, in which successive strata are 
successively deduced as standing in a regressive relation of 
founding to founded contents. The upshot of this is that TI is not 
structured around the parallel deduction of two separate 
ontological orders, as we appear to contend, but rather consists of 
a successive series of ontological reductions that ultimately reveal 
a "substrata" of ethical meaning standing in a supervenient 
relationship to a single ontological totality. Has not Levinas said as 
much in the Preface to TI in the oft-quoted statement that the 
"totality is reflected within the totality and history, within 
experience"? (TI 23).
Our response to this criticism is that it is no part of our 
contention that TI expounds an interrelation between two 
ontological orders. We fully concede that the relationship or 
infinity to totality is one between a me-ontological ethical 
noumenalism and an onto-phenomenological continuum. But, it is 
precisely the very heterogeneity of these two "planes" that 
precludes the extension of Husserl's phenomenological method 
beyond its theoretical axiomatic to the primacy of ethical proximity, 
in Levinas' sense of the term. To proceed on the assumption that
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there is a continuity between Husserl's and Levinas' methodology is 
to belie the radicality of the hiatus between ethics and ontology 
upon which Levinas is so insistent. It is not difficult to see why 
this is so. Insofar as transcendental ethical philosophy (or 
"metaethics") presupposes a succession of gradations linking a 
conditioned determinans to a conditioning determinar. it 
necessarily negates the ethical transcendence or the discontinuous 
alterity from which Levinas' ethics lives. (This is why we have 
insisted throughout this study that a speculative form of exposition 
is alone capable of expressing the paradoxical heterogeneity of the 
ethical relation, as Levinas conceives it.)1 /
Now, in our view, it follows from (1) that the ethical relation 
is radically discontinuous with the onto-phonomenological order 
and (2) from the requirement that the ethical relation assume a 
material and substantive form of expression, that, (3) ex hypothesi 
there has to be a separate, as it were, noumenological social and 
economic community existing parallel to the socio-economic 
totality, in order for the ethical, as Levinas conceives it, relation to 
be possible.
Perhaps it will be objected that what Levinas means by the 
term "society" in TI is simply the pluralisation of the face to face 
relation. Hence it is best understood as an ethical modification of 
the totality and consequently there is no need nor warrant for 
construing it as constituting a tangibly separate and exclusive form 
of communal life. However, such an interpretation is not 
consistent with Levinas' own premises. The visible transcendence 
of a self-enclosed ethical community must have lexical priority over
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the expression of the face in the totality, because, as Levinas' own 
genetical deduction of the world of phenomena shows, if there were 
no such visible community then there would be no way to avoid the 
incorporation and thus cancellation of the ethical relation in the 
phantasmagoria of civil society and the rational-legal state. 
Moreover, this interpretation also tallies with the structural 
relationship between TI and OBBE. The exposition of the indirect 
trace of the saying in the Said in OBBE is predicated upon the 
direct expression of the face to face within the ethico-religious 
community, as detailed in TI, and to which "illeity" bears witness 
in-the-world. In summary, then, the a-logical universality of the 
ethical summons presupposes the equally a-logical particularity of 
a visibly transcendent society of elected ethical beings.
As a result, there arises a further surprising correlation 
between Hegel's and Levinas' respective "systems". The 
interrelation between TI and OBBE parallels, mutatis mutandis, 
the structured relationship between Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit - and the Philosophy o f Right. In the Phenomenology the 
section on "Morality" concludes with a transition to "Religion" 
which, in turn, culminates with an exposition of the 'spiritual 
community'; similarly, in TI, the penultimate section "Exteriority 
and the Face" ends with a transition to "Beyond the Face”, an 
extended description of the familial basis of the ethico-religious 
society. In the Philosophy of Right on the other hand, the section 
on "Morality" concludes not with a transition to "Religion" and the 
spiritual community, but to Sittllchkeit and its tripartite divisions 
of family, civil society and the State; likewise, in OBBE, the 
penultimate section "Substitution", is followed not by a transition
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to the ethico-religious society, but to an account of the relation of 
proximity to the institutional structures of civil society and the 
state. Both systems therefore culminate in a movement beyond 
individual morality to a wider context encompassing the 
interrelationship between ethics, religion and the political order.
To our mind, these parallels are not accidental. Rather we 
take them as further confirmation of our general thesis that Hegel's 
system overarches Levinas' philosophy from the inside, so to speak. 
In the introduction we defined the system-proper as being based on 
the three-cornered relation between the Phenomenology, the 
Science of Logic, and the Philosophy of Right. To recap briefly: the 
Phenomenology narrates the recollection lErinnerungl of the 
recognition and misrecognition of the infinite in history. The 
narrative remembers and intériorisés the experiences through 
which self-consciousness transcends the figurative Understanding 
to enter into an absolute (i.e. trans-representational) relation with 
the Absolute. This emancipation from representational thought 
fVorstellungen) - and so from all previously given contents and 
presuppositions - constitutes "absolute knowledge". The Science of 
Logic, in turn, presupposes this result as the presuppositionless 
beginning for the immanent, constructive-deductive, self-movement 
of pure thought-determinations,2/ which, in their manifold 
interconnection, constitute the Notion of the Notion or the Absolute 
Idea. To complete the trinity, the Philosophy of Right presents the 
concrétisation of the Idea as a self-grounding, self-determining 
system of Sittlichkelt or "Objective Spirit". Finally, the speculative 
relationship between "Objective Spirit" and "Absolute Spirit" 
signifies the completion of philosophy and the actualisation of the
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Idea of the Good, which, in Hegel's ringing phrase: "is eternally 
accomplishing itself in the world: and the result is that it need not 
wait upon us, but is already by implication, as well as in full 
actuality, accomplished" (LL 212 Zusatzl.
How may the contents of T1 and OBBE be said to be 
'integrated' within the Hegelian architectonic? Essentially in two 
ways: first, from a phenomenological "standpoint", the ethico- 
religious community is a necessary element in the development of 
self-consciousness towards absolute knowledge. Second, from a 
logical "standpoint" the ethico-religious community constitutes a 
necessary moment in the concrete actualisation of the absolute 
idea in the idea of the state (as deduced in the Philosophy of Right).
In Hegel's system, phenomenologically speaking, Levinas' 
notion of ethical religion is essentially contained within the first 
stage of the penultimate section of the Phenomenology of Spirit. CC 
Religion. Indeed, it may be even more precisely 'situated' as 
corresponding to the first phase of this stage "Natural Religion", the 
first moment of which is: "God as Light". The stage of "Religion" 
marks the moment in the itinerary of consciousness where 
phenomenology passes over into noumenology.3/ The development 
of consciousness hitherto is recapitulated under the "meta- 
category” of the successive, historically emergent, forms of religious 
life. Herein, the divine-man relationship is comprehended under 
the double aspect of a noumenological-phenomenological unity. 
This is to say, the succession of religious shapes through which 
self-consciousness 'ascends' towards the Absolute equally count as
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progressive moments in the self-determination of the Absolute as it 
'descends' into human consciousness.
How, it is somewhat misleading of Hegel to include the first 
moment of "Religion", viz: "God as Light", within the overall 
category of "Natural Religion", since this first religious shape is 
founded upon the workshop of creation prior to all [natural] 
determination.4/ Hence it is a profoundly anti-natural religion 
that is not to be mistaken for a primitive form of pantheism. 
Within Hegel's system as a whole, it corresponds to the first 
moment of the self-othering of the Idea. As such, it is in the initial 
unity of the withdrawn infinite and wholly undifferentiated finitude. 
As Hegel expresses it, it is: "the pure I, which in its externalisation 
has within itself as universal object the certainty of its own self, or 
in other words, this object is for the I the penetration of all thought 
and reality" (Phen Para 685).
Hegel's description of "God as Light" anticipates and 
comprehends three salient elements of Levinas' characterisation of 
the ethical relation. First, Hegel notes that the initial unity of 
absolute transcendence and undetermined immanence is depicted 
as the opposition between transcendent light and a chthonlc realm 
of pure night:
This 'shape' is the pure, all-embracing essential light of 
sunrise, which preserves itself in its formless 
substantiality. Its otherness is the equally simple 
negative, darkness. (Phen Para 686)
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This description essentially encapsulates Levinas' contrast 
between a transcendent epiphany - the light before the light (TI 
192) - and the nocturnal, preternatural order of the there is.
Second, Hegel details the way in which this absolute 
antithesis between light and darkness places the infinite and the 
finite at the further possible remove from one another, and how, 
notwithstanding this, the absolute relation is nonetheless wholly 
transparent, since it is apprehended, so to speak, prior to the 
emergence of a fully determined phenomenal order. This unity of 
asymmetry and immediacy is described by Hegel thus:
Spirit beyolds itself in the form of being, though not of 
the non-spiritual being that is filled with the 
contingent determinations of sensation, the being that 
belongs to sense-certainty; on the contrary, it is being 
that is filled with spirit. It also includes the form 
which appeared in immediate self-consciousness. the 
form of lord and master over against the self- 
consciousness that retreats from its object. (Ibid)
In short, in this original stage of religion, consciousness 
'beholds itself not in the other qua phenomenon - a relation which 
only emerges at the level of sense-certainty - but in the other qua 
other, that is, qua spiritual being, which is there before it in all its 
sheer, intransigent, ultraempirical immediacy. This description 
corresponds with Levinas' designation of the face as the Kath'auto 
that "is by itself and not by reference to a system" (TI 74-75).
Third, the passage cited above also prefigures Levinas' 
emphasis on the dysymmetry between the I and the Other. For 
Hegel, the religion of light represents, in a spiritually sublimated 
form, the natural asymmetry between lord and bondsman that
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results from the primary life and death struggle for recognition, 
through which consciousness gains its first awareness of the 
absolute. However, from a Notional "standpoint", this spiritual 
subordination of the finite to the infinite is even more regressive 
that its phenomenological counterpart; for it inhibits the 
emergence of the self actualising subject necessary to the 
accomplishment of Ethical life and the absolute relation. Levinas' 
contention that the finite self is confirmed in its absolute ipseity 
through a wholly passive identification with the passivity of created 
being entails that any attempt on the part of the latter to become a 
self-determining subject, by assuming the roles of legal personality, 
civilian and citizen, is tantamount to an act of ethical apostasy. As 
a consequence, like the Immediate religious being, the ethical 
subject, "merely ascends, without descending into its depths to 
become a subject and through the self to consolidate its distinct 
moments" (Phen Para 687).
We sought to show in Part One how the ultimate difference 
between Hegel and Levinas is that for the former the asymmetry 
between the infinite and the finite is only an initial stage which is 
subsequently mutually sublated through their reciprocal 
interaction, with the result that the absolute Other or 'master' is 
shown to be the inmost truth of the finite subject or, as Hegel 
himself puts it: "The immediate being in which it stands In 
antithesis to its consciousness is itself the negative power which 
dissolves its distinctions. It is thus in truth the self; and spirit 
therefore passes on to know itself in the form of self' (Phen Para 
688). For Levinas, however, the relation between the infinite and 
the finite is a fixed antithesis and must remain so. The asymmetry
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characteristic of the first stage of religion must precisely not be 
allowed to 'pass on'. Rather the subject must incessantly purge 
itself of all determination. In Levinas' words, "For subjectivity to 
signify unreservedly, it would then be necessary that the passivity 
of its exposure to the Other not be immediately inverted into 
activity, but expose itself in turn; a passivity of passivity is 
necessary, and the glory of the Infinite ashes from which an act 
could not be reborn anew" (OBBE 142-143).
However, even for Levinas, the self cannot remain absolutely 
passive or else it would be unable to become sufficiently 
individuated to be capable of giving unto others. Indeed the very 
possibility of a 'passivity of passivity' is predicated upon the 
emergence of a hypostasised self from out of the elements via 
labour and the dwelling. This is why the ethical relation must 
presuppose the prior existence of an ethical community in which 
the self can develop as a self without having to renounce its ethical 
vocation as a consequence. A  further corollary of this necessity is 
the fact that the ethico-religious community positively requires the 
continued non-redemption of the world as a negative condition of 
its own ethical witness.
The reaffirmation of passivity as the ground of the ethico- 
religious community has a double-aspect corresponding to the 
noumenological-phenomenological distinction outlined above. On 
the one hand, the ethical community is, as we have seen, 
discontinuously 'reflected' within the socio-historical totality; 
though this implication is very much a one-way street: the ethical 
community exerts the profoundest influence on the secular world,
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but the secular world does not Impinge in any way upon the 
internal life of the ethical community. On the other hand, 
individual members of the ethical community happen to find 
themselves in the midst of a society which has evolved modem 
legal-rational forms of economic, social and political institutions. 
We say 'happen to find themselves' herein since Levinas provides 
no account of the interrelation between the ethico-religious 
community and the emergence of modernity. He simply assumes 
historical evolution as a given. Nonetheless, as we shall see below, 
the conditions of the ethical covenant that found the ethico- 
religious community are such that each member of the ethical 
element must bear witness not only to their immediate neighbour 
or indeed to their neighbour's neighbour but to the whole of 
humanity.
In summation, then, first the ethico-religious community 
deduced in TI is 'anticipated' within Hegel's Phenomenology as 
corresponding to the first stage in the noumenological development 
of sacred history. Second, the exposition in OBBE of the relation 
between the ethical subject and the secular world, falls within 
Hegel's speculative-logical deduction of the idea of the State, as 
presented in the Philosophy of Right.
Levinas' postulation in TI of a 'static' community removed 
from the vicissitudes of historical change is vulnerable to a 
Hegelian critique in two salient respects. First, it reproduces the 
petitio principii of all state of nature theorists, viz, that of 
presupposing the normative vision of society it purports to Justify. 
Second, the contents of this sol-dlsant original community, which
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include reference to money, property, contract, family and other 
(unspecified) social and political institutions, on closer examination 
prove to be not originary at all, but rather to have been abstracted 
from the modem social and political forms they presuppose. Yet 
from a Levinasian point of view, this is an impossibility since ex 
hvpothesi the ethico-religious community is sui generis, and 
therefore altogether removed from any dialectical interrelation with 
the socio-historical world. To adapt a barbed comment Hobbes 
made against state of nature theorists to our present purposes, we 
may say that individuals exist within Levinas' ethical community 
"as if but now sprung out of the earth, like mushrooms, and come 
to full maturity without any kind of engagement to one another".5/
No doubt Levinas would respond to this criticism by 
returning the charge of question begging to his would be Hegelian 
critic. The substance of this riposte boils down to the argument 
that Hegelianism cannot envisage an 'outside' to the system, and 
hence cannot relate to the other qua other, because its 
commitment to the ultimacy of the Logos necessarily leads it to 
identify freedom with the Good, with the result that freedom as a 
supreme value remains unquestioned. In short, the System is an 
Egology. The gist of this counter-critique is summed up by De 
Boer. Though his comments are directed at Rousseau they may 
(from a Levinasian point of view) be extended with equal felicity to 
Hegel:
For Levinas, the problem is not the limitation of 
freedom, but freedom itself, that is, its injustice. What 
must be abandoned in the social contract, or better, in 
the dialogue that enters into community is not 
freedom, but its arbitrariness.6/
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For Levinas, the difference between liberty in the state of 
nature and freedom in the State is one of degree rather than kind. 
From the ethical standpoint they both constitute equally 
unjustified forms of capriciousness. To transfer one's liberty to the 
general will is merely to exchange one form of arbitrariness for 
another. Whether 1 live spontaneously in the state of nature or I 
am duped into believing that in obeying the laws of the state I am 
willing my will in its objective appearance, the net result is the 
same: the ultimate value of freedom remains beyond doubt. The 
Levinasian conclusion then, is that the community founded on 
alterity rather than self-sameness is simply beyond the ken of 
Western ontology and a fortiori Hegel, its paradigmatic thinker.
However, this response merely distracts attention from the 
substantive point of the Hegelian objection. The ethico-religious 
community as presented in TI is not in any sense deduced: it is 
rather simply and dogmatically posited. Moreover, the counter­
claim that Hegel identifies freedom and the Good within the System 
is unfounded. Hegel's speculative understanding of the relation 
between freedom and the Good may be captured by assimilating it 
to Michael Theunissen's formulation of Hegel's account of the 
relation between freedom and love. Theunissen states that for 
Hegel freedom equals a "being-in-the-other with oneself' whereas 
love is "being-in-oneself in the other".7/ Analogously, freedom 
does not receive its ultimate Justification in the State - for this 
would amount to a mere self-justification, which is ultimately no 
justification at all - but from Absolute Spirit. That said, however, 
only an autonomous self-determining subjectivity is able to attain
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and so receive "pure self-recognition in absolute otherness". 
Therefore, the accomplishment of the absolute relation to the 
absolute presupposes the full self-actualisation of the subject and 
this, in turn, is predicated on the actualisation of the Idea of 
freedom in the State. But freedom, though an absolutely necessary 
prerequisite for the accomplishment of the Good, is not ultimately 
synonymous with the Good in itself.
The essential Hegelian objection to Levinas is not that he 
posits a transcendent community outside of history, but that he 
holds that the latter remains in a non-reciprocatable relation to 
history. For Hegel, as we have seen, there is a spiritual community 
whose fate is irreducible to the contingencies of historical 
development, but which nonetheless is only able to fulfil its 
vocation by undergoing a long process of historical education. The 
coming into being of a non-natural religious community is the 
beginning, but only the beginning, of this formative process, whose 
end is the union of Sittllchkeit and "Absolute Spirit".
In conclusion, then, our analysis has sought to demonstrate 
that from the premise that (i) The Philosophy of Right contains, in a 
sublated form, the necessary moments of the phenomenological 
genesis of the modem state and religion; and from premise (2) that, 
Notionally speaking, Levinas' exposition of the relation between 
ethics and politics is prefigured, as it were, in Hegel's 
phenomenological deduction; then we may conclude (3) that the 
contents of Levinas' system are to be found aufgehoben in Hegel's 
Wissenschaft. and specifically within the conceptual framework 
provided by the Philosophy of Right.
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We shall now seek to validate our contention by subjecting 
Levinas' account of the primacy of the ethico-religious community 
and its relation to the state, to a brief but comprehensive criticism 
in accordance with the centred divisions of the Philosophy of Right: 
(a) Abstract Right; (b) Morality; (c) Family, and (d) the State. (We 
refer the reader back to Part Two for our consideration of Levinas' 
derivation of civil society.)
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in R.A. Cohen (ed.), Face to Face with Levinas (New York. 
State University of New York 1986) notes that "Levinas 
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fixed foundation of things in the architectural sense" (p.66). 
Levinas is clearly making both a transcendental and an 
empirical claim vis a vis the face to face. Robert John 
Scheffler Manning, Interpreting Otherwise than Heidegger 
(Pittsburgh. Duquesne University Press 1993), p.239,
confirms that this is a reading held by the majority of 
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in (ed.) George di Giovanni, Essays on Hegel's Logic.
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4/ Walter Jaeschke, Reason and Religion: The Foundations of 
Hegel's Philosophy of Religion. Translated by J. Michael 
Stewart and Peter C. Holdgson. (Berkeley and los Angeles 
University of California Press 1990. Jaeschke demonstrates 
that Hegel begins his phenomenology of religion with the 
religion of Israel, the religion of sublimity, and not as has
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
PERSON AND PROPERTY
At first glance, it would appear that Hegel's presentation of 
the sphere of "Abstract Right" in the Philosophy of Right 
constitutes the antipodes of Levinas' notion of true sociality. Of 
course, in one sense this is absolutely the case. As we pointed out 
above for Levinas, civil society is a form of life founded upon the 
near total suppression of the 'face'. On the other hand, however, 
Levinas also maintains that these illusory forms of social 
interaction are underpinned by their concrete prototypes, internal 
to the ethico-religious community. This parallelism takes the 
following analogical form: For Hegel, the element of "abstract right" 
has two prerequisites: (i) The existence of individuals who have 
attained to a sufficiently advanced state of phylogenetic and 
ontogenetic development to enable them to enter into freely willed 
reciprocal forms of social interaction (Hegel provides a deduction of 
this formal requirement in Part Three, Section One, "Subjective 
Spirit", of the Encyclopaedia!: (ii) a socio-historical evolution 
culminating in the liberation of individuals from all natural 
determination, with the result that they no longer relate to one 
smother in terms of sex, class, gender or nationality, but simply 
qua wills, on the basis of the mutual recognition and respect by all 
of the rights of person and property of each, and vice-versa. Now, 
Levinas' derivation of the ethico-religious community also has a 
number of prerequisites. First amongst these is the need for (i) an 
'autochthonous' self, which is not simply an 'attribute' of the 
Infinite. Second, before this separated self may enter into the
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ethical relation it must have a home in which to welcome the 
stranger and sufficient resources to provide him with food, clothing 
etc. This is Levinas' Biblically picturesque way of saying that a 
condition of the ethical relation is that the self attains to a certain 
minimal level of psychological and economic development, an 
essential element of which is that it has the capacity to acquire 
property. However, (ii) there is no analogy with the second 
prerequisite of "abstract right" set out above. Whereas Hegel 
contends that the evolution of the self qua legal person is the work 
of the whole of history. Levinas believes the ethical relation is 
always - already accomplished within the segregated life of the 
ethical community. On these grounds, Levinas is able to explain 
how the self-actualisation necessary for the completion of the 
ethical relation does not expose the ethical community to a 
dialectically reciprocal relationship to history.
By contrast, Hegel contends that with the advent of the 
sphere of "abstract right" history is, in principle, at an end, insofar 
as this revolution accomplishes the "transition from the natural 
state of humanity to a truly ethical condition" (PR 57 Addition). 
The rational-legal community of persons sublates the natural 
asymmetry of the master-slave relation within a universal self- 
consciousness founded on symmetrical and reciprocal forms of 
recognition.
There is a further analogy here between the desacralisation 
of nature accomplished in the historical advance to a society 
founded on "abstract right" and. from a phenomenological 
standpoint, the negation of nature effected through the coming into
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being of the first nonnatural religious community. In the original 
religious configuration, the finite being is liberated from all natural 
determination and is thus brought face to face with (i.e. stands in 
a non-phenomenal relation to) the infinite transcendence of the 
Other. This initial preternatural form of individuation is precisely 
that described by Levinas in TI as the "atheist will", standing in the 
elements and assailed by intimations of Desire. Now, notionally 
speaking, the natural asymmetry of the master-slave dialectic and 
the nonnatural asymmetry of the infinite-finite relation are both 
aufgehoben in the figure of the denatured legal personality, devoid 
of all content, save its capacity to objectify its will in a given 
property and have this act of self-extemalisation recognised by 
others. Therefore, just as the "atheist will” undergoes a process of 
experiential formation within the ethical community in order to 
emerge as a fully concrete ethical self, so too, the abstract legal 
personality undergoes a process of self-actualisation by willing its 
own participation in the progressively more complex structures of 
morality, family, civil society and the State. These inverse parallels 
provide the rationale for Levinas' adaptation of the term Hegel uses 
to designate the will, bei slch selbst. to characterize the "atheist 
will" as chez sol.
We shall now proceed to further explore this isomorphism 
under three sub-headings: first, the infinity of the will, second, the 
Inalienability of personality and third, the dynamic of social 
recognition.
In the "Introduction" to the Philosophy of Right. Hegel defines 
the first moment of the will as the "limitless infinity of absolute
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abstraction" (PR 5). In the Addition to the paragraph he offers the 
following clarification of this phrase: "It is inherent in the element 
of the will that I am able to free myself from everything, to 
renounce all ends, and to abstract from everything. The human 
being alone is able to abandon all things, even his own life: he can 
commit suicide" (PR 5 Addition). Levinas essentially concurs with 
this definition, as the following citation from TI evinces: "The will 
marks, in the general economy of being, the point where the 
definitiveness of an event is produced as non-definitive" (TI 166). 
For Levinas, this power of infinite distanciation is embodied in 
labour (in animal laborens. not in homo faber): "Labour 
characterises not a freedom that has detached itself from being, 
but a will: a being that is threatened but has time to ward off the 
threat" (TI 166). The mention of time here is a reference to the 
infinite time of the ethico-religious community which permits a 
unique form of social interaction, one that though necessarily 
conducted through the mediation of things nonetheless remains 
wholly non-reified. This is possible according to Levinas because 
"Labour comes from a being that is a thing among things and in 
contact with things, but, within this contact, coming from its being 
at home with itself' fn 165); hence, it is not "produced in the ether 
of abstraction but as all the concreteness of dwelling" (TI 166). The 
dwelling is, so to speak, the first moment of the ethical community. 
We see then that though for both Hegel and Levinas the will is an 
"abstractive infinity", for the former it must further determine itself 
in being in and through the dialectical interrelation between the 
spiritual community and the socio-historlcal world, whereas for the 
latter it must remain 'outside' being, i.e. outside history, within a 
separate, though parallel, ahlstorical community.
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As said, for Levinas, the 'dwelling' is the first prerequisite of 
the ethical relation within the ethico-religious community. As 
such, it is 'beyond' the phenomenal order. In Levinas' words:
We may not see in it the counterpart of the presence of 
things, as though the possession of things, as a 
presence to them, dialectically contained the 
withdrawal from them. (TI 170)
Although the "home as a building, belongs to the world of 
objects" (TI 154), it is "not a possession in the same sense as the 
movable goods it can collect" (TI 157). In this sense, it is more 
substantiell than the transferable property it contains. Yet it is not 
fixed; on the contrary, it "indicates a disengagement, a wandering 
[errance]" (TI 172) and is therefore "the very opposite of a root" 
(Ibid).
This equivocation between transcendence and immanence - 
unlimitedness and limitation - corresponds mutatis mutandis to 
Hegel's definition of personality as "at the same time the sublime 
and the wholly ordinary; it contains this unity of the infinite and 
the utterly finite, of the determinate boundary and the completely 
unbounded" (PR 35 Addition). Moreover, Hegel's and Levinas' 
shared conception of the negative infinity of the will also accounts 
for the convergence of their views on the ultimate inalienability of 
the self. For example, Hegel states that "Those goods, or rather 
substantial determinations which constitute my own distinct 
personality and the universal essence of my self-consciousness are 
therefore inalienable and my right to them imprescriptable. They 
include my personality in general, my universal freedom of will.
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ethical life and religion" (PR 66). Henry Brod shows how Hegel's 
stress on inalienability follows from his rejection of the Lockean 
argument that we have rights in our body for Hegel:
A person by nature is the kind of entity over which no 
entity, even oneself, can have property rights. Rather 
than speaking of rights in our bodies, it would be more 
appropriate to say that we have rights through our 
bodies. 1/
According to Hegel, a person cannot rightfully be enslaved, 
either by coercion or voluntarily, for this would be to treat a 
spiritual being as if it were merely a natural entity and so negate 
the very possibility of a free personality. Similarly, in TI, Levinas 
states it is only permissible to speak of the body as a possession in 
the sense that it is "at home with itself' (chez soi) (i.e. qua will and 
not qua object). He adds, the 'naked body' is "not the first 
possession, it is still outside having and not-having" (TI 12), 
because "the body is its ontological regime and not an object" (TI 
230).
The concurrence of Hegel and Levinas on this point is further 
corroborated by their respective anti-individualist approaches to 
the question of suicide. For Hegel, there can be no right to suicide 
because as "this individual, I am not the master of my life, for the 
comprehensive totality of activity, i.e. life, is not something external 
to personality" (PR 70 Addition). Thus, he continues, "it would be a 
contradiction to speak of a person's right over his life, for this 
would mean a person had a right over himself' (Ibid). In a parallel 
formulation, Levinas states that "Before defining man as an animal 
that can commit suicide it is necessary to define him as capable of
226
living for the Other and being on the basis of the Other who is 
exterior to him" (TI 149).
A final area of identity and difference between Hegel and 
Levinas is their social conception of property. For Hegel, mere 
possession will not suffice to ground a right to property. The 
subjective act whereby I embody my will in an object must be 
objectively validated within a legal community, through deed or 
contract, before I can convert my claim to possession into an 
existent right. From the outset then possession refers not only to 
things but to other wills. In Hegel's words "my will can only be for 
the will of another person" (PR 71). The sphere of "abstract right" 
constitutes an elementary stage of justice, since it establishes a 
domain of formal equality regulated in accordance with the maxim 
"be a person and respect others as persons" (PR 36). Now, of 
course, it is the very impersonality of the legal sphere that Levinas 
condemns as unethical. Nonetheless he endorses a parallel 
formulation of the relation between property and possession, albeit 
in abstraction from a contractual context, when he states that: 
"possession itself refers to more profound metaphysical relations. 
A thing does not resist acquisition; the other possessors - those 
who one cannot possess - contest and therefore can sanction 
possession itself. Thus possession of things issues in discourse" 
(TI 162).
As said, the reference to "discourse" purports to refer to a 
wholly non-relfied sphere of exchange relations counterposed to the 
abstract legal relations appertaining to civil society. But we have 
sought to show that the possibility of such a non-reified form of
227
social recognition and indeed of its opposite, is already implicit 
within the sphere of "abstract right", which contains a sublimated 
form both the bellicosity and the irenicism of the Hobbesian and 
the Rousseauian states of nature, respectively. Levinas' own 
deduction simply abstracts the positive moment from the rational- 
legal sphere which it presupposes, and transcendentally projects in 
it onto an imaginary ethical community. This not only results in 
the factitious notion of a wholly ahistorical community, but also, as 
its obverse, produces an over-simplistic, one-dimensional, and 
misleading identification of the state with egoism simpliciter. that 
takes no account of the manner in which the state's institutional 
forms positively enable freedom and justice.
To be sure, "abstract right" as an elementary form of just 
interaction is still far removed from the ethical "immediacy" of the 
face to face relation. Intersubjective relations within these spheres 
are mediated through contractual relations with the result that 
each will stands in an external relation to very other will. The 
artificial nature of legal recognition is powerfully exposed by crime, 
particularly by murder and assault. For Hegel, the category of 
crime instantiates the speculative-logical "negative infinite 
judgement" in as much as the criminal does not simply violate my 
personal rights but my capacity for rights per se.2/ This leads to a 
sudden re-emergence of the prepolitical combat to the death within 
the midst of civil society. However, such temporary instances of 
social breakdown also allow for the repetition of the primary ethical 
dialectic between transgression of the law of life and the 
reconciliation of fate. But, from an abstract-legal point of view, 
what matters is not the struggle between two (or more)
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unencumbered selves, but the fact that one legal person has 
cancelled the rights of another legal person. In the first instance, 
justice demands this negation must be negated in turn through the 
exaction of pencil sanctions on the criminal, in order that the 
balance of rights and duties pertaining within the legal community 
be restored to its former equilibrium. An indication of the measure 
to which the sphere of "abstract right" transcends the natural order 
is the additional requirement that the punishment be determined 
on an objective basis by an authorised magistrate rather than be 
dictated by the subjective need for revenge. Through the 
experience of crime and punishment, then, individuals come to 
recognise that it is not enough to relate to one another merely as 
right-bearers. In addition, they must develop a subjective 
disposition to do right in general and to assume responsibility for 
their own actions. In short, they must learn to relate to one 
another not merely as persons but as moral subjects.
In conclusion, the sphere of "abstract right" is not opposed to 
the ethical relation as Levinas contends, but, paradoxically, 
includes it while at the same time being a necessary step towards 
its full accomplishment.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER THIRTEEN
1/ Henry Brod, Hegel's Philosophy of Politics: Idealism. Identity 
and Modemlnitv (Boulder Colorado. Western Press 1992), 
p.69.
2/ Enz 1. 173 Zusatz, "Crime may be quoted as an objective 
instance of the negatively infinite judgement. The person 
committing a crime, such as a theft, merely deny the 
particular right of some one definite thing. He denies the 
right of that person in general, and therefore is not merely 
forced to restore what he has stolen, but is punished in 
addition, because he has violated law as law, i.e. law in 
general.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
MORALITY. RESPONSIBILITY AND THE GOOD
For Hegel, the element of "Morality, like that of its antecedent 
"abstract right", is a self-determined sphere of social interaction. 
Its first stage instates the principle that the subject is only 
imputable for these actions which lie within the scope of its 
immediate knowledge. Hegel calls this the "abstract or formal right 
of action" (PR 114). This limitation rests on Hegel's important 
distinction between an action (Handlung) and a deed fTat). 1/ 
Actions comprise a sub-set of deeds-in-general. A deed refers to 
any event which 1 am casually responsible for, whereas an action 
consists only in that part or aspect of the deed that I am 
consciously aware of at the time I perform it or the outcome of 
which I may reasonably be expected to foresee. These aspects of 
my deed comprise what Hegel calls my purpose (Vorsatz). He goes 
on to say that the "right of knowledge" (PR 117) entails that I am 
only responsible for those actions which form part of my purpose.
Hegel's endorsement of the "right of knowledge" clearly 
indicates that his ethics respect the principle of autonomy and is 
therefore thoroughly modem. The subjective principle represents 
an advance over ancient Greek ethics, in which the "causality of 
fate" renders individuals (Hegel cites the examples of Oedipus and 
Ajax) responsible for the totality of their deeds, whether or not they 
constituted part of their express purpose. Now Levinas in TI also 
upholds the "right of recognition" against the pagan idea of fate. 
The ethical relation, he maintains, excludes every signification
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"unbeknownst to him who maintains that relation" (TI 79). He 
continues:
When I maintain an ethical relation I refuse to 
recognize the role I would play in a drama of which I 
would not be the author or whose outcome another 
would know before me; I refuse to figure in a drama of 
salvation or of damnation that would be enacted in 
spite of me and that would make a game of me. (Ibid)
Despite this degree of concordance, Hegel and Levinas 
nonetheless give widely divergent reasons for taking the "right of 
knowledge" to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a 
complete account of moral responsibility. Hegel maintains that in 
addition to the direct and immediate responsibility an agent has for 
those actions within its purpose, it must also assume a certain 
degree of indirect responsibility for their mediate consequences. 
Hegel states the point thus;
I ought to be aware not only of my individual action, 
but also of the universal which is associated with it.
When it emerges in this manner the universal in what I 
have willed is my intention. (PR 118 Addition)
We see then that Hegel affords a wider scope to actions that 
fall under the category of "intention" (Abslcht) than those that come 
within the ambit of "purpose". "Intention" denotes the essential 
underlying reason an agent possesses for wanting to execute a 
particular act in order to bring out a given state of affairs. 
Consequently, it extends beyond immediate subjective volition to 
Include reference to the totality of circumstances and 
consequences in which a specific action is embedded. As such, it 
has an objective element that requires the rational agent to allow 
for contingency. From this point of view, the agent is imputable
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not only for the results of its specific intent but also for the 
potential unintended consequences of its actions, and even, in 
certain circumstances, for those consequences which are contrary 
to its intention, to the extent that they are in principle, knowable, 
foreseeable and hence avoidable, as measured from a rationed 
standpoint.
Fred Dallmayr helpfully elucidates Hegel's distinction 
between purpose and intention by mapping it on to Weber's 
contrast between an ethics of conviction and an ethics of 
responsibility.2/ The former corresponds to the moral agent who, 
in order to remain faithful to its intensional concept of the good, 
disclaims all responsibilities for the negative implications of her 
actions (in terms of an increase in human suffering) which may 
follow as a result of its display of moral rigour; the latter 
corresponds to the ethical agent, who possesses the capacity to 
adjust its subjective moral aims and values to an extensional 
notion of the good, by taking steps to ensure that her normative 
objectives have a reasonable chance of being realised and at an 
acceptable level of human cost.
It might be apposite, in order to bring out the contrast with 
Levinas, to say that Hegel is committed to a notion of infinite 
political responsibility: the more rational I am the more guilty I 
become and therefore the more responsible I am; this is also a 
responsibility that increases in the measure that it is assumed. 
But, of course, this only holds for the subjective will, where the 
good is posited though not realised. In Hegel's words: "In morality, 
self-determination should be thought of as sheer restless activity
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which cannot yet arrive at something that is. Only in the ethical 
realm fSittlichkeit) does the will become identical with the concept 
of the will and have the latter alone as its content" (PR 108 
Addition).
The element of rational calculation inherent in Hegel's notion 
of political responsibility is simply anathema to Levinas. Indeed, 
does it not amply confirm his contention that: "Idealism completely 
carried out reduces all ethics to politics. The Other and the I 
function as elements of an ideal calculus, receive from this 
calculus their recil being, and approach one another under the 
domination of ideal necessities which traverse them from all sides. 
They play the role of moments in a system, and not that of origin" 
(TI 216). Conversely, however from Hegelian point of view, does not 
Levinas' repudiation of any notion of political responsibility 
necessarily commit him to an ethics of conviction? Have we not in 
this opposition identified the ultimate difference between Hegel and 
Levinas?
There is no simple answer to this last question. In one sense 
it is true, in another not. First, Levinas is clearly not propounding 
a deontological ethics. Rather he is maintaining that an ethic of 
supererogation constitutes the fundamental structure of 
subjectivity. Hence, the ethical stance is not to be equated with 
adherence to an absolute moral rule, regardless of the 
consequences. Rather, for Levinas, qua ethical self, I am not 
simply responsible for my deeds - intended or otherwise - but I am 
ab initio responsible for the deeds of all the others: I am even 
responsible for their responsibility, to the point of accepting
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responsibility for the persecution I undergo at their hands. 
Therefore, it follows, that ethical responsibility is not devoid of a 
consequentialist dimension. Levinas, as we have seen, is quite 
emphatic on this point. To reiterate his position we note once 
again this formulation form his essay "Ego and the Totality": 
"Justice can have no other object than economic equality. It does 
not come to birth out of the play of injustice; it comes from outside. 
But it is an illusion or hypocrisy to suppose that, originally outside 
of economic relations, it could be maintained outside of them in a 
kingdom of pure respect" (CP 44).
Nonetheless, we contend, that from a phenomenological 
point of view, Levinas' notion of the ethical relation must appear as 
an ethics of conviction, or, to be more exact, as an ethics of pure 
conscience. In a recent work, Zygmunt Bauman, has shown how 
Levinas' identification of the face with the command, when 
approached from within the phenomenal order, necessarily results 
in what he calls the "aporia of proximity". The aporla is this: the 
command in the face of the Other is necessarily a silent command, 
since the face "speaks" prior to language (in the sense of la langue). 
ordering me to attend to the condition of the Other, prior to any 
deliberation on my part. However, to respond to the command I 
must know what the condition of the Other is, and so give a voice 
to the command that commands me. But of course this introduces 
an element of mediation that is ex hvpothesl antithetical to the 
ethical relation; for now it is I who says what the command 
commands, not the Other, and this opens the possibility that the 
Other may fall to recognise itself in the Interpretation I place upon 
its silence and contest it; even so it would not necessarily follow
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that I would have to abandon my Interpretation of her command, 
since I may still feel obliged to include in my responsibility "a duty 
to overcome what I can see as nothing else but her ignorance, or 
misinterpretation of her 'best interest"'. Bauman completes his 
statement of the difficulty by noting how:
Following its own logic, inperceptibly and 
surreptiously, without fault of mine or ill-will, care has 
turned into power. Responsibility has spawned 
oppression. Service rebounds as a contest of wills. 
Because I am responsible and do not shirk my 
responsibility, I must force the Other to submit to what 
I, in my best conscience, interpret as her own good.
Bauman concludes pessimistically: "This is the genuine 
aporia of moral proximity. There is no good solution in sight".4/ 
Though Bauman does not mention it, we can see that the aporia 
also holds, so to speak, the other way about. That is to say, if I 
interpret the command of the Other as a command to command 
my total self-sacrifice, how can I be sure that I am obeying the 
Other qua absolute Other and not simply placing myself in thrall to 
the designs of another will?
However, Bauman's practice of reading TI through the prism 
of OBBE deprives Levinas of his most cogent response to this 
"aporia". To see how this is the case we must examine in some 
detail a short but pivotal section in TI Section II B, 6 entitled "The 
Other and the Others".5/ A  careful reading of this section will 
show that the "aporia of proximity" is not fatal to Levinas' 
deduction of the ethical relation, since it is emergent only, as it 
were, a posteriori to the primary ethical encounter.
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The most Important point to realise about this section is that 
it describes the relation of the face to face to the third party within 
the ethico-religious community, in complete separation from the 
question of the relation of the face to the third party in the socio- 
historical world. Levinas discusses the latter relation in Chapter 
Five of OBBE; the section we are presently discussing is exclusively 
devoted to an exposition of social relations internal to the ethical 
community.
Levinas therefore begins his description by stating that the 
"presentation of the face puts me into relation with being" (TI 212). 
The existence of this being is "irreducible to phenomenality" and 
outside the sphere of causal relations. The face elicits not a 
"reaction" but a response, which abolishes the intermediaries 
between antecedent and consequent, and places the self in front of 
the Other. Nonetheless this relation cannot remain entre nous: 
rather everything that takes place here "between us" concerns 
everyone; the face that looks at it places itself in the full light of the 
public order (Ibid), with the result that: "The third party looks at 
me in the eyes of the Other - language is justice" (TI 213). It is 
impossible to understand this whole section if we fail to see that 
the "light of the public order" which Levinas makes reference to 
here is not the panoramic light of the totality, but the light before 
the light, the epiphanic light, produced by a society of faces.
The "society of faces", which we have hitherto termed the 
ethico-religious community, is comprised of the plurality of 
asymmetrically related ethical beings. Thus Levinas is able to 
assert: " the face in its nakedness as a face present to me the
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destitution of a poor one" and at the same time maintain that "the 
poor one, the stranger, presents itself as an equal" (TI 213). Now, 
in the light of the whole preceding development of TI, it comes as 
something of a surprise to hear Levinas speaking of the ethical 
relation as one of equality. Is not the definitive characteristic of the 
ethical relation the absolute inequality between its relata? As 
Levinas himself puts it in a typical formulation taken from earlier 
in the text: "In Desire are conjoined the movement unto the Height 
and unto the Humility of the Other" (TI 200). In other words, the 
Other is "above" me, as transcendent height and majesty, or 
"below" me, as destitute and needy, but he is never my equal. This 
passage therefore is indeed a pivotal point in the text insofar as it 
marks the moment when absolute asymmetry reverts into a 
symmetrical order. The dynamic of this reversion of the "poor one" 
from a condition of inequality to one of equality is described as 
follows:
His equality within this essential poverty consists in 
referring to the third party, thus present at the 
encounter, whom in the midst of his destitution the 
Other already serves. He comes to join me. But he
^ins me to himself for service: he commands me as a aster. The command can command me only 
inasmuch as I am maser myself; consequently this 
command commands me to command. The thou is 
posited in front of a we. (TI 213)
This extract contains Levinas "reply" to Bauman. First of all 
the command that commands me to serve the Other must, it is 
true, on Levinas' account, be, so to speak, "doubled", so that the 
exteriority of the command equally issues from my interiority, 
thereby inverting heteronomy into autonomy. Yet, there is no 
possibility for any "misinterpretation" of the command in the
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course of its translation from exteriority into interiority, since it is 
ordained in the ethical community, and so outside of the 
phenomenal world; at no point therefore does it pass through the 
mediation of la langue. In other words, the command to command 
is a pre-reflexive iteration that is equally as silent as its exterior 
origin.
There is moreover a special form of reciprocity involved in the 
iteration of the command to command. Within the ethical relation 
the Other confronts me. Therefore, just as the Other commands 
me to command the command (to myself) to serve him, so to my 
face issues a command to him, not, to be sure to serve me - for 
that would violate the asymmetry condition - but to serve his 
Other, who stands to me in the relation of a third party. This is 
how the Other comes to "join me" in the common task of ethical 
service. Only in this sense is the Other my equal. Paradoxically, 
then, it is through an absolute submission to the Other that I am 
elevated into a position of mastery over him. For Levinas, the 
command to command the Other constitutes the positive moment 
of the ethical covenant. Its negative counterpart is the interdiction 
against murder that suspends the spontaneous powers of the I, 
bringing about the primary dispossession that makes the ethical 
community possible. In contrast, the positive injunction to serve 
the neighbour of my neighbour is pronounced "as Sermon, 
exhortation, the prophetic word" (TI 213). As such, it constitutes, 
according to Levinas, a wholly benign form of mastery that is 
altogether devoid of oppressive implications.
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Prior to TI, in the essay Ego and the Totality. Levinas had 
already sought to show how the asymmetry of the ethical relation 
transcends the sphere of violence:
To show respect is to bow down not before the law, but 
before a being who commands a work from me. But 
for this command not to Involve humiliation - which 
would take away from me the very possibility of respect 
- the command I receive must also be a command to 
command him who commands me. It consists in 
commanding a being to command me. The reference 
from command to command is the fact of saying "we", 
of constituting a party. By reason of this reference of 
one command to another, "we" is not the plural of "I". 
(CP 43)
This passage illustrates Levinas' belief that there is no 
possibility of the asymmetry of the ethical relation assuming an 
abusive and exploitative form because it is primarily enacted within 
a community dedicated to ethical service. The Other who 
commands me is equally self-effacing before the Other who 
command him, etc. But this community is necessarily an inclusive 
one insofar as there comes a point where the neighbour's command 
to his neighbour will not be obeyed. For Levinas, this marks the 
boundary where the ethical community ends and the 'State' begins.
There are, then, two distinct senses in which Levinas deploys 
the term "we". On the one hand, it refers as above to the ethical 
community, in which the 'we' is not the plural of the "I" - in the 
sense of a series of indexicals - but rather consists of a society of 
ethically individuated beings. On the other hand, this is
contrasted with the "we" of the State - "a humanity of 
interchangeable men, of reciprocal relations" (TI 300) - in which the 
self is "absorbed" within the abstract universal.
240
In its primary significance, the "we" designates a "society of 
infinity" or "fraternity". It is opposed to the "struggle of egoisms" 
which "results in a human city" (Tl 214). As such, it has two 
"aspects": one, as said above, it consists of individuals whose 
"singularity consists in each referring to itself', and, two, it involves 
the "commonness of a father" (Ibid). The society of infinity 
constitutes a "human kinship", a genuine plurality as against the 
merely logical unity of belonging to a genus. However, kinship, 
though not reducible to biology, retains a biological fundament. 
The ethical being receives its election by dint of being bom into the 
ethical community that is above nature. It is this fact that bestows 
real equality on its members as opposed to the merely abstract 
equality of personhood. The restriction of the ethical community 
on biological grounds necessarily entails that the ethical 
community is founded on exclusion.
This is a conclusion that Levinas does not shrink from. 
Again we turn to "Ego and Totality" for his most candid statement 
of the interrelation between the ethical elect and the world:
The one respected is not the one to whom, but the one 
with whom one renders justice. Respect is a relation 
between equals. Justice presupposes this original 
equality. (CP 44-45)
In short, justice is first directly accomplished in the ethical 
community and then indirectly ministered to the world, as Levinas 
makes clear below:
We are we because, giving commands from identity to 
identity, we are disengaged from totality and from
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history. But we are a we inasmuch as we command 
one another to a work for which we recognize one 
another. To disengage oneself while accomplishing a 
work is to set oneself up not against but for the 
totality, to be at its service. To serve the totality is to 
fight for justice. (CP 44)
The point bears repeating that, for Levinas, the ethical 
community is not merely a postulate but has a visible form. The 
basis of its visibility is the family. The family in turn, as we have 
just observed, is the means through which ethical election is 
secured. The following passage sums up Levinas' thinking on this 
question so unambiguously that it demands to be cited in full:
Because of my position as an I is effectuated already in 
fraternity the face can present itself to me as a face. 
The relation with the face in fraternity, where in this 
turn the Other appears in solidarity with all the others, 
constitutes the social order, the reference of every 
dialogue to the third party by which the we - or the 
parti- encompasses the face to face opposition, opens 
the erotic upon a social life, all signifyingness and 
decency, which encompasses the structure of the 
family itself. But the erotic and the family which 
articulates it ensure to this life, in which the I does not 
disappear but is promised and called to goodness, the 
infinite time of triumph without which goodness would 
be subjectivity and folly. (TI 280)
The ethical community therefore constitutes a redeemed 
community in the midst of an unredeemed world.6/ In Levinas 
words, "It is conceived starting from an I assured of the 
convergence of morality and reality, that is of an infinite time which 
through fecundity is its time" (TI 306). Hence, the Good is not a 
mere ought-to-be, nor is it a matter of subjective conviction, for it 
is always already accomplished in the life of the "society of infinity".
Although Levinas may avoid the dilemma on which Bauman 
has sought to impale him, he may do so only at the expense of
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exposing deeper problems concerning his whole notion of a soi- 
disant ahistorical ethical society. In effect, we have only been able 
to "solve" the "aporia of proximity" by displacing it onto a wholly 
noumenological plane. But insofar as this transcendental realm 
has a visible, worldly form, the question returns as to how there 
can be total unanimity within the ethical community with respect 
to the command of the face? The only possible answer is that the 
law of the face is simply given. At one point in TI, Levinas does 
appear to allow for some interpretation of the moral law when he 
states that "The school, without which no thought is explicit, 
conditions science. It is there that is affirmed the exteriority of the 
Master" (TI 200). However, this only goes to underline the point 
that in Levinas' version of the "right of knowledge", the subject's 
only right is to receive without question the revealed law as 
prescribed to it by an external authority. Although, according to 
Levinas, the moral law is to be obeyed because it is reasonable (and 
not merely because it is the law of God), he identifies reason with 
the total subjection of the self to the Other. It has no other content 
beyond this. Indeed, as we have said, any further determination of 
content, outside the institutional limits prescribed as legitimate 
within the ethical community, would eo ipso be unethical. In 
short, life within such a community would be so highly restrictive 
as to be practically devoid of all individual liberty. Therefore, 
Levinas' ethics, far from being post-modem, are decidedly pre- 
critical.
The contrast with Hegel could not be more complete. For 
Hegel, the good has no content prior to or outside o f the normative 
relations which result from the free self-determination of the will to
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will its relation to other wills in reciprocally enacted moral 
structures founded on the mutual recognition of the moral rights of 
each subject by all and of all by each. The first or immediate moral 
right is a right to subjective satisfaction and happiness. Again, we 
see here a further parallel with Levinas. Just as the latter 
emphasised the legitimacy of needs, Hegel states that the 
satisfaction of desire is entirely permissible for: "There is nothing 
degrading about being alive, and we do not have the alternative of 
living in a higher spirituality. It is only by raising what is present 
and given to a self-creating process, that the higher sphere of the 
good is attained" (PR 123 Addition). However, we see here also a 
significant difference between their respective understanding of the 
role o f needs in the moral relation: for Levinas, the satisfaction of 
need is bona fide insofar as it remains at the level of the elemental; 
for Hegel, it is precisely by being elevated above the elemental 
realm that needs acquire ethical significance.
Nonetheless, Hegel predicates the individual right to 
satisfaction on the reciprocal recognition of the rights of others to 
the same.
This universal moment, initially posited within this 
particularity itself, includes the welfare of others - or in 
its complete and wholly empty determination, the 
welfare of all. The welfare of many other particular 
beings in general is thus also an essential end and 
right of subjectivity. (PR 125)
In Rawlsian terms, for Hegel, right has lexical priority over 
well-being.7/ The formal requirement that my subjective welfare 
and happiness be congruent with the happiness of others, in the 
negative sense of not unduly restricting their possibility for well-
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being as broadly defined by abstract right, provides the will with its 
first objective determination. By the same token, it elevates the 
will to the standpoint of formal universality. According to Hegel, 
this advance for moral consciousness is represented by the 
philosophy of Kant, and specifically in the latter's definition of the 
goodwill as the performance of duty for duty's sake. As Hegel puts 
it, "In doing my duty, 1 am with myself [bei mir selbstl and free. 
The merit and exalted viewpoint of Kant's moral philosophy are 
that it emphasised this significance of duty" (PR 133 Addition).
Now it is not our concern here to pursue the congency of 
Hegel's critique of Kant. Rather our aim is to show the role Kant 
plays in Hegel's account of the self-determination of the moral 
sphere.®/ From this point of view, what matters is not so much 
the detail of Hegel's reading (or misreading) of Kant but its result.
For Hegel, the Kantian standpoint essentially denotes a 
return, at a higher level, to the "abstractive infinity" of the pure 
will. He arrives at this conclusion by seeking to show that the 
universalisibility procedure underpinning Kant's deduction of the 
moral law is essentially defective with the consequence that the 
categorical imperative reduces itself to an empty formalism. The 
charge of formalism has two grounds: first, Hegel argues, the 
categorical imperative fails because it can generate no new moral 
maxims, and, second, because it can provide no adequate test of 
existing maxims. Hegel's critique is grounded in his interpretation 
of Kant's formula of universal law "So act that you can will the 
maxim of your action to be a universal law "as resting upon and 
being reducible to the (tautologous) law of noncontradiction (A
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cannot be non-A). As a result, he contends the moral law is empty 
because it cannot articulate itself without presupposing a content 
externally given to it, since: "the criterion that there should be no 
contradiction is non-productive - for where there is nothing there is 
no contradiction either" (PR 135 Addition). However, by merely 
taking up, so to speak, morals maxims that Eire present to hand, 
the moral subject is allowing itself to be restricted by a 
heteronomous content not freely determined in accordance with 
the universEil norms of its own self-legislating will.
In addition, Hegel sdso maintains that the formula of 
universal law is equEilly incapable of testing those mEixims it must 
necessEirily assume. To illustrate this deficiency, Hegel takes issue 
with Kant's application of the universal law test to the case of a 
man entrusted with the deposit of a person who has since 
deceased. The moral question involved here is ought the trustee 
return the deposit to the deceased's next of kin or keep it for 
himself? Kemt says that the former maxim CEinnot pass the test of 
universability since it would involve the trustee in a volitionEd self- 
contradiction of willing to keep the deposit and negating the social 
practice (i.e. trust) that makes the practice of deposit-keeping 
possible. Hegel's objection is that this only amounts to a 
"contradiction" if we admit the additionsil premise that the abolition 
of the institution of private property - presupposed by the practice 
of deposit-keeping - involves a logical inconsistency. But since the 
existence or non-existence of private property is a contingent rather 
than a necessEiry truth, it follows that there is no contradiction 
whatsoever involved in willing maxims that would bring about its
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destruction. Hegel concludes from all this that the formula of the 
universal law is a test any maxim can pass.
However, for Hegel, the failure of the Kantian deduction of 
practiced reason does not signal a retreat to a pre-universalist 
standpoint; rather, it leads on to the shape of "conscience". 
Conscience is essentially a universal form of self-consciousness (in 
the negative sense that is entirely abstracted from all content) 
which nonetheless is unable to provide itself with a universal 
determination because it has no way of knowing whether its 
subjective insight corresponds to the good in its objective 
determination. In Hegel's words, it is "subjectivity in its 
universality reflected into itself' (PR 136)... "that deepest inner 
solitude with oneself in which all externals and all limitations have 
disappeared - it is total withdrawal into self (PR 136 Addition). Yet 
precisely because it embodies this negative infinity and has only its 
own subjective conviction to determine for itself what is good, it is 
equally capable of taking for its principle "either the universal in 
and for itself or the arbitrariness of its own particularity" (PR 139) 
and therefore has the power of "giving the latter precedence over 
the universal and realising its action, i.e. it is capable of evil" (Ibid).
We have seen how in the Phenomenology. Hegel shows how 
conscience may either remain withdrawn into itself, and adopt the 
life of "a beautiful soul", or else actively determine itself in a 
subjective manner, and so become the Immoral "hero". The mutual 
confession of these two ideal-types inaugurates the transition to 
the spiritual community. In the Philosophy of Right, by contrast, 
the hiatus between conscience and objectivity is not immediately
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healed. Within the moral sphere it manifests itself in the 
dissatisfactions of hypocrisy and the ironic standpoint. 
Nonetheless the "very subjectivity of pure self-certainty, melting 
away for itself in its emptiness, is identical with the abstract 
universality of the good" (PR 141). The perfection of the moral 
subject in the shape of conscience allows the transition to be self- 
determined totality of Sittlichkeit - the first stage of which is the 
Family - where, in principle, it will find its objective correlative.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FOURTEEN
1/ For a short but concise treatment of the relationship between 
Handlung and Tat in Hegel's Philosophy of Right see Allen 
Wood's Hegel's Ethical Thought, pp. 140-142.
2/ Fred R. Dallmayr, G.W.F. Hegel : Modeminitv and Politics 
(Newbury Park, London, New Delhi, Sage Publications 1993), 
p.113. For the Weberian distinction see Politics as a 
Vocation in From Max Weber : Essays in Sociology. 
Translated and edited by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright-Mills 
(New York, Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 118-128. 
Allen Wood sums up the point of this distinction in Hegel's 
Ethical Thought, p. 139, "If our intentions issue in actions 
that naturally produce bad results, then we have bad 
intentions. The moralists are guilty of hypocrisy when they 
squander all their regret on the external world leaving none 
for their own subjectivity".
3/ Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford. Blackwell 
1993), pp.88-92.
4/ Ibid, p.91.
5/ My interpretation of this key section is indebted to Simon 
Critchley's careful reading of the passage in The Ethics of 
Deconstruction. Derrida and Levinas (Oxford, Blackwell 
1992), pp.225-236, although, as will soon become clear, my
249
Interpretation points in a direction quite different to that of 
Critchley's.
6/ See Appendix.
7/ John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA., Harvard 
University Press 1971), pp.42-43.
8/ My summary of Hegel's critique of Kant is heavily indebted to 
Seyla Benhabib's Critique Norm and Utopia (New York, 
Columbia University Press 1986), pp.71-84.
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN
ETHICAL LOVE AND THE FAMILY
Hegel places the family at the very centre of the system of 
Right, after the derivation of "Abstract Right" and "Morality" and 
prior to the exposition of "Civil Society" and the "State". This order 
of presentation is in strict accordance with the immanent 
development of the Idea. Personality and property, on the one 
hand, and moral subjectivity, on the other, provide the material 
and spiritual prerequisites necessary to the formation of the 
familial bond. Richard Winfield sums up the conceptual 
justification for the centrality of the "family" in the deduction of the 
Idea of Right as follows: "property relations provide all the 
necessary resources for establishing common ownership. Morality, 
on the other hand, provides a framework of mutual accountability 
where individuals are obliged to act for the sake of one another's 
rights and welfare. As an institution of freedom, the family 
incorporates both these dimensions into the common household it 
establishes". 1/
For Hegel, therefore, the family constitutes the moment in 
which the moral self receives its first concrete embodiment and 
objective self-determination. Hence, although marriage pre­
supposes two self-conscious individuals capable of entering into 
contractual relations and of fulfilling moral obligations, it is, 
nonetheless, not reducible - contra Kant - to the status of a 
contract. As Hegel puts it: "the precise nature of marriage is to 
begin from the point of view of contract, i.e. that of Individual
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personality as a self-sufficient unit - in order to supersede it fihn 
auf zuchebenl" (PR 163). In other words, although marriage 
outwardly takes the form of a contract, it is a contract that 
transcends contract, in that it sublates the plane of legality in 
"ethical love". In Hegel's words, in marriage "I gain my self- 
consciousness only through the renunciation of my independent 
existence fmeines fursichseinsl and through knowing myself as the 
unity of myself with another and another with me" [PR 158 
Addition]. Accordingly, "Love is therefore the most immense 
contradiction, the understanding cannot resolve it" (Ibid). The 
contradiction is this: that two persons can "consent to constitute a 
single person" [PR 162]. Yet it is through this mutual loss of self 
that both partners gain absolute selfhood: "their union is a self­
limitation, but since they attain their substantial self- 
consciousness within it, it is in fact their liberation" (Ibid). Finally, 
"Love is both the production and the resolution of this 
contradiction. As its resolution, it is ethical unity" (PR 158 
Addition).
It is important to note that for Hegel the reciprocal 
recognition of two persons in marriage is not merely founded on 
the mutual agreement of two alter ego's - although this is a 
necessary constituent of the marital relation - but ultimately 
involves a total communion between two absolute others, both of 
whom must be self-consciously aware of their absolute status, and 
it is only in and through this communion that each self is brought 
into relation with and confirmed in its own absolute alterity. In 
Hegel’s logical parlance, marriage is a "being-with-oneself in the 
Other". It therefore constitutes the immediate union of eros and
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agape, that perfects two concrete individuals. Put another way, 
matrimony effects the complete Aufhebung of the emotion, will, 
personality, and subjectivity of each of the parties in a joint- 
personality, which does not annul but rather completes their 
respective individualities.
Finally, insofar as the marriage relation is based on the free 
decision of two rational beings, it must necessarily acquire a public 
dimension. The two parties to the marriage have not simply 
"fallen" in love, though this may indeed characterise the pre­
nuptial stage of their relationship; rather their decision to marry 
involves a mutual will to will to love each other. As such, it is 
based not merely on feeling but on a rationed principle. Moreover, 
since the mutual decision of the parties will have repercussions for 
wider society the rationality of their union must take the form of a 
public statement, open to refutation, i.e. the marriage ceremony.
Now, at first sight, Hegel's concept of ethico-legal love, 
appears to be at the furthest possible remove from Levinas' 
descriptions of "eros" and "fecundity" and its cognate terms, 
'caress', 'profanation', voluptuosity', 'trans-substantiation', etc. 
Indeed, Levinas does not even once mention the word "marriage" in 
TI. Nevertheless, as in the spheres of "abstract right" and 
"morality", a closer examination reveals a number of inverse 
parallels between Hegel's and Levinas' respective treatments of the 
family. Broadly speaking, these may be summarised under three 
headings. First, for Levinas and Hegel, the erotic union 
presupposes two beings with resources and an ethical disposition 
towards one another. Second, for both thinkers, the erotic union is
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at once a human and a divine covenent.2/ Third, albeit in 
markedly different ways, Hegel and Levinas both contend that the 
family is the basis of ethical life within the State.
In the light of these broad areas of identity and difference we 
shall now subject Levinas' deduction of the family to a Hegelian 
critique. Our critical analysis is divided into three parts (a) Women 
and Ethics; (b) The Divine Nuptial; and (c) Voluptuosity and the 
Child.
(a ) W om an and Ethics
In the first part of the present chapter, we noted how there 
are in fact two parallel deductions taking place simultaneously 
within TI. On the one hand, Levinas sets out a phenomenological 
genesis of the socio-historical world. This traces the way in which 
the solitary self escapes the anxiety of the there is. engulfing the 
elemental realm, by setting to work and representing a world to 
itself. Later this results in the more complex mediatory structures 
of commerce and the state. However, the historical subject 
remains encapsulated within the Same, wholly ignorant of ethical 
transcendence. On the other hand, Levinas executes an onto- 
phenomenological epoche of the social-historical world to its 
aboriginal origin in the ethico-religious community. As we noted 
above, the first moment of the ethical relation is the "dwelling". 
Hence, in this primary derivation, the separated being does not 
pass directly from the elements to a world of social forms but is ab 
initio contained within an ahistorlcal ethical society. We now turn
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to examine the role played by women in the "genesis" of this 
transcendent community.
In Levinas' account, the ethical community is grounded on 
an ethical covenant which evolves through four distinct stages. 
First, there is a domestication of the spontaneous "atheist" will in 
and through its "recollection" in the "dwelling". Second, there is a 
primary dispossession of this recollected self, enacted through the 
prohibition on murder, which founds a common world. Third, the 
self responds to the summons to command ethical service in the 
face of the third party. Fourth, and Anally, these three moments 
lay the ground for the erotic union, which engenders the child and 
so perpetuates the generational infinity of the ethical nation. 
Women play a critical role in the first and last moments of this 
deduction.
Levinas maintains that the dwelling - the possibility of 
inferiority and inhabitation - is predicated on feminine alterity. 
The withdrawal from being effectuated in the dwelling implies "a 
new event" (TI 170), insofar as it serves to demonstrate that the will 
has transcended the sphere of need and labour. As Levinas 
expresses it, in the first person discourse of TI, the dwelling shows 
that "I must have been in relation with something I do not live with. 
This event is the relation with the Other who welcomes me in the 
Home, the discreet presence of the feminine" (Ibid). The "first 
revelation of the Other" (TI 151), then, is the peaceable welcome 
produced "primordially" in the gentleness of the feminine face" (TI 
150). This, in turn, allows for "Intimacy" and "inhabitation". 
Hence, the feminine face signlffes itself differently to the face
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to examine the role played by women In the "genesis" of this 
transcendent community.
In Levinas' account, the ethical community is grounded on 
an ethical covenant which evolves through four distinct stages. 
First, there is a domestication of the spontaneous "atheist" will in 
and through its "recollection" in the "dwelling". Second, there is a 
primary dispossession of this recollected self, enacted through the 
prohibition on murder, which founds a common world. Third, the 
self responds to the summons to command ethical service in the 
face of the third party. Fourth, and finally, these three moments 
lay the ground for the erotic union, which engenders the child and 
so perpetuates the generational infinity of the ethical nation. 
Women play a critical role in the first and last moments of this 
deduction.
Levinas maintains that the dwelling - the possibility of 
interiority and inhabitation - is predicated on feminine alterity. 
The withdrawal from being effectuated in the dwelling implies "a 
new event” (TI 170), insofar as it serves to demonstrate that the will 
has transcended the sphere of need and labour. As Levinas 
expresses it, in the first person discourse of TI, the dwelling shows 
that "I must have been in relation with something I do not live with. 
This event is the relation with the Other who welcomes me in the 
Home, the discreet presence of the feminine" (Ibid). The "first 
revelation of the Other" (TI 151), then, is the peaceable welcome 
produced "primordially" in the gentleness of the feminine face" (TI 
150). This, in turn, allows for "intimacy" and "inhabitation". 
Hence, the feminine face signifies itself differently to the face
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proper. It expresses itself not as a presence but as an absence: it 
is "discreet". Accordingly, Levinas insists.
habitation is not yet the transcendence of language. 
The Other who welcomes in intimacy is not yet the you 
fvousl of the face, that reveals itself in height, but 
precisely the thou [tu] of familiarity: a language 
without teaching, a silent language, an understanding 
without words, an expression in secret. (TI 155)
This silent expression, though "situated on another plane 
than language" is not pre-ethical, for it "includes all the 
possibilities of the transcendent relation with the Other" and is 
therefore grounded in the "full human personality". The latter, 
"however", Levinas adds, "in the woman can be reserved so as to 
open up the dimension of "inferiority"" (Ibid).
Within the terms of Levinas' deduction, the welcome 
extended to the autochthonous self by the feminine resident in the 
"dwelling" represents a perfection, so to speak, of the finite will. 
This, in turn, prepares the fined ground for, as it were, the second 
"revelation of the Other" that binds and seals the ethical covenant. 
In Levinas' words:
but in order that I be able to free myself from the very 
possession that the welcome of the Home establishes, 
in order to be able to see things in themselves, that is, 
represent them to myself, refuse both enjoyment and
Bossession, I must know how to give what I possess.•nly thus could I situate myself absolutely above my 
engagement in the non-I. But for this I must 
encounter the indiscreet face of the Other that calls me 
into question. (TI 170-171)
The response to the "indiscreet” command of the face, 
prlmordlally expressed as the interdiction against murder,
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dispossesses the I of both its spontaneity and its possessions. This 
primary dispossession is the first discourse or ethical language 
that "institutes a common world" (TI 173) by rendering universal 
what was "hitherto mine" (TI 174).
Now it is evident from the above account that Levinas has 
framed the two stages of the ethical covenant in terms of an 
implicit contrast with Hegel's master-slave dialectic. If we follow 
the feminist tradition and read the primary struggle for recognition 
as a battle between the sexes,3/ then we may see that the implied 
contrast in Levinas' presentation is this: whereas the transition 
from the elements to the world of work and representation 
proceeds via the forced subordination of the female sex to male 
domination, the advent of the ethical community is distinguished 
by the fact that it is based on the voluntary and gratuitous self- 
acquiscence of womankind. Moreover, it is this primordial 
feminine self-abnegation that makes ethics possible by carving out, 
so to speak, a dimension of gentleness and intimacy within the 
midst of the bellicosity of being.
Yet, on closer scrutiny, Levinas' account of the abdication of 
the feminine is not so wholly opposed to Hegel's derivation of the 
birth of self-consciousness as the above contrast would suggest. 
Indeed, his statement that feminine expression is "reserved" so as 
to found "interiority" is essentially a reformulation of Hegel's 
observation that self-consciousness achieves recognition in another 
self-consciousness "only when the object itself effects the negation 
within itself' [Phen Para 175). Whether the self-abnegation of the 
feminine is voluntary or non-voluntary is besides the point, for the
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fact remains that according to Levinas the birth of civilisation - 
"inhabitation" - remains predicated on the submission of woman to 
the male Other.4/
Levinas' description of the foundational moment of the 
ethical covenant has therefore the unpalatable implication that 
"woman" counts as the first possession of the separated being - 
along with the "dwelling" and its furnishings. To be fair to Levinas, 
the possession of woman in the dwelling is not a legal possession, 
for it is altogether outside the sphere of reciprocal right, it is rather 
an extension of that special form of possession in the sense of 
which the separated being is said to be chez soi. Nonetheless, in 
keeping with the overall stress Levinas places on asymmetry, the 
silence of the feminine entails that when the masculine I responds 
to her welcome and enters the dwelling he is placed in possession 
of her as well as of the home.
It is Important to note that Levinas is not propounding the 
broadly defensible socio-historical thesis that all civilisations 
hitherto have de facto been based on the confinement of the female 
sex to the domestic role; rather he is maintaining the Identification 
of the feminine with care and domesticity to be the de jure 
foundation of the ethical community and, hence, indirectly of world 
civilization. It is only because the masculine I - and from the 
moment of the self-abnegation of the feminine the separated being 
is necessarily defined as masculine - has a home, complete with a 
woman and possessions, that he is able to enter the ethical 
encounter, not simply in the negative sense of complying with the 
interdiction against murder, but positively by welcoming the Other,
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as a brother, into his home and offering him food and raiment. The 
"dwelling", and the (male) self who owns it are inalienable; but the 
first substitution that establishes a "world in common" requires, 
above and beyond the donation of material gifts, the institution of 
an incest taboo and a primary system of kinship exchange.
In summary, then, in Levinas' dedication of the ethical 
covenant the feminine is subsumed twice under male authority: 
first she is rendered subordinate to the spontaneity of male power 
by imposing upon herself a domestic vocation, she is then 
abnegated a second time as part of the suspension of the power of 
the male will before the transcendent - paternal law of the face.
The obvious question Levinas' deduction raises is whv should 
the feminine consent to be "discreet", to forgo her own voice and 
visibility, to hold herself in reserve, etc. To put the question in a 
slightly different way: how is the double acquiescence of woman to 
patriarchal authority justified? Levinas' answer to this question 
moves in a circle: "it is necessary because without it there could be 
no ethics". But what is ethics?": answer: "nothing other than 
acquiescence to the patriarchal law." Hence he is unable to 
produce non-question begging justification for his contention that 
the silencing of the feminine voice is absolutely normative. Indeed, 
his entire claim that the production of the ethical relation is 
predicated on the self-denial of the feminine reduces itself to the 
following simple tautology" "it Is (necessaiy) because it is 
(necessary).
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The inherent dogmatism of this response is further 
compounded by the perverse argument that the subordination of 
the feminine finds its rational justification in the eschewal of the 
search for reasons to justify it. This follows from Levinas' 
identification of reason with the paternal moral law:
In the welcoming of the face the will opens up to 
reason. Language is not limited to the maieutic 
awakening of thoughts common to beings. It does not 
accelerate the inward maturation of a reason common 
to all; it teaches and introduces the new into thought. 
The introduction of the new into thought, the idea of 
infinity, is the very work of reason. (TI 219)
On this basis, even the posing of the question as to why the 
self-suppression of the Feminine under paternal law is required, 
would constitute a denial of ethical transcendence and therefore be 
eo ipso unethical, and "irrational” to boot. The soi-disant source of 
all "critique" is itself placed beyond criticism.
It will perhaps be objected, on Levinas' behalf, that we have 
traduced his argument by inadmissibly identifying the "feminine" 
with the biologically specific category of the female sex simpliciter. 
To the contrary, the objection may continue, the genders 
"masculine” and "feminine" in Levinas' work must not be read as 
corresponding to the sexual division between male and female but 
as denoting two me-ontological principles integrated within each 
human personality. Commentators sympathetic to Levinas, 5/ 
point inter alia to a passage in Ethics and Infinity where this more 
appealing line of interpretation is expressly confirmed by Levinas 
himself:
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All these allusions to the ontological differences 
between the masculine and the feminine would appear 
less archaic if, instead of dividing humanity into two 
species (or into two genders) they would signify that 
participation in the masculine and the feminine were 
the attribute of every human being. (El 68)
Moreover, our own analysis in the previous chapter, showed 
that the notion of the "maternal-psyche" signifies the "presence" of 
the (feminine) Other in-the-same. But, while there is no denying 
the manner in which Levinas' use of gender terms transcends 
biological determinates with respect to his characterisation of the 
intra-subjective relation, it must equally be acknowledged that his 
understanding of the nature o f inter-subjectivity remains grounded 
in a biological conception of sexual difference. Indeed, his whole 
polemic against the philosophy of the "Neuter" basing itself on the 
merely logical unity of the species, and thereby reducing the female 
sex to the self sameness o f the concept, is premised on the 
irreducibility of sexual difference. Levinas makes this explicit in TI:
the other sex is an alterity borne by a being as an 
essence and not as the reverse of his identity, it could 
not affect an unsexed me. (TI 120)
Against this background, Levinas' statement that the 
"empirical absence of the 'feminine' sex in a dwelling nowise affects 
the dimensions of femininity" (TI 156) does nothing to mitigate the 
force of his exposition which tends towards an absolute normative 
identification of gender and sexual difference. Although, in fact the 
"dwelling" does not presuppose a female occupant, in principle it 
does so. Just as the production of empirical evidence showing that 
husbands today help their wives around the house more than they 
did in the past, confirms rather than refutes the stereotypical view
261
that housework Is a woman's primary responsibility, so, on another 
plane, this is a similar instance of the exception serving to prove 
the rule. It would therefore be naive to suppose that Levinas' 
deduction of the ethical relation has no negative implications for 
Women's self-liberation and for sexual politics generally. On the 
contrary, Levinas' contention that the self-affacement of woman 
and her confinement to the reproductive role is a condition of 
human civilisation, and a fortiori of all morality, places powerful a 
priori limits on the scope of female self-development.
(b) The Divine Nuptial
In the "Phenomenology of Eros", Levinas derives the erotic 
relation in terms of a three-way interplay between the moral law, as 
expressed in the "indiscreet" face of the Other, the Lover and the 
Beloved. This is therefore at once a description of a divine and a 
human nuptial. The erotic relation both presupposes and 
reproduces the ethical community, by quite literally replenishing 
the stock of its members.
Levinas uses the term "profanation" to define the nature of 
eros. The Beloved exhibits the qualities of the feminine: 
gentleness, tenderness, intimacy, fragility, vulnerability, etc. These 
are not merely the psychological properties of the "female sex": 
rather they denote a withdrawal from the ontological order, a 
delightful "lapse in being", that renders ethical life possible. The 
feminine is from another time, from the "future which is not-yet" (TI 
257); she is beyond all Intentional relations and projects. 
Accordingly, the Lover solicits his Beloved, not through the grasp
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but in the "contact" of the caress, which precisely cannot grasp its 
"object". This is the whole pathos of the caress. The alterity of the 
feminine is such that she remains intact in her otherness, even in 
the midst of the sexual union. She is a mystery that can be 
violated but not disclosed. She remains inviolable in her very 
violability. Her presence as an exorbitant "ultramaterial nudity" is 
ever an absence, secret and clandestine. Thus, the Beloved moves 
at "the limit of transcendence and immanence" (TI 254), beyond 
both the object and the face. In Levinas' words:
Alongside of the night as anonymous rustling of the 
there is extends the night of the erotic, behind the 
night of insomnia the night of the hidden, the 
clandestine, the mysterious land of the virgin, 
simultaneously uncovered by Eros and refusing Eros - 
another way of saying: profanation. (TI 258-259)
The feminine face does not express itself, or rather it 
"expresses only this refusal to express" (TI 260). As such, it is 
liable at any time to be inverted into raillery, mockery, innuendo, 
lasciviousness and indecency. Yet this descent into non-sense is 
nonetheless predicated on the straightforwardness of the face. As 
Levinas puts it: "Only the being that has the frankness of the face 
can be 'discovered' in the non-signifyingness of the Wanton" (TI 
261), or, in a more extended formulation: "disrespect presupposes 
the face. Elements of things remain outside of respect and 
disrespect. It is necessary that the face have been apperceived for 
nudity to be able to acquire the non-slgnifyingness o f the lustful" 
fTl 262). In Levinas' account, then, the feminine is both the basis 
of the ethical order and the source of its Instability and vitiation:
Equivocation constitutes the epiphany of the feminine 
- at the same time interlocutor, collaborator and
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master superiorly intelligent, so often dominating men 
in the masculine civilisation it has entered, and 
woman having to be treated as woman, in accordance 
with rules unprescriptable by civil society. (TI 264)
The power of the "feminine epiphany" resides in its 
indeterminancy and equivocality. As Levinas says "The violence of 
this revelation marks precisely the force of this absence, this not 
vet, this less than nothing, tom up from its modesty, from its 
essence of being human" (Ibid). The apparition of the feminine eros 
divorced from its ethical context, emanates from the abyss into 
which it sinks "weighing a monstrous weight in the shadow of 
nonsense" (TI 264). It leads away from the Thou of community. In 
the first instance, it is recuperated in the "non sociality of the 
society of lovers" (Ibid). But is only in and through the 
engenderment of the child that the violence of the erotic is 
ultimately defused and, via the family, reintegrated into the ethical 
order.
Now, in order to gain a critical purchase on Levinas' notion of 
eros as 'profanation' we shall briefly compare it with Hegel's 
exposition o f Greek Sittlichkeit in the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Three salient parallels immediately suggest themselves. First, 
Hegel's description of the ethical order as divided between the 
Human law, the manifest law of the state, and the Divine law, the 
chthonic law of the family, is represented, mutatls mutandis, in 
Levinas' identification of the masculine principle with the revealed 
law of the community and the feminine with the subterranean 
realm of interiority. Thus, Hegel's statement that "Nature, not the 
accident of circumstances or choice, assigns one sex to one law, 
the other to the other law; or conversely the two ethical powers
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themselves give themselves an individual existence and actualise 
themselves in the two sexes" [Phen Para 465] is clearly echoed in 
Levinas' gendered presentation of eros.
Second, this identification of the masculine with the manifest 
law and the feminine with the law of the Netherworld leads both 
Hegel and Levinas to identify the feminine with the subversive 
principle. Again, allowing for the necessary changes - viz, that for 
Levinas this is a distinction within the ethical community opposed 
to the State, whereas, for Hegel the separation of the human and 
the divine law is a distinction within the State, conceived as a 
single ethical order - there is a definite correlation between Hegel's 
memorable statement that "Womankind - the everlasting irony [in 
the life] of the community - changes by intrigue the universal end 
of government into a private end... and turns to ridicule the earnest 
wisdom of mature age" (Phen Para 475) and Levinas' just-quoted 
epiphet that "Equivocation constitutes the epiphany of the 
feminine", and that woman is a source of mockery and innuendo 
capable of undermining and corrupting the moral order.
Hence, both Hegel and Levinas confer special moral powers 
upon the feminine, not available to the masculine principle. For 
example, Hegel's assertion that "the feminine in the form of the 
sister, has the highest intuitive awareness of what is ethical" (Phen 
Para 457) is paralleled in Levinas' contention that woman is "a 
master, superiorly intelligent in the masculine world it has entered” 
(TI 264). Both thinkers are here implicitly contrasting the 
supposed particularity of female moral perception to the 
universalism of (mode) reason.
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However, Hegel's specification of the sister as the supreme 
example of feminine ethicality alludes to a critical disanalogy 
between our two thinkers' respective accounts of the feminine. It is 
by no means an accident that Hegel deems the sister-brother 
relation, rather them that of husband and wife or parent and child, 
to be the highest embodiment of the Divine law. In the 
circumstances of natural Sittlichkeit. a woman can find no 
recognition in marriage, nor in her role as a daughter, where her 
ethical duty is to resign herself to the death of her parents, nor as a 
mother, where she performs a universal rather than a particular 
function. Only in the sibling relation is she recognised as an equal. 
In Hegel's words: "The brother, however, is for the sister a passive, 
similar being in general; the recognition o f  herself in him is pure 
and unmixed with any natural desire"... hence... "the moment of 
the individual self, recognising and being recognised, can here 
assert its right" (Phen Para 457). This moment of equality within 
the family marks both its perfection and its point of dissolution, for 
it is "the limit at which the self-contained life of the family breaks 
up and goes beyond itself' (Phen Para 458), i.e. the brother passes 
from the sphere of the divine law to the realm of the human law, 
while "the sister becomes, or the wife remains, the head of the 
household" (Phen Para 459).
This sets the stage for the tragic collision between family 
right and state-right, symbolised in the figure and fate of 
Antigone. 7/ The conflict demonstrates that the divine and the 
human law are interconnected and presuppose one another. In the 
person of Antigone, the feminine is raised to the point of the
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universal consciousness, insofar as she fully comprehends the 
right of both sides in the conflict between family and state, and yet 
freely subsumes her own individuality in defence of the ethical 
substance. Unlike her father, she knows the full extent of her 
transgression in advance of the deed and must therefore more 
completely assume the guilt that ensues from it. In her immortal 
words:
"Because we suffer we acknowledge we have erred."
The historical circumstances of Greek Sittlichkeit. however, 
are such that Antigone must remain within the bounds of the 
family and therefore she is incapable of actualising her self- 
consciousness, and can therefore attain only to an "intuitive" 
awareness of the ethical. Nonetheless, the feminine principle has 
been established as a political force within the state: subsequently, 
in more propitious historical circumstances this implicit principle 
may be actualised in a way that will allow women to transcend the 
familiar sphere in which they have hitherto been encompassed.
We have now identified the point where the difference 
between Hegel's and Levinas' respective understanding of the 
feminine is at its most pronounced. For Levinas, in contrast to 
Hegel, the dialectic between the masculine and the feminine is 
contained within an essentially static community, hence there is a 
priori no possibility of a radical re-working of the relationship 
between the ethical law and the feminine principle. The latter may 
disturb the male order and even exert a kind of mastery over it - 
the devious kind of mastery exercised by the powerless over the
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powerful - but she cannot attain equality within it. That is to say, 
within the ethical community, the woman has no transformational 
potential. Moreover, if she were to agitate for equality with her 
'brothers' she would, in Levinas' eyes, be simply denying her own 
"otherness". Perhaps she would then have to be forced to be 
"ethical"? This flippant remark has a serious intent; for it 
highlights how, under the guise of "me-ontological" categories, 
Levinas has re-imparted a neo-essentialism to rival that of the most 
formal Aristotelianism; and, like all essentialisms, in as much as it 
defines individuals in advance of the way they may define 
themselves, it is latently authoritarian.
It will no doubt be thought a bit rich to use Hegel of all 
people to criticize Levinas for being sexist. This would appear to be 
a case of the chauvinist kettle calling the patriarchal pot black. 
Hegel after all is hardly a pro-feminist. His analysis of Greek 
Sittlichkeit is by no means confined to a survey of classical Greek 
literature. We find many of its features Aufgehoben in the 
deduction of the modem family, as the first concrete moment of the 
Idea of the State. In particular, the supposed ethical division of the 
sexes is reproduced in accordance with a functional account of 
complementary role allocation. The made sex is self-determining 
"being of self' amd has its "knowledge and volition" in the reailm of 
"free universadity", while the femade sex is a "spirituality which 
madntains itself in unity as knowledge amd volition of the 
substamtiad in the form of concrete individuadity" lElzelheitl amd 
feeling lEmpflndungl. In its extemad relations, the former is 
powerful amd active, the latter passive amd subjective" (PR 166). He 
goes on to say that mam has "his actuad substantial life in the state
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and learning IWissenschaftl". while, "Woman has her substantial 
vocation (Bestimmungl in the family, and her ethical disposition 
consists in this [family] pietv" (Ibid). The man is dedicating himself 
to a life of division, work and struggle "fights his way to a self- 
sufficient unity with himself'; but this end is already anticipated in 
his family life which provides him with " a peaceful intuition of this 
unity, and an emotive fempfindendl and subjective ethical life" 
(Ibid). By contrast, the woman remains within the closed circle of 
the family. Seyla Benhabib succeeds in damning Hegel simply by 
accurately summarising his position:
Women, since they cannot overcome unity and emerge 
out of the life o f the family into the world of 
universality, are excluded from history-constituting 
activity. Their activities in the private realm, namely 
reprodiuction, the rearing of children, and the 
satisfaction of the emotioned and sexual needs of men, 
place them outside of the world of work. This means 
that women have no history, and are condemned to 
repeat the cycles of life.®/
Any lingering doubts about Hegel's sexism may be dispelled 
by reference to his infamous obiter dicta concerning the educability 
of women. These inform us that though women may have "insights 
(Enfallel taste and delicacy", they do not "possess the ideal". Hegel 
likens the difference between male and female to the distinction 
between animals and plants. Man actively pursues knowledge of 
the universal through scientific labour while woman's inner 
development "is a more peaceful [process of] unfolding whose 
principle is the more indeterminate unity of feeling fEmpflndungl". 
Consequently, "the education of women takes place imperceptibly", 
they simply live and breathe "the atmosphere of representational 
thought”. Finally, Hegel warns that, on account of their
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combination of emotivity and particularity, women are unfit to 
govern: "When women are in charge of government the state is in 
danger, for their actions are based not on the demands of 
universality, but on their contingent inclination and opinion" (PR 
166 Addition).
The question naturally arises, then, as to whether such an 
overt champion of male dominance as Hegel is a reliable authority 
to indict Levinas as a sexist. Indeed, it may be said that our 
Hegelian antipathy to Levinas' notion of the feminine derives from 
the fact that Levinas defines woman as other per se. rather than as 
the binary (and subordinate) opposition of the male sex? Is there 
not therefore a positive notion of the feminine in Levinas' thought 
which Hegelianism is in principle incapable of understanding?
Our [Hegelian] response to these questions is to recall the 
distinction we made in Chapter One of this work between the 
System and Hegel's authorship. The two are not identical; and in 
this non-identity resides the possibility and indeed the necessity of 
criticising the content of Hegel's oeuvre on the basis of his own 
system. Hegel's theory of gender relations and the state are a 
prime candidate for such an exercise in immanent revision. It is 
evident that Hegel's contention that the natural determinacy of the 
sexes emerges from a rational and ethical necessity, which entails 
the men are to enter civil society and the state while women are to 
pursue a domestic vocation, is in complete contradiction with his 
own demonstration that the advent of the Idea of the modem state 
is predicated upon the liberation of humanity from all natural 
determination. As Richard Winfield rightly observes Hegel's
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attempt to place biological constraints on family relationships 
"doubly violates the spirit of his own ethics of freedom by limiting 
marriage to a heterosexual relation where men and women have 
different roles based on their gender, the man taking charge of the 
household and representing its affairs in the world, the woman 
restricting her activity to child-rearing and domestic chores''^/ 
insofar as this re-imports elements contingent on history and 
tradition into a self-determining institution of right. Similarly, 
Peter Steinberger shows that Hegel's theory of gender and his 
theory of marriage are "flatly contradictory" since ex hvpothesi the 
"success of marriage depends upon the full and mutual 
spiritualisation, i.e. rationalisation - of the parties; both must 
attain to the kind of reflective enlightenment required of Concrete 
Persons. But the theory of gender would make this simply 
impossible, since, according to Hegel, women would never achieve 
such rationality". 10/ in short, Hegel is his own best critic
However, it would be facile to explain Hegel's views on 
women as simply reflecting the prevalent prejudices of his time. 
Hegel's rational for reintroducing natural determinacy into the 
system of right is grounded in two conceptual principles which 
must be retained in any subsequent speculative-systemic 
philosophy of the State. First, the liberation from all natural 
determinations of personality, concomitant with the predominance 
of abstract right in the sphere of social relations, and necessary to 
the advent of modernity, does not entail that the State can be 
established de novo, without reference to its antecedent genesis in 
history and tradition. As Hegel demonstrates in his analysis of the 
French revolution, such an abstract negation of all existing
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institutions in the name of absolute freedom ultimately leads to 
terror and a frenzy of destruction. In order to provide itself with a 
determinate content the system of right must be based on a will to 
will the historically extant institutional forms of society and the 
state to the extent that they conform with the requirements of 
rational justice. Second, and this is closely related to the first 
point, Hegel's Idea of the State is grounded in the necessity to 
reconcile its substantial and subjective shapes within a single but 
non-inclusive - insofar as it necessarily remains open to the infinite 
dimensional of the Sacred - self-mediating totality. Now, the family 
constitutes the substantial element in the life of the State. It 
demarcates an effective private domain whose essential internal 
relations may only become subject to legal interference only at the 
point when they cease to be self-regulated by bonds of ethical love 
exclusive to its own inner sphere. Therefore, from the standpoint 
of the System, so to speak, the critical requirement is that the 
private sphere of the family or household remain conceptually 
distinct from the public institutions of civil society and the state. 
Once the principles of abstract right have consolidated themselves 
in society, there is no justification for continuing to determine the 
rights to establish households on the basis of gender and sexual 
inheritance rather than on the basis of the freely willed decision of 
consenting adult persons. Equally it is evidently unjust to assign 
women to the family domain and exclude them from full 
participation in the public realm.
The system of right therefore demands that the necessary 
equilibrium between the substantial and the reflective principle be 
determined without reference to gender. However, the extent to
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which at any specific historical conjuncture the relationship 
between substance and subject may be reformed in accordance 
with its rationed determination is a matter for political judgement, 
since it is conditional upon a number of contingent factors which 
cannot be determined a priori. This in turn explains why the 
system itself can never be complete and why even Hegelians 
seldom agree upon its immediate practical import.
Nonetheless these broad considerations suffice to disqualify 
Levinas' claim to provide an ethics of absolute otherness. As we 
argued above, the full development of both men and women as 
persons, civilians and citizens is a necessary condition for the 
revelation of divine alterity. Thus, Levinas' requirement that 
women must keep themselves "in reserve", entails that "ethical 
transcendence" is predicated on the non-recognition of feminine 
alterity.
(c) Voluptuositv and the Child
Hegel and Levinas place their analysis of the erotic relation 
within the overall context of their respective philosophies of divine 
redemption. We noted above, that whereas Hegel maintains 
redemption is accomplished in and through the absolute 
reconciliation between the infinite and the finite, Levinas holds the 
contrary view that redemption is attained in the non-reconciliation 
between the divine and the human. In this section we shall 
attempt to show, through a further comparison with Hegel, how 
Levinas' ethics of absolute non-reconciliation corrupts his 
philosophy of eros. by re-importing a neo-Platonic conception of
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love which devalues sensuality in general and women in particular. 
Finally, we shall also contend that Levinas' notion of the erotic 
results in an insular and particularist concept of community based 
on a potentially dangerous combination of consanguinity, moral 
righteousness and anti-statism.
Our stated aim of directly comparing Hegel and Levinas on 
the nature of eros is complicated by the fact that the two texts 
containing their most extended treatments of the subject, namely 
the Philosophy of Right Part Three, Section One, respectively, and 
Section IV of TI, are widely disparate in character. In the 
Philosophy of Right. Hegel's comments on love are integrated 
within his overall speculative-logical deduction of the institutions of 
marriage and the family in relation to the State; by contrast, in TI, 
Levinas sets out a phenomenology of eros. A simple juxtaposition 
of material taken at random from these two texts would give the 
misleading impression that Levinas was some kind of Epicurean 
and Hegel a moralising prude. For example, contrast Levinas' 
statement that "In the caress, a relation yet, in one aspect sensible, 
the body already denudes itself of its very form, offering itself as 
erotic nudity. In the carnal given to tenderness, the body quits the 
status of an existent" (TI 258) with Hegel's decidedly non-romantic 
comment that in marriage "the natural drive is reduced to a 
modality of nature destined to be extinguished in its moment of 
satisfaction" (PR 163).
To compare like with like, however, it is necessary to go back 
to Hegel's own "phenomenology of eros", his early fragment on 
"Love". This short text is usually read as an example o f Hegel’s
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early romanticism which he is said to repudiate in his nature 
thought. However, as is often the case with Hegel, it would be 
closer to the truth to say that he did not altogether abandon his 
early concept of love in his maturity. The underlying element of 
continuing is that both young and the old Hegel consistently define 
the erotic relation as, in essence, a sacrament.
On the surface, there are a number of striking similarities 
between Hegel's "love" and Levinas' description of "Eros". To begin 
with both texts, appropriately enough, tend toward the rhapsodic 
in their depiction of the "oceanic" feeling engulfing the lovers in the 
erotic encounter. Thus Hegel's lyrical contention that in the 
moment of love" what in the first instance is most the individual's 
own is united into the whole in the lovers' touch and contact; 
consciousness o f a separate self disappears and all distinction 
between the lovers is annulled" (ETW 307) is virtually 
interchangeable with Levinas', equally intense, averment that: "The 
caress does not act, does not grasp possibles. The secret it forces 
does not inform it as an experience; it overwhelms the relation of 
the I with itself and with the non-I. An amorphous non-1 sweeps 
away the I into an absolute future where it escapes itself and loses 
its position as a subject" (TI 239).
A  second parallel is that the respective texts each describe 
the erotic encounter as a trans-reflective passion which 
accomplishes a unity of identity and difference between the two 
lovers. Hegel asserts that " genuine love excludes all oppositions. 
It is not the understanding, whose relations always leave the 
manifold of related terms as a manifold and whose unity is always
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a unity of opposites [left as opposites]" (ETW 304). This statement 
is clearly echoed in Levinas' declaration that "voluptuosity” - 
Levinas' term for carnal desire - "is a pure experience, which does 
not pass into any concept, which remains blindly experience" (TI 
260). In similar vein, Hegel states "love completely destroys 
objectivity and annuls and transcends reflection" {ETW 305) and, 
as a consequence, "in love, the separate does still remain, but as 
something united and no longer as something separate; life [in the 
subject] senses life [in the object]".
Contrary to a received view, propagated for example by Max 
Scheler, ^ 3/ and with which Levinas implicitly concurs, there is no 
warrant for interpreting this passage as committing Hegel to a 
notion of love as constituting a Spinozaic fusion of two alter-egos in 
a single, pantheistic substance. This reading relies on 
inadmissibly interpreting Hegel's concept of life in monistic terms. 
But as we sought to show above, throughout his authorship, 
Hegel's definition of life is consistently Trinitarian rather than 
monistic. Life, for Hegel, is infinite-life: the union of the union and 
the non-union of the transcendent and the immanent. Hence in 
the erotic union the lover is not simply transported into an 
impersonal identification with the life-substance but is brought 
into an absolute relation with its own self as infinite-life in and 
through its absolute relation to the infinite-life of its beloved.
It is no exaggeration to say that Hegel's notion of life sensing 
itself in life anticipates Levinas' definition of the caress as a 
transcendence of sensibility irreducible to an intentional relation. 
To see this we have only to compare Hegel's statement that "Love
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neither restricts nor is restricted; it is not finite at all. It is a 
feeling, yet not a single feeling [among other single feelings). A 
single feeling is only a part and not the whole of life; the life present 
in a single feeling dissolves its barriers and drives on till it 
disperses itself in the manifold of feelings with a view to finding 
itself in the entirety of this manifold" (ETW 304-305), with Levinas’ 
avowal that voluptuousity accomplishes the "common action of the 
sentient and the sensed" (TI 265), such that: "the other is not a 
sensed, but in the sensed, affirmed as sentient, as though one and 
the same sentiment were substantially common to me and the 
other" (Ibid). In the light of this convergence, it is not surprising 
that Levinas' whole analysis of the erotic is expressed in 
speculative terms lifted directly from Hegel. Thus Hegel's 
speculative proposition that "in love, life is present as a duplicate of 
itself and as a single united self' (ETW 305) is reiterated almost 
verbatim in Levinas' affirmation that "voluptuosity, as the 
coinciding of the lover and the beloved, is charged by their duality: 
it is simultaneously fusion and distinction" (TI 270) and in other 
equivalent formulations, which defined the erotic as: "inward and 
yet intersubjectively structured, not simplifying itself into 
consciousness that is one. In voluptuosity the other is me and 
separated from me" CTI 265).
However, these apparent symmetries mask profound 
differences in Hegel's and Levinas' respective understanding of the 
nature of eros. In our view, Hegel has a concept of the erotic that 
is far deeper, richer and more all-inclusive than that advanced by 
Levinas. Unlike the latter, Hegel does not limit the erotic relation 
to the purely carnal but defines it as being a total interpenetration
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of the mind, body and spirit of two independent beings. In Hegel's 
own words:
True union, or love proper, exists only between living 
beings who are alike in power and thus in one 
another's eyes living beings from every point of view. 
(ETW 304)
The erotic communion is only accomplished through the total 
reciprocal giving of the whole self of the lover to the beloved and of 
the beloved to the lover. In their mutual cancellation as solus ipse 
the lovers are perfected in their selfhood. Invoking Shakespeare, 
Hegel expresses the dynamic of eros thus:
The lover who takes is not thereby made richer than 
the other; he is enriched indeed, but only so much as 
the other is. So too the giver does not make himself 
poorer; by giving to the other he has at the same time 
and to the same extent enhanced his own treasure 
(compare Juliet in Romeo and Juliet [ill 175-177 : "My 
bounty is as boundless as the sea. My love as deep;] 
the more I give to thee, the more I have"). (ERW 307)
The subject-in-desire fears its own dissolution as a subject. 
Eros is inseparable from death. But by surrendering itself in love 
the subject is able to face and transcend death and so accomplish 
a reconciliation with the other qua other. Hence, to shrink from 
eros, to remain entirely intact in one's separability, whether in the 
name of morality or out of deference for the sanctity of the body, is 
to confess one's lack of faith. In Hegel's words, the motivation for 
this denial of transcendence is the refusal of eros:
...is not a fear far what is mortal, for what is merely 
one's own, but rather a fear of it, a fear which vanishes 
as the separable element in the lover is diminished by 
his love. Love is stronger than fear. It has no fear of 
its fear, but led by its fear, it cancels separation.
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apprehensive as it is of finding opposition which may 
resist it or be a fixed barrier against it. (ETW 306-307)
In short, for Hegel, in the passion of the erotic encounter, 
two lovers bring one another into relation with their own and each 
other's absolute otherness and are thus simultaneously both the 
agent and the patient of a mutual absolute negation of self and of a 
redemption of this negation. Love is stronger than death. But for 
love to overcome death there must be a reciprocal and total self­
surrender, without reserve, of the whole being of each party to the 
erotic communion.
Now, in comparison with the sublimity of Hegel's theory of 
love, Levinas' account of eros is clearly defective in two salient 
respects: First, because it displaces transcendence from the erotic 
relation per se to its "issue": the child; and, second, because it 
divorces love and friendship, and identifies eros exclusively with 
the carnal desire for the carnal desire of the Other.
For Levinas, eros is at best only, as it were, a relative 
transcendence. The erotic union itself does not accomplish the 
absolute relation. Rather it is a necessary but indirect "means" 
towards genuine transcendence, which is only positively 
accomplished in the birth of the son. In Levinas' words:
if love is to love the love the Beloved bears me, to love 
is also to love oneself in love, and thus to return to 
oneself. Love does not transcend unequivocably - it is 
complacent, it is pleasure and dual egoism. (TI 266)
That is to say, for Levinas, there is no absolute self­
transcendence in love, but only through it. In the erotic union
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itself, the lovers remain unreconciled. Indeed, Levinas implies that 
the lovers remain much the same as they were before. His 
understanding of the erotic is in this respect quite frankly debased. 
As Luce Iriquray rightly observes of Levinas: "He knows nothing of 
communion in pleasure... for Levinas, the distance is always 
maintained with the other in the experience of love". 14/
Hegel, in contrast, shows that there can be no absolute self­
transcendence in eros if the lovers either merely stake their bodies 
in lieu of their whole being or if they only give themselves 
spiritually to one another but remain bodily separate. There is no 
doubt that, generally speaking, love and friendship are distinct in 
essence; but in the erotic relation they are not distinct. The beauty 
of love resides in its integrity, yet it is precisely this integrity which 
Levinas sunders by isolating carnality from the whole human 
personality. In his own words:
Love and friendship are not only felt differently; their 
correlative differs : friendship goes onto the Other; love 
seeks what does not have the structure of an existent, 
the infinitely future, what is to be engendered.
According to Levinas, then, the lover does not seek to be 
recognised by his beloved, for this would presumably count as 
friendship, but rather directly and impatiently desires that 
"unparalleled conjunction of identification" which will engender the 
child. Thus he concludes, "I only love fully if the Other loves me... 
because my voluptuosity delights in his voluptuosity" (Ibid). The 
beloved qua subject is simply by-passed in the erotic union. Of 
course, Levinas is not saying that the erotic relation is contracted 
with the intention of conceiving a child. Procreation is rather its
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unconscious telos. The child is supposedly implicit in the very 
structure of desire.
To see how this is so we must recall Levinas' definition of 
desire as being "beneath and beyond discourse" (TI 255). On the 
one hand, desire is rooted in the need and enjoyment of carnality 
and immanence, on the other, it is driven by the transcendent 
search for that "regime of tenderness" (TI 256) that exceeds the 
possible, the non-negative future that anticipates the child. Thus 
eros is bifurcated into two forces - the desiring and the desired - 
which mutually solicit one another. Levinas assigns the masculine 
to the active, the feminine to the passive moment in this polarity. 
Moreover, by explicitly identifying feminine alterity with the 
maternal function, Levinas renders the term sexually specific. The 
feminine is woman; and woman is the repository of male desire.
In the midst of the erotic relation, the beloved must continue 
to keep herself "in reserve". "The feminine is the other, refractory 
to society, member of a dual society, an intimate society, a society 
without language" (TI 265). She therefore cannot appear or speak 
for herself. It is not that Levinas believes women are incapable of 
being the equal of mean, as lovers, friends and persons, but he 
holds that ethics requires them to renounce their claim to equality. 
As a result, the female beloved Is systematically negated as a 
spiritual being and thoroughly infantalised in the sexual union. 
She does not give or take from her lover; she allows herself to be 
taken - after a struggle. Although Levinas states that "In the 
possession of the Other I possess the Other inasmuch as he 
possesses me; I am both master and slave" (TI 265) the context
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makes clear that this reciprocity In the sport of love Is predicated 
on the feminine seduction of the ardent male. The beloved cannot 
give herself In the erotic encounter because her innermost 
subjectivity is said not to reside in herself as subject but in her 
capacity as child-bearer. Hence, Levinas avers, the beloved does 
not oppose her lover as a will, but "on the contrary, as an 
irresponsible animality which does not speak true words, returned 
in the stage of infancy without responsibility - this coquettish head, 
this pure life 'a bit silly’ has quit her status as a person" (TI 263). 
He adds, the perhaps marginally even more insulting comment, 
that: "The relation with the Other is enacted in play : one plays 
with the Other as with a young animal" (Ibid).
In the light of this analysis, we fully concur with Irigaray's 
judgement that "the description of pleasure given by Levinas is 
unacceptable to the extent that it presents man as the sole subject 
exercising his desire upon the woman who is deprived of 
subjectivity except to seduce him" and that "for Levinas, the 
feminine does not stand for another to be respected in her human 
freedom and human identity. The feminine other is left without her 
own specific face. On this point, his philosophy falls radically 
short of ethics”.15/
Levinas' suppression of erotic transcendence may be traced 
back to his particular appropriation of Plato's theory of love. His 
revision of Platonism proceeds in three steps. First, as we have 
seen above, he reinterprets Plato's definition of eros. the daughter 
of "contrivance and poverty", as the half-mortal, half-immortal 
composite of "concupiscence and transcendence". Second, on this
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basis, he then proceeds to reverse the Platonic hierarchy which 
elevates spiritual procreation - the attainment of immortality (via 
the sublimation of desire) in the production of works, the 
performance of deeds and the contemplation of the eternal forms - 
over physical procreation - the attainment of immortality (via the 
expression of desire) in one's progeny and indirectly through the 
regeneration of the race. Whereas Plato says of the fruits of 
spiritual creativity "Everyone would prefer children such as these 
to children of the flesh", 16/ Levinas per contra, asserts that the 
"infinite time" produced through fecundity "is better" (TI 268) than 
the lifeless eternity of the Idea. The Forms represent a false 
transcendence that negate the real transcendence engendered 
through eros. Hence, the Idea of the beautiful "inverts the beauty 
of the feminine face" by substituting an image for its "troubling 
depth" (TI 263).
Third, and finally, Levinas also rejects Plato's theory of 
physical immortality. As we noted above, the mere endless 
reproduction of the species does not transcend the self-sameness 
of the totality. In Levinas words, "In the exaltation of the biological 
life the person arises as a product of the species or of impersonal 
life, which has recourse to the individual so as to ensure its 
impersonal triumph” (TI 120). It is only when the procreation is 
"articulated" through the family, within the overall structure of the 
ethical community (TI 280), that it "delineates a structure that goes 
beyond the biologically empirical" CTI 277) such that "fecundity 
engendering fecundity accomplishes goodness" fTI 269).
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In short, Levinas transposes the Platonic Idea of the Good 
from the supersensible world of intelligible forms o f the terra firma 
of the ethical community considered under the aspect of its 
generational perpetuity. At the same time, he retains the 
transcendent dimension of Plato’s epekeina tes ousias by defining 
the ethical community over and against the Totality (which he 
identifies with Being-in-itself). The propagation o f the membership 
of the ethical elect therefore ensures the "convergence of reality and 
morality" (IT 306), within the internal life of the irenic community, 
which further serves as an ethical example and standard to the 
unethical, war-ridden, world.
Therefore, for Levinas, the procreation of the child, 
specifically the son, is at once a natural and ethical event. This 
further entails that the erotic relation, as a matter of ethical 
necessity, must be made subordinate to the reproductive function 
within the kinship network comprising the community. By 
implication then erotic relations which do not conform to this 
imperative are eo ipso 'unethical'. Levinas therefore consistent 
with his own premises identifies the erotic per se with 
concupiscence, egoism and evil. We have already seen this above, 
in his characterisation of eros as "monstrous", "violent", and 
leading away from the Thou to a "closed society"; but his view is 
even more candidly stated in his essays, see for example this 
passage taken from "Humanism and An-archy",
That there is in the midst of the submission to the 
Good, the seduction of irresponsibility, the probability 
of egoism in the subject responsible for his 
responsibility, that is the birth of the ego in the 
obeying will. This temptation to separate oneself from
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the Good is the very incarnation of the subject in his 
presence in being. (CP 137)
Here Levinas is simply reformulating the hackneyed 
identification of woman as the source of a diabolical temptation to 
divine disobedience (the latter a synonym for patriarchal authority). 
It follows that the "evil" inherent in the temptation to carnal 
irresponsibility embodies in the female sex may only be 
surmounted by channelling it into legitimate forms of procreation. 
Woman is thus redeemed through motherhood. And so the whole 
ethical covenant turns full circle; for it is as a mother, or potential 
mother, that the woman welcomes the Other into the dwelling 
where she remains "discreetly" deferential to paternal authority.
We see therefore, that in Levinas' account of the ethical, both 
the sensuality and the spirituality of woman are alienated and 
placed at the service of the fraternal order. In consequence, 
Levinas entirely negates the redemptive power of feminine eros. 
since, for him, contrary to the Song of Songs (8:6), it is not erotic 
love but non-erotic love, filial love and love of one's neighbour, that 
is "stronger than death". By reducing carnality to eros and by 
identifying female sexuality with concupiscence, Levinas denies the 
essence of female alterity, her freedom, and thus denies the 
redemptive possibility of faith and grace to all human subjects. 17/
Hegel, in sharp contrast to Levinas, defends the integrity of 
eros. In the Philosophy of Right, his early theory of love is 
Anfhehnng. within an institutional framework. His concept of 
marriage upholds the wholeness of the erotic relation against, on 
the one hand, so-called Platonic Love, "associated with the
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monastic attitude which defines the moment of natural life 
fLebendigkeitl as utterly negative" (PR 163), and on the other hand, 
against "free love", which reduces eros to the "arbitrariness of 
sensuous inclination" (PR 164). As our analysis of Levinas 
demonstrates, these apparent opposites are in fact two sides of the 
same coin. In both the "divine and substantial is separated from 
its existence (Daseinl" (PR 163).
Now, of course, in the Philosophy of Right. Hegel maintains 
that the integrity of love can only be upheld within marriage. 
However, his reasons for asserting this are largely based on 
historically contingent considerations with respect to the economic 
dependence of women on men. 1®/ His argument against 
Schlegel's notion of "free love" is that if the latter's doctrine were to 
become generally practised, women would be denied the economic 
status marriage afforded them and so be reduced to some form of 
concubinage. Although Hegel may be justly faulted for not drawing 
the alternative conclusion that women should therefore be granted 
entry into civil society on the basis of full economic and political 
equality with men, 19/ the important point now is that his failure to 
draw this conclusion is no wise analytically contained in his 
concept o f marriage, which, to the contrary, presupposes the 
complete equality between the spouses. From a contemporary 
perspective, given the greater extension of civil and political rights 
to women, at least in the Western world, the contingencies that 
preoccupied Hegel no longer obtain, and therefore there is no 
reason to insist that the formal legality of marriage is a necessary 
condition of the integrity of the erotic union. But, by the same 
token, legal marriage is certainly not incompatible with ethical love.
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and it may still be said to be its logical consequence, as it were. 
The erotic union is not, in essence, a "closed society" as Levinas 
avers. Ultimately secrecy corrodes the erotic relation, which, in 
order to be fully celebrated, has to be to some degree openly known 
and recognised.
In summation, for Hegel, the erotic union is confirmed in the 
existence of the child, while for Levinas, it is consummated through 
the child. However, this is not to say that for Hegel the birth of the 
child adds nothing to the relationship between two lovers. To the 
contrary, the child is the visible embodiment of their inner 
communion. This speculative understanding of the union and 
non-union of the parents and child is a leitmotif that runs 
throughout Hegel's entire authorship. In the fragment on "Love" 
Hegel states that the result of the erotic union is that "The mortal 
element, the body has lost the character of separability, and a 
living child, a seed of immortality, of the eternally self-developing 
[race), has come into existence. What has been united [in the 
child] is not divided again; [in love and through love) God has acted 
and created" (ETW 307). In love and through love, God has acted 
and created and "not solely, as Levinas holds, through love. The 
child certifies the love of the parents. Hence the "child is the 
parents themselves" (ETW 307). As Levinas himself acknowledges, 
albeit obliquely (TI 267), Hegel's speculative exposition of the 
parent-child relation forms the basis of his own presentation of the 
nature of filiation. This is evident in such formulations as "I do not 
have my child; I am my child" (TI 277) and "my child is a stranger 
(Isaiah 49), but a stranger who is not simply mine, for he la me. He 
is me a stranger to myself (TI 267).
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But whereas Hegel contends that the child is the visible 
expression of the union of both parents, Levinas subsumes the 
child exclusively under the name of the father, and thus privileges 
the male child. In Levinas words "The I owns its unicity as I to the 
paternal eros" fTl 278). "The paternal eros first invests the unicity 
of the son; his I qua filial commences not in enjoyment but in 
election" (TI 279), i.e. it is not borne out of the erotic fusion 
between male and female but rather out of the infusion of the 
female by the paternal moral law. Levinas goes on to say the son is 
only unique to himself because he is unique for his father "and 
because the son owes his unicity to the paternal election he can be 
brought up, be commanded, and can obey, and the strange 
conjuncture of the family is possible" (Ibid). However, once the son 
has reached maturity, he must be to some degree released from the 
obligations of the filial bond so that he can take his place within 
the fraternal community;
The unique child, as elected one, is accordingly the 
same time unique and non-unique. Paternity is 
produced as an innumerable future; the I engendered 
exists at the same time as unique in the world and as 
a brother among brothers. I am I and chosen one, but 
where can I be chosen, if not from among other chosen 
ones, among equals. (TI 279)
The founding of the ethico-religious community is therefore 
concomitant with the complete abrogation of the feminine.
Now, Levinas' account of paternal eros conforms to Hegel's 
presentation in the Phenomenology of Spirit of the nature of 
filiation within natural Sittlichkeit. Here, in contrast to the
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fragment on "Love" and the Philosophy of Right. Hegel states that 
the relation between the spouses has "its actual existence not in 
itself but in the child - as 'other' whose coming into existence is the 
relationship, and it is also that in which the relationship passes 
away; and this alternation of successive generations has its 
enduring basis on the nation" (Phen. Para 456). Allowing for the 
necessary changes - the fact that Hegel places Greek Sittlichkeit at 
the beginning of world-history while Levinas situates the ethical 
community outside of history - we nonetheless find a parallel in 
Levinas' contention that fecundity is "discontinuously historical 
without fate" (TI 278) and that it therefore "defines a notion distinct 
from continuity, a way of resuming the thread of history - concrete 
in a family and a nation" (Ibid).
The analogy may be pressed further. Levinas’ separation of 
the soi-disant transhistorical ethical community from the 
historical-political state reproduces the inner diremption between 
the divine law and the human law which, according to Hegel, 
divided the natural ethical order. For example, Levinas states that 
"the irreplaceable unicity of the I which is maintained against the 
State is accomplished by fecundity (TI 300, emphasis added). The 
ethical nation existing in "infinite time" constitutes the "antipodes" 
of the State (TI 306). Nonetheless it is not indifferent to the fate of 
the State. To the contrary, it affirms itself as being "the model in 
relation to which the work of the State must be situated" (TI 30). 
In keeping with Levinas' stress on dysymmetry, this is an entirely 
unlvocal relation. Although the state must take the ethical 
community as its paradigm the reverse does not appertain. In 
Levinas' words, the ethical community "is not subordinated to the
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State as a means and does not represent a reduced model of the 
State" (Ibid).
Therefore, whereas Hegel distinguishes between the genesis 
of the parent-child relation within natural Sittlichkeit on the one 
hand, and the Aufhebung of that relation within the Idea of the 
State, Levinas makes no such distinction, and as a consequence 
his understanding of the nature of filiation remains within a pre­
modem, patriarchal and anti-subjectivist framework. The upshot 
is that on Levinas' account, the ethical community and the State 
remain in an unmediated and potentially conflictual relation with 
one another.
The system of right comprehends the reversal accomplished 
in modernity whereby the subjective element is made paramount 
and the substantial moment rendered subordinate to it. As we 
noted above, this development exerts its most powerful impact on 
the family; to an extent which Hegel himself was loathe to admit. 
For once the family is grounded by society, and not vice-versa, 
there is no warrant to restrict the right to establish common 
households on the basis of gender or sexual preference. A 
consensual agreement between two free persons is now the only 
legitimate ethical criteria applicable in this matter. Equally, once a 
household has been established, and the decision is taken to raise 
children within it, there is no necessity that the relation between 
parents and children be based on consanguinity. Rather what 
counts is that the parents be prepared to fully accept the 
responsibilities of child-rearing, namely to provide the child with 
the necessary maternal support and emotional and spiritual love to
290
enable it to mature, not in the first instance into an ethical being 
selflessly devoted to others, but into an autonomous subject 
capable of determining itself to act in accordance with universal 
moral principles.
Therefore, in contrast with natural Sittlichkeit where the 
child perpetuates the nation, in rational Sittlichkeit. the child 
perpetuates the elementary sphere of the State: "the presupposition 
of persons existing immediately as persons - here becomes the 
result, a process which runs on into an infinite progression of 
generations which presuppose one another" (PR 173). The child is 
quite literally raised into civil society, and is equally its offspring, 
insofar as the family is founded on the mutual will of autonomous 
subjects. Both parents have a shared responsibility for the 
household and a duty to particularise themselves through work, 
welfare and political participation, and ultimately as members of 
the spiritual community. Thus, the opposition found in natural 
Sittlichkeit between nation and state is transcenced. The family 
and the state no longer answer to two independent laws, the divine 
and the human, but constitute two distinct elements within a 
single order. Properly speaking, there can no longer be a tragic 
collision between nation and the state because the state now has 
all the right on its side.
Ironically it is Levinas' insistence on the unmediated relation 
between the irenic community and the state which leaves it open to 
violence. One of the principle defects of Levinas' quasi-Augustinian 
statement of the relation between religion and the state in TI is that 
he presents no worked out response to the ethical and political
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problems raised by his pacifism. What if a state emerged intent on 
the annihilation of the ethical community? Ought this persecution 
be accepted as a sign of ethical election, even if this were to put at 
risk the very possibility of goodness in the world? For Levinas, this 
is not the hypothetical question it would have been for his mentor 
Franz Rosenweig. The belief that the "eternal star" might continue 
undisturbed in is spiritual witness under the protective wing of the 
"eternal way", in the form of the enlightened Christian state, was 
cruelly shattered by the Holocaust. As a consequence, this is one 
aspect of Rosenzweig's works which Levinas cannot avail himself 
of. But T1 has nothing to put in its place.
In our view, Levinas' awareness of the shortcomings of his 
statement of the relation between ethics and politics in TI led him 
to reformulate the relation between justice and the state in OBBE, 
and to effect a rapprochement with liberalism. We shall conclude 
our study with a critical assessment of the cogency of this 
restatement. However, it must be borne in mind that the 
innovations of OBBE concern only the external relations between 
the ethical elect and the State; Levinas does not renounce a single 
detail of his deduction of the ethical covenant, which is indeed 
presupposed in all his later analyses.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FIFTEEN
1/ Richard Dien Winfield, Reason and Justice, p.186.
2/ LPR "The Love that God is, is in the Actual Life, Conjugal 
Love".
3/ Simone De Beauvoir, The Second Sex. Translated and edited 
by H.M. Parshley, London, Penguin Books, 1972, p.96, 
'Certain passages of the argument employed by Hegel in 
defining the relation of master and slave apply much better 
to the relation of man to woman". See also Genevieve Lloyd 
The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western 
Philosophy (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press 
1984) pp.91-92 and Susan Easton "Hegel and Feminism", in 
(ed.) David Lamb, Hegel and Modem Philosophy. London, 
Croom Helm 1987). For a selective bibliography of Hegel and 
Feminism, see Henry Brod, Hegel's Philosophy of Politics, 
pp. 174-179.
4/ For a contrary view to my own, see Tina Chanter, "Feminism 
and the Other" in (ed.), Robert Bemasconi and David Wood 
The Provocation of Levinas. Rethinking the Other.
5/ Ibid., p.47.
6/ Alison Ainley in "Amorous Discourses The Phenomenology of 
Eros and Love Stories'", also in The Provocation of Levinas, 
pp.70-82 is Justifiably more circumspect than Chanter when
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voluptuosity, which is the seifs immersion within itself, as 
fecundity, or that which expresses a 'beyond', it seems that 
inherent within Levinas' schema is a specifically heterosexual 
formulation of love relations, containing the possibility of 
parenthood...", p.78.
Robert John Schoffler Manning, Interpreting Otherwise than 
Heidegger, p.221 in defending Levinas against the Derridean 
charge that Levinas subordinates sexual difference to the 
difference between people in general, contends that: 
"Derrida's criticism can at least be rightly accused of 
overlooking the fact that sexual difference is absolutely 
central for Levinas in his very significant move from the 
Other to the totally, absolutely and infinitely Other. It is 
sexual difference itself that enables him to make this move. 
Given the significance of sexual difference for Levinas' early 
work, it is hard to agree with Derrida that Levinas' work has 
"always rendered secondary" sexual difference”.
7/ I am indebted in what follows to Tina Chanter's essay 
"Antigone's Dilemma", in (ed.), Robert Bemasconi and Simon 
Critchley, Re-reading Levinas (Bloomington and Indianopolis, 
Indiana University Press 1991).
8/ Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self. Gender. Community and 
Post-Modernism in Contemporary Ethics (Cambridge. Policy 
Press 1992). Chapter 8: “On Hegel, Woman and Irony", 
pp.247-248.
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10/ Peter J. Steinberger, Logic and Politics (New Haven and 
London, Yale University Press 1988), p.188.
11/ As Seyla Benhabib points out in On Hegel. Woman and 
Irony. '"His time' was a revolutionary one, and in the circles 
closest to Hegel, that of his Romantic Friends, he 
encountered brilliant, accomplished and non-conformist 
woman who certainly intimated to him what true gender 
equality might mean in the future. Hegel saw the future, and 
he did not like it", p.254.
12/ See Richard Dien Winfield, Reason and Justice, pp. 187-190.
13/ Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy. Translated by Peter 
Heath (New York, Yale University Press 1954). Scheler 
interprets Hegel as maintaining that love is the incorporation 
of the other person into oneself. To this view, Scheler 
opposes his own: "Love calls explicitly for an understanding 
entry into the individuality of another person distinct in 
character from the entering self, by him accepted as such, 
and coupled, indeed, with a warm and whole-hearted 
endorsement of 'his' reality as an individual, and 'his' being 
what he is', p.70. However, this is a statement with which 
the young Hegel would concur. Scheler errs in attributing to 
Hegel a monistic concept of life which he does not hold.
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14/ Luce Irigaray, "Questions to Emmanuel Levinas On the 
Divinity of Love". Translated by Margaret Whitford in Re­
reading Levinas, pp. 110-111.
15/ Ibid, p.113. See also Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the 
Limit (New York, Routledge 1992). "Without the recognition 
of phenomenological symmetry, Levinas' ethical relation 
inevitably degenerates into violation".
16/ Plato, The Symposium (London, Penguin Books 1968), 209C, 
p.91.
17/ Phyllis Trible, "Love's Lyrics Redeemed" in (ed.) Harold 
Bloom, The Song of Songs (New York, Chelsea House 
Publishers 1988), reads the Songs of Songs as a redemption 
of the casting out of man and woman from the Garden of 
Eden. "In the closing movement of the Song of Songs, this 
tragedy is reversed. Once again eroticism can face the threat 
of death. The woman says:
Let me be the seal upon your heart.
Like the seed upon your hand.
For love is as fierce as death.
Passion is mighty as Sheol;
Its doubts are darts of fire,
A  blazing flame.
Trible concludes "Naked without shame or fear (cf. Gen 2.25; 
3:10), this couple treat each other with tenderness and
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respect. Neither escaping nor exploiting sex, they embrace 
and enjoy it. Their love is truly bone of bone and flesh of 
flesh, and this image of God male and female is indeed very 
good (cf. Gen 1:27, 31). Testifying to the goodness of 
creation, then, eroticism becomes worship in the context of 
grace", p.65.
18/ Peter Steinberger in Logic and Politics shows how on Hegel's 
own premises there is no necessity to consider marriage the 
only institution "that begins the transition from subject to 
concrete person". "For example, we can imagine certain 
communal living arrangements that would satisfy procreative 
and other social urges, provide children with sound moral 
instruction, and be based upon a free and rational decision 
to join with others in a self-limiting union based on ethico- 
legal love" (p. 187).
19/ Seyla Benhibib, “On Hegel. Woman and Irony", p.250.
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN
ETHICS AND POLITICS
(a) The Other and the Others
In TI, Levinas defines the face to face as a direct relation to 
the Other which accomplishes " a coinciding of the expressed with 
him who expresses" (TI 66). By contrast, in OBBE, the face to face 
is re-defined as an indirect relation with the Other that signifies 
itself not beyond but through representation: "A trace is sketched 
out and effaced in the equivocation of a saying" (OBBE 12). In TI, 
Levinas states "We ceill justice the face to face approach in 
conversation". By contrast, in OBBE, he defines justice as residing 
in the relation between the face to face and the third party: "The 
relationship with the third party is an incessant correction of the 
asymmetry of proximity in which the face to face is looked at" 
(OBBE 158).
Notwithstanding these appearances to the contrary, we 
continue to maintain that the innovations of OBBE do not cancel 
but rather complement the conclusions of TI, The key to 
understanding the systematic relationship between the two texts is 
the recognition that the concept of the "third party" has a different 
referent in each of the two works in question. In TI the "third 
party" refers to the plurality of face to face relations: in OBBE it 
refers to social plurality in general, as it were, the "faceless" 
plurality. This distinction corresponds to the two senses in which 
Levinas employs the term "we". In TI, as shown above, the third
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party or "we" is defined endogenously as the neighbour to my 
neighbour within the ethical community; in OBBE, the third party 
is defined exogenously as the neighbour to my neighbour without 
it.
In summary, then, the restatement of the relation of the I to 
the third party in OBBE transfers the ethical subject from its 
inclusive membership of a transcendent community, consisting of 
asymmetrically related individuals standing in an immediate 
relation to one another, into a non-inclusive rational-legal 
community comprised of formal, reciprocal interactions, mediated 
through an abstract system of rules. Therefore, whereas in TI the 
"third party" is my equal and brother summoned like me to ethical 
service by virtue of our common birth into a monotheistic, paternal 
order, in OBBE the "third party" defines that limit to the 
"fraternity" where my command to my neighbour to command his 
neighbour to ethical service is not reciprocated by my neighbour's 
neighbour. This limit, in turn, defines the moment when the 
ethical subject transcends the fraternity, or society of faces, and is 
forthwith placed within the midst of a faceless world.
As a consequence of this transition the primordially artless 
and straightforward face to face "relation" assumes the character of 
a difficulty and a predicament. Levinas explains this complication 
thus:
If proximity ordered to me only the other alone, there 
would not have been any problem, in even the most 
general sense of the term. A question would not have 
been bom, nor consciousness nor self-consciousness. 
The responsibility for the other is an immediacy 
antecedent to questions, it is proximity. It is troubled
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and becomes a problem when the third party enters. 
(OBBE 157)
In other words, although within the ethical community the 
moral law is transparent, universally known and absolutely 
imprescriptable; without it it is mediated through representation 
and, thus, exposed to interpretative indeterminacy. As a result, 
the primordially "evident" becomes obscure and opaque:
The other stands in the relationship with the third 
party, for whom I cannot entirely answer, even if I 
alone answer, before any question, for my neighbour. 
The other and the third party, my neighbours, 
contemporaries of one another, put distance between 
me and the third party. "Peace, peace to the neighbour 
and the one far off' (Isaiah 57:19) - we now understand 
the point of this apparent rhetoric. The third party 
introduces a contradiction in the saying whose 
signification before the other until then went in one 
direction. (Ibid)
This is the critical juncture where Levinas' analysis diverges 
from that given in TI. In the latter work, Levinas contends that the 
assimilation of the ethical relation into the structures of the socio­
political world is tantamount to its negation tout court. It is only 
saved from this fate by its containment within the ethical 
community. In OBBE, on the other hand, Levinas modifies this 
antithetical formulation of the relationship between ethics and the 
totality in two important respects. First, there is here no "retum- 
to-community". The ethical relation must suffer its alienation in 
the "Said". Second, this alienation of the face to face in 
representation, unlike in TI, is not presented as a negation without 
remainder. On the contrary, it is now seen as essential to the very 
manifestation of ethical transcendence. In brief, the face to face is 
no longer held to express itself exclusively within the confines of
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the ethical community; in addition it is also said to signify itself as 
a "trace" within the world as a whole. In the following exert from 
OBBE, Levinas sums up the essence of these modifications vis a 
vis TI. In the "Said":
There is weighing, thought, objectification and thus a 
decree in which my anarchic relationship with illeity is 
betrayed, but in which it is conveyed before us. There 
is a betrayal of my anarchic relation with illeity, but 
also a new relation with it: it is only thanks to God 
that, as a subject incomparable with the other, I am 
approached as an other by the others, that is, "for 
myself'. "Thanks to god" I am another for the others. 
(OBBE 158)
The question is exactly what it is that the betrayal of the 
anarchic relation "conveys" through its annulment? The key term 
in this respect is the neologism "illeity". The masculine root of the 
term clearly indicates that the "trace" is an indirect revelation of 
the paternal moral law which founds the ethical community. If this 
were not so, there would be nothing to distinguish it from the 
Heideggerian ontological difference. Hence the statement of the 
relationship between ethical transcendence and representation in 
OBBE does not supplant but rather presupposes the deduction of 
the ethical covenant in TI. As said, the absence of this 
presupposition would deprive the ethical relation of its specifically 
ethical content. Moreover, the presupposition is mutual. As we 
shall now show, the ethical community requires its members to 
become legal persons and to accept the rights and duties of 
citizenship in order to sustain its own religious vocation. 
Therefore, the innovations of OBBE bring the analysis undertaken 
in TI to a systemic completion.
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As a result of becoming "another for the others", the ethical 
subject becomes at once a member of the ethical elect within the 
ethical community and a denizen of the State. The ethical subject 
is thus dirempted into a religious and a political being and placed 
under two forms of jurisdiction: the transcendent moral law and 
the positive law of the State.
Of course, to a certain extent, this is also the position in TI. 
The difference is, however, that whereas in TI, as we have already 
said above, Levinas maintains participation in the structures of the 
state to be tantamount to a total alienation of the ethical relation, 
in OBBE, he contends that the trace of illeity within the state 
entails that involvement within its structures is no longer inimical 
to ethical transcendence, indeed, it is positively required by it. To 
put it another way, we may say that whereas in TI the notion of a 
just state is treated as something of an oxymoron, in OBBE it is, in 
principle realisable.
How then does Levinas understand the relationship between 
transcendent justice and the justice of the state? The answer is: in 
a deeply equivocal fashion. On the one hand, in OBBE Levinas 
insists, contra TI, that justice requires symmetry and reciprocity. 
In his own words, "Justice requires contemporaneousness of 
representation. It is thus that the neighbour becomes visible, and, 
looked at, presents himself and there is also justice for me" (OBBE 
159). Levinas elaborates on this point in the following, more 
extended, formulation:
Synchronisation is the act of consciousness which,
through representation and the Said, institutes with
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the "help of God", the original locus of justice, a terrain 
common to me and the others where I am counted 
among them, that is, where subjectivity is a citizen 
with all the duties and rights measures and 
measurable which the equilibrated ego involves, or 
equilibrating itself by the concourse of duties and the 
concurrence of rights. (OBBE 160)
On the other hand, Levinas also maintains, immediately 
contradicting the above assertion that representation is the 
"original locus" of justice: 'The one for the other of proximity is not 
a deforming abstraction, in it justice is shown from the first" 
(OBBE 159). He adds that "Justice is impossible without the one 
that renders it finding himself in proximity" (Ibid).
This is a prime instance where we must "stay with the 
extreme situation of the diachronic thought" if we are not to 
misunderstand Levinas' meaning. For Levinas, justice resides in 
the relation between proximity and formed equality. Nevertheless, 
the justice of the state is ultimately grounded in proximity. Levinas 
explains this order of priority thus:
But the contemporaneousness of the multiple is tied 
about the diachrony of the two: justice remains justice 
only, in a society where there is no distinction between 
those close and those far off, but in which there also 
remains the possibility of passing by the closest. The 
equality of all is borne by my inequality, the surplus of 
my duties over my rights. (OBBE 159)
The "society where there is no distinction between those 
close and those far o ff is an unmistakable reference to the ethical 
community. This provides the standard of justice of the state is to 
judged and measured. Our interpretation on this point is explicitly 
confirmed in the text: "Justice, society, the state and its 
institutions, exchanges and work are comprehended out of
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proximity. This means that nothing is outside of the control of the 
responsibility of the one for the other” (Ibid).
In short, Levinas contends that by virtue of the inclusion of 
the ethical subject within the State, a trace of the transcendent 
moral law enters the world. In this way the divine dispensation 
granted to the ethical community is universally communicated to 
humanity as a whole:
"Thanks to God" I am another for the others. God is 
not involved as an alleged interlocutor: the reciprocal 
relationship binds me to the other man in the trace of 
transcendence, in illeity. (OBBE 158)
The work of justice therefore resides in keeping open the 
movement or oscillation between proximity and equality: "It is 
through this ambivalence which always remains an enigma that 
infinity or the transcendent does not allow itself to be assembled" 
(OBBE 161). The totalitarian gesture par excellence is to reduce 
justice to either its transcendent or immanent pole. Levinas warns 
against this, advising a middle course between the Scylla of 
religious zealotry and the Charybdis of political fanaticism:
My lot is important. But it is still out of my 
responsibility that my salvation has meaning, despite 
the danger in which it puts this responsibility which it 
may encompass and swallow up, Just as the State 
issued from the proximity of the neighbour is always 
on the verge of integrating him into a we, which 
congeals born me and the neighbour. (Ibid)
Levinas therefore is only too well aware that Just as political 
rule is always liable to degenerate into corruption and violence,
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organised religion is also "in permanent danger of turning into a 
protector of all the egoisms" (Ibid).
The ethico-political task, then, is to maintain the 
'ambivalence' through which transcendent justice signifies itself in 
the state. This also defines the nature and work of philosophy as 
Levinas understands it:
Philosophy serves justice by thematizing the difference 
and reducing the thematized to difference. It brings 
equity into the abnegation of the one for the other, 
justice into responsibility. (OBBE 165)
In a deliberate inversion of Hegel's definition of Wissenschaft 
as the accomplished love of wisdom (Phen. Para 5), Levinas defines 
philosophy as "the wisdom of love in the service of love" (OBBE 
162). He likens the relationship between philosophy and the state 
to that between scepticism and rationalism:
In an alternating movement, like that which leads from 
scepticism to the refutation that reduces it to ashes, 
and from its ashes to rebirth, philosophy Justifies and 
criticises the laws of being and the city. (OBBE 165).
According to Levinas, philosophy is the critical conscience of 
the State. Although its claim to uphold ethical transcendence is 
self-refuting, it nonetheless "returns" to "interrupt" all attempts by 
the State to immanently ground Justice in its own structures.
(b) The Right and the Good
We recall that above, in relation to TI, we asked the question: 
what is to prevent the asymmetry of the ethical relation assuming
305
an exploitative form? That is to say, if I as an ethical subject am 
obligated to the other on a wholly non-reciprocal basis, i.e. 
regardless of his or her actions towards me, what is to prevent the 
other from subjecting me to abuse, degradation, physical violence, 
slavery and, ultimately, from putting me to death? Levinas' 
implicit answer to this question in TI is that insofar as the face to 
face is primarily enacted within the bounds of a community 
collectively ordained to ethical service, the ubiquity and the 
transparency of the moral law limits the risk of violence. Of 
course, Levinas is not saying that members of the ethical 
community are so obedient they have neither the inclination nor 
the capacity to transgress the law; his point is rather that their 
spontaneity is antecedent to their election 'in responsibility', which, 
in turn, derives from their being bom into a society founded on the 
ethical covenant. Therefore, within the ethical community: "The 
will is free to assume their responsibility in whatever sense it likes; 
it is not free to ignore the meaningful world into which the face of 
the other has introduced it. In the welcoming of the face the will 
opens to reason" (TI 218-219).
Nevertheless, even if, for arguments' sake, we were to assent 
to the terms of Levinas' account in TI, which defines the ethical 
community as primordially peaceable while projecting all war and 
violence into the realm of the state, this would not resolve the 
question of how, as a community, it is to defend itself from the 
threat and indeed the actuality of aggression, persecution and even 
annihilation at the hands of forces within the State, or indeed from 
the State itself, that are hostile to its very existence, and yet remain 
faithful to its irenic vocation? OBBE as a whole, and particularly
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Chapter V: "Subjectivity and Infinity", represents Levinas' more 
considered response to this predicament. In a nutshell, Levinas' 
answer here is that the assumption of citizenship by individual 
members of the ethical elect will enable the ethical community as a 
whole to practise its religious life in peace, under the aegis of the 
rule of law.
This more positive stance towards the state is reflected in an 
interview Levinas granted in 1985, published under the title "The 
Paradox of Morality". In reply to a question regarding the 
relationship between ethics and politics, he states: "There is no 
politics for accomplishing the moral, but there are some politics 
that are further from it or closer to it". He then goes on:
The liberal state is a state which holds justice as the 
absolutely desirable end and hence as a perfection. 
Concretely, the liberal state has always admitted - 
alongside the written law - human rights as a parallel 
institution. It continues to preach that within its 
justice there Eire always improvements to be made in 
human rights. Human rights are the reminder that 
there is no justice yet. And, consequently, I believe 
that it is absolutely obvious that the liberal state is 
more moral than the fascist state, and closer to the 
morally ideal state. * /
However, Levinas also maintains that liberalism by itself 
cannot generate an adequate theory of justice. The discourse of 
rights has to be supplemented by equity and charity: these 
ancillary principles, supplement the requirement of formal equality, 
and serve to guide the moral improvement of the state.
Nonetheless we must be careful not to exaggerate the extent 
to which the significant changes in form and emphasis introduced
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in OBBE represent a fundamental revision of Levinas' basic 
characterisation of the state itself. For, in the later work, he 
continues to depict the state in purely instrumental and 
mechanical terms. The only reason he holds the liberal state to 
have a moral precedence over other state formations is that its 
constitutional framework retains the trace of the convental law 
more "fully" or "completely" that any other known form of polity. It 
is important to note therefore that, as far as Levinas is concerned, 
the structures of right have no intrinsic validity; all their legitimacy 
derives from a transcendent source. Minus 'illeity', so to speak, the 
self-determination of the rational subject through reciprocal forms 
of normative interaction, remains in Levinas' eyes tantamount to 
the wholesale negation and alienation of the ethical being perfected 
prior to its entry into civil society. In this respect, his 
understanding of the relationship between justice and the state is 
at one with that of St Augustine's, as summed up in the latter's 
famous question: "Remove justice and what are kingdoms but 
gangs of criminals on a large scale?"^/ All justice within the state 
derives from ethical transcendence; none is generated by the state's 
own immanent resources:
... justice is not a legality regulating human masses, 
from which a technique of social equilibrium is drawn.
That would be a justification of the state delivered over 
to its own necessities. (OBBE 159)
In short, for Levinas, the state is an arena of venality and 
violence. This is essentially true even of the liberal-democratic 
state. This too has an inherent tendency towards the suppression 
of alterity and difference, and is thereby congruent with the 
"political character of all logical rationalism, the alliance of logic
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with politics" (OBBE 171). Levinas expresses this charge in the 
form of a rhetorical question designed to capture the equivocal 
nature of the relationship between justice and the state:
Does not the coherent discourse, wholly absorbed in 
the Said, owe its coherence to the state, which violently 
excludes subversive discourse? Coherence thus 
dissimulates a transcendence, a movement from the 
one to the other, a latent diachrony, uncertainty and a 
fine risk. (OBBE 170)
He alludes to the now former Soviet regime's practice of 
incarcerating political dissidents in mental hospitals, as an 
example of the way in which rationalism may collude with the state 
to oppress the other:
The interlocutor that does not yield logic is threatened 
with the prison or the asylum or undergoes the 
prestige of the master or the medication of the doctor: 
violence or reasons of state ensures to the rationalism 
of logic a universality and to law its subject matter. 
The discourse then recuperates its meanings by 
repression or mediation, by Just violences, on the verge 
of the possible injustice where repressive justice is 
exercised. It is through the state that reason and 
knowledge are force and efficacity.
Transcendent or ethical justice therefore champions the 
cause of those marginalised and excluded by the "coherent 
discourse" of the state". From the standpoint of the said, this 
appears a "folly". But it is a folly the state cannot "irrevocably 
discount", since, like scepticism, it always returns to trouble its 
own rational foundation (Ibid).
In summation, then, notwithstanding the fact that within 
OBBE, the opposition between the ethical community and the state 
is integrated within the state itself, the basic asymmetry between
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ethics and politics detailed in TI, remains intact. This has the 
following significant consequence: there is no necessary 
concordance between transcendent justice and secular, 
conventionally defined, statements of human rights. To the extent, 
then, that there exists an overlap, as it were, between the 
covenantal law and, say, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, this is purely contingent; it simply reflects the fact that the 
"interruption" of the Said by Saying partially coincides with the 
evolution of the Western liberal state. But, conversely, there is also 
a potential and actual non-coincidence between illeity and the 
secular notion of human rights.
This, in turn, poses the question as to whether this element 
of non-coincidence between the divine and secular rights may place 
them on a collision course with one another? From our analysis of 
Levinas' deduction of the moral law in TI we can see this is a 
distinct possibility. We showed above how Levinas' description of 
the ethical covenant has substantive, moral implications. In 
particular, heterosexuality is considered absolutely normative, and 
woman are identified with the maternal and domestic function. 
Other potential areas of conflict between Levinas' ethics and 
secularism are not difficult to identify. For example, does the 
prohibition against murder extend to abortion? We may surmise 
that Levinas would answer this question in the affirmative. When 
viewed from the standpoint of civil society, such absolute norms 
must appear wholly arbitrary insofar as they are not 
intersubjectively determined but simply dogmatically pronounced 
to be imprescriptible. This follows from the fact that "rationality" 
by which they are justified is inherently circular, and therefore
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immune to adjustment through the process of rational debate. 
Therefore, when Levinas speaks of illeity "interrupting" the 
"coherent discourse" of the state through acts which will appear a 
"folly" from the point of view of the rationality of its institutions, he 
is potentially licensing violence, based on moral indignation and 
subjective caprice, against the democratic state itself.
Of course, we acknowledge that this strand in Levinas' 
thought is at odds with his overtly moderate politiceli stance. 
Nonetheless we insist that the potential for violent conflict between 
illeity and formal universality is implicit within his very definition 
of justice qua "equivocation". The vagueness of this term allows 
Levinas to subject the state to a critique from two opposed 
perspectives which flatly contradict one mother. On the one hand, 
as said, the state is charged with being insufficiently egalitarian. 
This is the familiar, and justified objection, that the formal 
universality mediating relations within the rational-legal 
community is not truly universal since, in practice, it operates to 
exclude a whole range of "non-autonomous others" - women, 
children, the sick, the mentally disabled, the poor, etc. - simply by 
defining them as non-persons or by effectively depriving them of 
the means to fully participate in the life of the community. The 
ethico-political task therefore is to campaign for the extension of 
rights - both formal and material - to such marginalised and 
disadvantaged social groups. The ethical superiority of the liberal 
state in this respect, is that the disadvantaged may appeal to the 
'theory' of the state - its constitutional principles - against its own 
practice, to demand equality of treatment and respect. Moreover, 
the liberal state possesses an internal mechanism as it were to
311
peacefully resolve such disputes over social justice, obviating the 
threat of war.
On the other hand, however, Levinas also criticises the state 
from a direction which entirely cuts across the terms of the 
egalitarian argument. Here the charge is that the state, precisely 
because it seeks to extend rights and include all others within the 
"coherent discourse" of a single universal framework, thereby 
denies the otherness of the other. Hence, the legal-rational state a 
priori precludes a substantive conception of the good society in 
which interpersonal relations Eire grounded in the immediate 
responsibility o f one for all, rather than on the basis of a mediate, 
formal reciprocity between legal entities. In short, the objection 
here is that the prioritisation of the right over the good results in 
an abstract homogenisation of individuals and thus negatives the 
ethical personality of the subject.
To illustrate the incompatible nature of these two approaches 
to justice, let us briefly return to the issue of homosexuals and 
their rights. It is plainly the case that as a matter of historical fact 
homosexuals have been systematically denied full civil rights even 
in liberal states. Even today, despite the progress that has been 
made in this direction by the gay movement, many areas of 
discrimination continue to exist. For example, in Britain gays are 
barred from serving in the armed forces. The question arises 
therefore as to whether "transcendent justice" requires equal rights 
for homosexuals? After all, is this not a prime instance where the 
otherness of the other is being denied by the "coherent discourse" 
of the state? Does not Justice demand that gays be granted the
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same rights as other members of the rational-legal community in 
all spheres of social life? Since Levinas himself ducks this 
question,^/ we must reconstruct the answer implied by his texts. 
These show that his notion of justice is equivocal in the pejorative 
sense of the term. On the one hand, he is clearly committed to 
answering yes; the requirements of formed equality entail that, as a 
simple matter of natural justice, homosexuals be granted the same 
rights as heterosexuals. But, on the other hand, he must equally 
answer no; for, insofar as the ethical covenant is transmitted 
exclusively via heterosexual relations, this evidently implies that, 
from a transcendent point of view, as it were, homosexuality is an 
ethically deviant practice or at best some kind of pathological 
aberration. It may or may not be tolerated within civil society or 
indeed within the ethical community, but it can never be 
considered to be in itself legitimate or just. Moreover, in the event 
of a collision between the convenantel law and the constitutional or 
positive law of the state on this question, say, for example, the 
state sought to extend the principle of formal equality into the 
internal regulation of the ethical community, then from a 
Levinaslan point of view the convenantal law would prevail over or 
"trump" state legislation. Hence it may even be consistently argued 
that (transcendent) Justice positively requires the denial of civil 
rights to homosexuals.
These contradictions in Levinas' concept of justice reflect a 
wider impasse vis a vis the relationship of the ethical community to 
the state: on the one hand, the ethical community requires the 
protection of the state and formal equality in law in order to secure 
the peaceful conditions necessary for it to continue to practice its
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religious form of life; on the other hand, the extension of the 
universal norms of the state to its internal regime threatens to 
destroy the non-formal inequality upon which it is founded. In 
OBBE, Levinas addresses this question by proposing what 
amounts to a Faustian pact with the state. The implicit agreement 
is this: the ethical community, in return for legal protection and 
the right of citizenship for its members, and for a guarantee of non­
interference in its internali affairs, undertakes to abide, externally 
at least, by the law of the state and to conduct its ethical protest as 
perceived injustices within the prevailing legali limits. We see, then, 
that the continued survived of the ethicad community is the latent 
interest underpinning Levinas' soi-disaint "disinterested" ethics.
In pursuit of this reapproachment with liberadism, Levinas 
attempts to defuse the conflictuad potential inherent in his 
understanding of the relationship between illeity aind universality 
by effectively de-politicising his entire concept of justice, reducing it 
in the process to the status of an individual imperative to moral 
sadntliness:
We find the agglomeration or dispersions of the peoples 
in the deserts without manna in the eairth. But each of 
these peoples is virtuadly a chosen one, called to leave 
in his turn, or without awadting his turn, the concept 
of the ego, its extension in the people, to respond with 
responsibility: me. that is, here I am for the others, to 
lose his place radicadly, or his shelter in being, to enter 
into ubiquity, which is adso a utopia. (OBBE 184-185)
In passing, we note how in this extract the quadifler 
"virtuadly" a chosen people underlines the derivative, second-order 
nature of ethicad witness in the world. However, the more 
importaint point the passage demonstrates is that, for Levinas, the
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struggle for justice does not primarily involve collective 
participation in a political movement for social and political 
change, rather it takes the form of making an individual stand 
against specific instances of unjust behaviour.
To be fair to Levinas, he acknowledges the danger of a self- 
oriented "ethics of conviction" that such an individualist stance 
invites:
Here I am for the others - an enormous response, 
whose inordinateness is attenuated with hypocrisy as 
soon as it enters my ears forewarned of being’s 
essence, that is, the way being carries on. (Ibid)
However, he immediately continues:
The hypocrisy is from the first denounced. But the 
norms to which the denunciation refers have been 
understood in the enormity of meaning and in the full 
resonance of their statement to be true like 
unrefrained witness. (Ibid)
Yet this heralded "enormity of meaning" and "unrefrained 
witness", which it is implied will regulate and expose injustice 
wherever it appears, immediately turns out to be positively bathetic 
in its import: "In any case, nothing less was needed for the little 
humanity that adorns the world, if only with simple politeness or 
the pure polish of manners" (Ibid). This recalls an earlier banality 
when Levinas cites "the simple 'After you, sir'" to exemplify the 
nature of proximity (OBBE 117).
In conclusion, Levinas does not maintain that the law of the 
state must be made to conform to the moral standards of the
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ethical community, but only that as individuals ethical citizens 
ought to live in accordance with the convenantal law. Levinas' 
contention is partly motivated by his concern to avert the potential 
for political fanaticism inherent in his own notion of illeity; but it 
also reflects a certain sense of embarrassment at the fact that if the 
ethical community were to promote the cause of social justice in an 
overtly political manner, this would serve to draw attention to the 
inegalitarianism at the heart of its own internal arrangements, and 
so expose it to the charge of hypocrisy. In short, Levinas does not 
challenge the state but rather reaches an accommodation with it.
Politically speaking, Levinas' ethical philosophy is thereby 
rendered critically neutral and his notion of justice is emptied of all 
substantive content.^/ As a result, far from it being the case that 
the state is "regulated" by the norms of transcendent justice, it is 
these so-called transcendent norms that are subordinated to the 
legality of the state. We shall now proceed to examine the 
underlying social basis of this inversion.
(c) ReHglow and Human Freedom
Does not our critical analysis of Levinas commit us to the 
proposition that in order to become a full citizen the ethical subject 
must cease to be a religious being? This is, of course, essentially, 
the argument of Bruno Bauer to which Marx replied in "On The 
Jewish Question". In fact, on this point, the substance of our 
Hegelian critique of Levinas' philosophy is closer to Marx's 
argument than to Bauer's. In this section, we first review Marx's 
essay and then critically apply it to Chapter V of OBBE, as a
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prelude to demonstrating that the force of the Marxian critique is 
only consistently defensible on the basis of Hegel’s system.
In "On The Jewish Question", Marx refutes Bauer's 
contention that religious affiliation is incompatible with political 
emancipation. He conclusively demonstrates, citing the articles of 
the Constitutions of Pennsylvania and New Hampshire, and the 
Declaration o f the Rights of Mem and of the Citizen in the French 
Constitutions of 1791 and 1795 as proof, that the "principle of 
faith", that is, freedom of religious worship and belief, is not only 
compatible with full membership of civil society but is integral to 
the principle of negative liberty upon which the modem state is 
founded, viz the liberty to do and perform anything that does not 
harm others.5/ Therefore, to the extent that liberalism defines 
rights in negative terms - as delimiting an egoistic sphere of private 
interest and choice free from interference by the wider community 
or the state - the right to private property and the right to religious 
freedom are continuous with one another.
According to Marx, there is then no contradiction in the 
modem state between religious affiliation and membership of the 
political community; for both religion and politics have been 
reduced to the level of civil society. Thus the diremption of the 
subject into a religious being on the one hand and a political being 
on the other simply reflects and disguises the more profound 
"secular contradiction between the political state and civil 
society".^/ Although, outwardly, the modem state establishes an 
autonomous political sphere, for example, through the abolition of 
the property qualification for voting and the introduction of
317
universal adult suffrage, this only secures the nominal 
emancipation of the individual from the "egoism" of civil society. In 
Marx's words: "The state abolishes distinctions of birth, rank- 
education and occupation in its fashion when it declares them to 
be non-political distinctions, when it proclaims that every member 
of the community equally participates in popular sovereignty 
without regard to these distinctions".7/ However, the appearance 
of political emancipation is contradicted by the actuality of non­
freedom: "Nonetheless the state permits private property, education 
and occupation to act and to manifest their particular nature as 
private property, education and occupation in their own ways".8/
The upshot is that the alienation of humanity in religion is 
reproduced as the alienation of humanity in the state. This is 
expressed in the form of a secular contradiction between man as 
bourgeois and man as citoven:
In the political community he regards himself as a 
communal being, but in civil society he is active as a 
private individual, treats other men as a means, 
reduces himself to a means, and becomes the 
plaything of alien powers. The political state is as 
spiritual in relation to civil society as he is in relation 
to earth.9/
In point of fact, however, in the modem state the 'political 
community' is from the very beginning fractured into a plurality of 
competing, mutually opposed and antagonistic private-interest 
groups. Ironically, therefore, "political emancipation" is 
concomitant with the death of politics. The rights of the citizen are 
annulled to the extent that they are reduced to the level of 
instruments fashioned for the pursuit of self-interest:
318
The political liberators reduce citizenship, the political 
community, to a mere means for preserving the so- 
called rights of man and the citizen is thus proclaimed 
to be the servant of the egoistic man, the sphere in 
which mem acts as a member of the community is 
degraded below that in which he acts as a fractional 
being and finally man as a bourgeois rather than man 
as citizen is considered to be the proper and authentic 
man. 10/
Now, Levinas' philosophy of justice clearly falls within the ambit of 
Marx's critique of human rights. Levinas' diremption of the ethical 
subject into a religious being and a citizen de facto reduces the 
ethical community to the status of a private association within civil 
society. The ethical community's defence of human rights is 
therefore a particularist defence of its own self-interest, that 
demands for its members equal status with all other citizens while 
at the same time reserving the right to dissent from those aspects 
of formal universality which it deems incompatible with its own 
internal order. Moreover, this accommodation with liberalism is 
purchased at the price of an uncritical endorsement of the 
bourgeois state, not to be sure o f all its actual functionings, but of 
its negative definition of the nature of the political. This, in turn, 
restricts the scope of redemptive justice. As we said above, the full 
development of the self within a political community is a necessary 
condition for the accomplishment of the absolute relation with the 
absolute; hence, Levinas' negative definition of the state not only 
places barriers in the way of genuine political emancipation, it also, 
and for that very reason, vitiates the religious vocation of the 
spiritual community.
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However, Marx's positive proposals for overcoming the 
contradiction between politics and civil society (including religion) 
lack the cogency of his critical diagnosis of the problem. Marx's 
answer is to simply counterpose a holistic notion of "human 
emancipation" to alienated forms of bourgeois political freedom:
Only when the abstract individual man has taken back 
into himself the abstract citizen in his everyday life, his 
individual work, and his individual relationships, has 
become a species being, only when he has recognised 
his own powers as social powers so that social force is 
no longer separated from him as a political power, only 
then is human emancipation complete.11 /
In her commentary on the above passage, Seyla 
Benhabib1^ / notes that Marx's project of human emancipation 
may be construed as taking one of the two disjunct forms, for 
which she coins the helpful shorthand labels (a) the 
"universalisation of the political" and (b) the "socialisation of the 
universal", (a) - "the universalisation of the political" - requires the 
extension of democratic norms throughout all the institutions of 
state and civil society via a restructuring of social and economic 
relations in accordance with the common good as collectively 
determined by the political community: (b) - "the socialisation of 
the universal" - on the other hand, necessitates the complete 
reappropriation of alienated humanity via the elimination of the 
differentiated value spheres - political, societal. Juridical - 
constitutive of the modem state and their integration into a 
completely communalised society. On the latter interpretation, 
Benhabib states: "social life itself would become the genuine 
expression of universal and common interests and would not
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delegate the representation of this universal interest to an 
independent political realm". 13/
In our view, (a) the accomplishment of human freedom 
through "the universalisation of the political" - broadly speaking, 
represents the Hegelian standpoint. Private property, and hence 
material inequality, is not a priori incompatible with political 
enfranchisement so long as the levels of wealth and income 
available to the poor in society are not so reduced as to effectively 
exclude them from political participation in the state. 14/ This in 
turn requires a programme of social justice to address the civil 
wrong of poverty and a démocratisation of the state to enable and 
facilitate genuine self-government. In contrast (b) - "the
socialisation of the universal" - corresponds to the orthodox 
Marxist position, which requires the complete dissolution of both 
state and civil society in a communist order. However, Maux 
himself in "On The Jewish Question" - taking his cue from Hegel’s 
analysis of the French Revolution - outlines how the abstract 
negation of the prepolitical conditions of political emancipation 
results in terror and destruction and is fated to end in the 
restoration of the superseded order. The prescience of Marx's 
comments demand that they be cited in full:
To be sure, in periods when the political state as such 
is forcibly bom from civil society, when men strive to 
liberate themselves from the form of political self- 
liberation the state can and must go so far as to 
abolish and destroy religion, but only in the way it 
abolishes life by the guillotine. In moments of special 
concern for itself political life seeks to repress its 
presupposition, civil society and its elements, and to 
constitute itself the actual species life of man. But it 
can do this only in violent contradiction with its own 
conditions of existence by declaring the revolution to 
be permanent and thus the political dogma is bound to
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end with the restoration of religion, private property, 
and all the elements of civil society just as war ends 
with peace. 15/
Marx therefore contends that the bourgeois revolution is 
unable to accomplish real human liberation because 
notwithstanding those emergency circumstances when the 
emergent state, in order to consolidate its own rule and, indirectly, 
the rule of capital, is forced to take measures against particular 
private interests - it stops short at abolishing the true basis of 
human alienation viz private property, which constitutes its own 
fundament and presupposition. The clear implication is that if the 
expropriation of private property were to be enacted then the 
"violent contradiction" between the political state and civil society - 
and the attendant antithesis between bourgeois and citoyen - 
would be aufgehoben in a fully human society. Punning on 
"Judaism” as a metaphor for commence, Marx expresses the 
completion of human liberation thus:
When society succeeds in transcending the empirical 
essence of Judaism - bargaining and all its conditions - 
the Jew becomes impossible because his 
consciousness no longer has an object, the subjective 
basis of Judaism - practical need - is humanised, and 
the conflict between the individual sensuous existence 
of man and his species existence is transcended.
The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation 
of society from Judaism.16/
In short, Marx's argument is that once society is 
emancipated from bourgeois egoism, the social basis of Judaism, 
and indeed of all religious movements, will be annulled, human 
alienation will be overcome, and religion, like the state itself, will 
'whither away'.
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If Marx's polemic against "Judaism" is not anti-semetic in its 
intent, though the emotive overtones of his remarks leave some 
doubt on this score, it is certainly so in its consequences. 17/ For 
Marx offers no independent argument to show how the 
accomplishment of a "socialised universal" would not result in the 
very self same destructive Jacobinism he himself warns against. In 
the absence of a worked out theory of socialist transition, the 
abstract negation of the contradiction between state and civilian 
society can only reinstate a far more violent contradiction between 
the idea of a communal society and an existent, plural, self- 
differentiated, socio-political totality. If the former were ever to 
succeed in superimposing itself on the latter, then, yes, this might 
well signal the "end of religion" - but it would also constitute the 
end of the political. The total emancipation of humanity from 
religion would be tantamount to the complete negation of the 
preconditions of human freedom and therefore of human freedom 
itself.
(d) The Redemption of the Political
Hegel's theory of the relationship between religion and the 
state receives its most extended treatment in the long Remark to 
Paragraph 270 of the Philosophy of Right. Here, Hegel attempts to 
chart a via media between the de-politicisation of the state entailed 
in equal measure by the privatisation of religion on the one hand 
and the terror of a pure Enlightenment on the other. To this end, 
he develops a speculative exposition of the identity of identity and 
non-identity of religion and the state. Insofar as the "object" of
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religion is God, it defines the transcendent end in terms of which 
all finite ends are merely relative; it is "the unlimited foundation 
and cause on which everything depends" (PR 270R), and hence eo 
ipso it is also the foundation of the state. But Hegel is equally 
insistent that religion is "only the foundation" (Ibid) of the state - its 
presupposition rather than its result. In order to complete its 
spiritual and ethical vocation religion must, while retaining its 
distinct institutional identity, pass over into the state and undergo 
an education (Bildung) in relation to it. Conversely, the state, as 
the necessary but autonomous agent for the fulfilment of the 
spiritual community's redemptive mission, is itself a spiritual 
organism, or, as Hegel puts it: "The state is the divine will as 
present spirit, unfolding as the actual shape and organisation of a 
world" (Ibid).
Hegel presents his theory in contradistinction to both a neo- 
Augustinian and a liberal conception of the religion-state relation. 
He summarises the former view as one which holds that religion 
embodies "the spiritual in general and hence also the ethical 
elements sure part of its concern, whereas the state is a mechanical 
framework serving non-spiritual ends" (Ibid). This approach, he 
continues, "seems to represent the entire political regime as a 
matter ISachel of indifference and arbitrariness either in such a 
way as to suggest that the state is dominated by the ends of 
passion, unjust iunrechtlicherl force, and the like, or because such 
religious advice attempts to retain exclusive validity and claims 
authority to determine and administer (the process of] rights" (Ibid). 
Now, it is evident from our discussion in section (b) of the present 
chapter, that Levinas understanding of the religion-state relation in
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TI essentially conforms to the neo-Augustinian perspective as Hegel 
describes it. Moreover, Hegel may also be credited with having 
demonstrated the logic by which Levinas is led from an initial 
standpoint of indifference towards the state to seek a 
reapproachment with it, without in the process fundamentally 
revising his negative evaluation of the state itself. This is entirely 
consistent for, as Hegel shows, the liberal standpoint, in essence, 
represents a secularisation of the neo-Augustian position, insofar 
as it, too, holds that the state is an irreligious and unethical entity 
whose "sole function fBestimmungl ...is to protect and secure the 
life, property and will of others; in this view, the state is merely an 
arrangement dictated by necessity INotl (Ibid). Hence, Levinas 
ostensibly contradictory stance of simultaneously distancing the 
ethical community from the state while accommodating itself to it, 
turns out, on closer examination, to have a logic of its own.
In sharp contrast with both the neo-Augustian and liberal 
standpoints, Hegel proposes that "the state is not a mechanism but 
the rational life of self-conscious freedom and the system of the 
ethical world" (Ibid). As such, it educates and predisposes its 
citizens to be conscious of ethical principles and to act in 
accordance with them. He then proceeds to divide all religious 
organisations into two distinct groups: those that are in "direct 
agreement" with the latter proposition form part of the "state- 
religion" or Church; those that are in "direct opposition" to it 
comprises the diversity of sectarian religious communities.
Now it is essential if we are not to misunderstand Hegel on 
this point that we constantly bear in mind his logical distinction
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between actuality and existence. For Hegel, Actuality (Wirklichkeit) 
is the unity of existence iDasein or Existenzl and essence fWesen) 
(Enz. 1.142). The rational or actual state is not therefore the state 
as it de facto exists. On the other hand, the element of possibility 
inherent in the definition of the actual entails, that the rational 
Idea of the state is grounded in the existent modem state. The 
identity and non-identity between the existence of the modem state 
and its essence constitutes the speculative relation between the 
rational and the actual and the actual and the rationed (PR 
Preface).
The historical presupposition of the Philosophy of Right in its 
entirety is that the reconciliation between the Lutheran Church 
and the reformed Prussian State achieved in Hegel's own time, 
entails that the state has become sufficiently rational to constitute 
the accomplishment of the absolute Idea in the world. But it is 
only implicitly accomplished. It is still necessary to fully actualise 
the rational. This is why Hegel says that the absolute Idea, though 
accomplished, "is ever accomplishing itself' (Enz. 234.R). As 
Michael O. Hardiman aptly puts it in a recent work: "Hegel thought 
that his social world was worthy of reconciliation and stood in need 
of reform. Roughly speaking, he thought that its existing features 
were sufficiently rational to warrant reconciliation and sufficiently 
irrational to warrant reform". 1®/
Against this background, we can see why it is that Hegel 
maps on, so to speak, the distinction between state-religion and 
sects to that between the Lutheran Church and dissenting 
Christian communities and non-Christian religious communities.
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including Judaism. In the Philosophy of History. Hegel states that 
in the Lutheran Church "Christian freedom is actualised" (PH 416). 
He continues, with reference to the Reformation: "Time, since that 
epoch, has had no other work to do other than the formal imbueing 
of the world with this principle, in bringing the Reconciliation 
implicit (in Christianity] into objective and explicit reconciliation" 
(Ibid), and he concludes his Lectures by saying that: "... in the 
Protestant Church the reconciliation of Religion with Legal Right 
has taken place. In the Protestant world there is no sacred, no 
religious conscience in a state of separation from, or perhaps even 
in hostility to Secular Right" (PH 456). But, as we have said, the 
important point here is that although the reconciliation between 
religion and secular right has taken place, it is nonetheless still to 
be accomplished. From this Notional "point of view", the specific 
reconciliation between the Lutheran Church and the State 
constitutes an existent element in the actual which is itself subject 
to contingency and therefore open to historical re-formation. 19/ 
What is unchanging, however, is the Notional unity between the 
state-religion and the state. In essence, the state-religion, like the 
state itself in its non-institutional sense, is an invisible community. 
Therefore, it cannot be wholly identified once and for all with any 
one empirical Church or religious organisation. Rather, it 
embraces every form of institutional religion that is reconciled with 
the rational Idea of the state.
In summary, then, there is no warrant, in the contemporary 
world, for identifying the state-religion with any given 
denomination of the Christian Church. On the contrary, as we 
shall shortly see, the state-religion must incorporate a plurality of
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religious traditions. By the same token , the state-religion is not to 
be identified with any existent state formation. In this respect, it is 
to be entirely distinguished from any concept of a civil religion - 
which simply elevates one particular religious group to the status 
of an official representative of the Notstaat or else makes a cult of 
the state itself - precisely because it constitutes an integral part of 
the political community.
According to Hegel, the characteristic feature of sectarian 
religious communities is that they "refuse to go beyond the form of 
religion when confronted by the state" (PR 270.R). Adherents of 
such groups may develop one of two reactive dispositions towards 
the state, both of which we have seen evidenced in Levinas' 
account of the relationship of the ethical community to the political 
realm. On the one hand, they may relate to the state as moral 
purists "who will only the abstract good and leave it to the arbitrary 
will to determine what is good" (Ibid). Hegel appoints up the 
potential for violence inherent in such an ethics of pure conviction. 
He cautions that when the latter is taken "for the essentially valid 
and determining factor in the political context too", then, the 
consequence is that we "expose the state as an organism in which 
lasting differences fbestendsl. laws and institutions have developed 
to instability and disruption" (Ibid). As noted above, this self same 
danger is implicit in Levinas' notion of the saying "interrupting" the 
"coherent discourse" of the said. On the other hand, Hegel also 
observes that the religious disposition which insists exclusively 
upon its form may develop a more benign, but nevertheless 
damaging, mode of antagonism towards the state; viz., "it may well 
retain its inward character, conform to social institutions (and
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laws], and either simply resign itself to these with sighs or with 
contempt and longing" and thus practice "a polemical kind of piety" 
(Ibid) against it. Hegel's description of the peaceful negative 
disposition towards the state displayed by the Pietest sects of his 
own era, accurately captures the essential bad faith of Levinas' 
concluding outward rapprochement with the liberal state, as 
presented in Chapter V of OBBE. There we witness the same 
destructive combination of an inwardly non-reconciled and 
antagonistic stance towards the state coupled with an outer 
compliance to its institutions and laws.
In opposition to the anti-political standpoint of sectarianism, 
Hegel contends that "it is philosophical insight which recognises 
that Church and State are not opposed to each other as far as their 
content is concerned, which is truth and rationality, but merely 
differ in form” (Ibid). Hence if religion is "of a genuine kind", that is 
to say, if it does not have a "negative and polemical attitude 
towards the state but acknowledges and endorses it" (Ibid), then 
Hegel avers, its relationship to the state is a "simple one". Religion, 
for its part, "integrates the state at the deepest level of the 
disposition (of its citizens]" (Ibid) and thus "gives the state itself its 
religious accreditation" (Ibid). In return, "the state fulfils a duty by 
giving the religious community every pursuit and protection of its 
religious end" (Ibid).
Hegel maintains that legal protection and support is to be 
extended to all religious organisations irrespective of whether or 
not they explicitly endorse the ethical principles of the state. The 
only proviso is the general one, binding on all religious
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organisations of whatever persuasion, that they must be, in respect 
to their external affairs and arrangements, subject to the "policing 
and supervision of the state" (Ibid). Hegel even goes so far as to 
suggest that:
the state ought even to require all its citizens to belong 
to such a [religious - AG] community- but to say any 
community they please, for the state can have no say 
in the content [of religious belief] insofar as this relates 
to the internal dimension of representational thought.
(Ibid)
Of course, Hegel's recommendation of compulsory religious 
affiliation is completely unacceptable from a moral point of view. 
Not least because it contravenes the spirit of his own ethics, for it 
clearly violates the right of conscience. It is wholly inconsistent of 
Hegel to insist on the right of religious conscience while at the 
same time denying the right of conscious to atheists and 
freethinkers. However, this illiberalism on Hegel's part must not be 
allowed to obscure the fact that he defends the right of subjective 
inwardness in the matter of religious belief and thereby implicitly 
welcomes the religious pluralism that is its corollary.
Sectarian communities, according to Hegel, are to be treated 
as "active members only of civil society" and hence "as private 
persons" who "have purely private relations with the other people" 
(PR 270 R. Authors note). As a consequence of this, the religious 
convictions of the member of a given sect "has its province in the 
conscience and enjoys the right of self-consciousness, the sphere of 
inwardness which is not itself the province of the state (Ibid)”. 
Hegel's general view, then, is that since the majority of sectarians 
base their worship and religious practice upon emotion, symbolic
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media and revealed textual authority, they do not as a rule 
formulate their beliefs as objective doctrines to be adopted by the 
state and therefore do not encroach upon its sphere; consequently, 
provided that they conduct their affairs within the limits set by law, 
they are to be left to their own devices. Furthermore, Hegel 
recommends tolerance in those cases where the religious 
convictions of sectarians lead them to refuse or fail to fulfil their 
duties and obligations towards the state. This tolerance extends to 
the ultimate act of recusancy: a refused to defend from armed 
attack by a foreign enemy. In such an eventuality, Hegel advises 
that an accommodation be reached that would allow the dissenter 
to serve the state in some non-military capacity. Hegel concludes 
that the moral strength of a state is directly proportionate to its 
capacity to tolerate groups which remain unreconciled with its 
ethical principles.
By contrast, Hegel grants the state a more direct role in the 
regulation of the internal affairs of the Church. A  distinguishing 
feature of the Church vis a vis a sect is inter alia, that the former 
does not confine its religious practice to the witness of the heart, 
the performance of rite and ritual, or indeed to the doing of good 
works; although all these forms of religious worship and action 
remain essential to its inner life and vocation, in addition, it also 
presents the central elements of its faith in a rational and codified 
manner in the form of dogma and doctrine, which taken together, 
constitute its systematic self-knowledge as a religious community. 
Now, because religion is the foundation of the state, and identical 
in content, though not in form, with the latter, then its doctrine, in 
Hegel's words, "relate to objective principles, to ethical and rational
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thoughts" and "its expression of these doctrines immediately brings 
it into the province of the state" (PR 270 R). Hegel does not 
stipulate that all Church doctrine is subject to state control. He 
specifically states that those aspects of the Church's teaching 
which remain "peculiar to the Church as a religious community" 
(Ibid) are to be determined by the members of the Church without 
interference from the state. However, insofar as the doctrine of the 
Church relate to matters which directly concern the principles of 
the state, this immediately suggests the possibility of a conflict 
between them. In the event of such a collision, Hegel insists that 
the will of the state must prevail over that of the Church. In his 
own words, when confronted "with a Church which claims 
unconditional authority, the state must on the whole assert the 
formal right of self-consciousness to its own insight and conviction 
and in general to thoughts concerning what should count as 
objective truth" (Ibid). Moreover, to ensure "the right and form of 
self-conscious objective rationality" the state may take it upon itself 
to determine the interpretation of Church doctrines in respect to 
their ethical content and to enforce its view "against assertions 
based on the subjective variety (Gestaltl of truth, no matter what 
assurance and authority this truth may carry with it" (Ibid).
Hegel's account of the relationship between Church and 
State is essentially a speculative restatement of the Lutheran 
doctrine which subordinates the spiritual to the temporal power in 
the realm of extemality.20/ This grants the state the right to 
reform the organisation and doctrines of the Church in the event of 
the latter deviating from the word of God as proclaimed in the New 
Testament. Yet in one highly significant respect Hegel's account of
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the hegemony of the State over the Church radically departs from 
this Orthodox Lutheran model. For Hegel, it is not scripture but 
science fWissenschafti that is to be the final arbiter determining 
the necessity and nature of the internal reform of the Church. The 
effect o f this innovation is to reverse the terms of the Lutheran 
balance between theology and politics, which, broadly speaking, 
institutes a division of labour according to which theology presides 
over matters concerning the Church-invisible, leaving the temporal 
power to administer the Church-visible. In Hegel's version, 
however, speculative philosophy, which represents the standpoint 
of the state, supplants theology as the ultimate standard in respect 
to matters of faith.
This reversal is entirely consistent with, and indeed is an 
expression of, Hegel's stated view that, though different in form, 
religion and the state are identical in their content. According to 
Hegel, this entails that, in principle, there can be no genuine 
collision between the Church and the state. Nonetheless, Hegel 
also believes that because the Church - in contrast to the state, 
which, as the actualisation of the Idea of right, is grounded in pure 
logic - remains wedded to symbolic media, it is more likely to 
commit the error of mistaking these forms of representation for 
their speculative content. Philosophy and the State, on the other 
hand, presupposes liberation from all representational 
foundations. As Hegel puts it: "Science, too, is to be found on the 
side of the state, for it has the same element of form as the state, 
and its end is cognition, by means of thought, of objective truth 
and rationality" (Ibid). Hegel therefore maintains that philosophical 
science sublates the abstract opposition between theology and
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politics. The categorical determinations of the Science of Logic 
provide the self-determining ground for both the comprehension of 
the inner forms of the religious community in speculative theology 
and the normative institutional structures of the modem state in 
political science. Philosophy therefore is the identity underlying 
the identity and difference between Church and State.
Nevertheless, Hegel is acutely aware that there is no less a 
discrepancy between the Idea of the State and its de facto 
existence, than there is between the Idea of religion and the 
existent Church, Hegel captures the nature of this disparity when 
he states that "A bad state, of course, is purely secular and finite, 
but the rational state is infinite in itself' (PR 270 Addition). A 
certain irony therefore pervades Hegel's treatment of the 
relationship between Church and State. On the one hand, 
philosophical science, as we have said, is the ground of the 
speculative unity of the latter. On the other hand, however, it is 
also, for this very reason, the source of the deepest critical insight 
into the extent to which the actualisation of the Idea is not yet fully 
accomplished. Thus the adherents of the Idea of religion constitute 
a distinct "state-religion" which is not identical with the existent 
Church. By the same token, proponents of the speculative Idea of 
the state constitute a political community which is not reducible to 
the empirical state. Philosophical science is the "ground" of this 
identity and non-identity between the "state religion" and the 
political community. Finally, the "state religion" and the political 
community stand in a relation of identity and difference to the 
existent Church and the existent State, This has the Important 
consequence that science fWlssenschaft); state-religion and the
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political community transcend their institutional correlates: 
university: Church and State respectively, while the latter 
nonetheless continue to function as the ground of their real 
possibility. The ethico-political task of the spiritual-political 
community is to reform these existing institutions in order to bring 
them into accord with their rationed concept.
It is in the light of these considerations that we now turn to 
consider Hegel on the Jewish question. In the Philosophy of Right. 
Hegel defends the extension of civil rights to the Jewish 
community. He implicitly repudiates the views of Jacob Fries, 
subsequently restated in a different form by Bruno Bauer, that 
maintains membership of the Jewish faith to be incompatible with 
the assumption of the rights and duties of citizenship. Hegel bases 
his objection to this argument on two grounds. First, he contends, 
that the foundation of the state in abstract right entails that, from 
a legal point of view, Jews are first and foremost to be treated as 
human beings: their religious beliefs being entirely a matter for 
their private concern. Thus the denial of civil rights to Jews on 
religious grounds would involve the state in a violation of the most 
elementary structure of justice upon which it is founded. In 
Hegel's words:
(If they had not been granted civil rights] the Jews 
would have remained in the isolation with which they 
have been reproached, and this would rightly have 
brought blame ISchuldl and reproach upon the state 
which excluded them; for the state would thereby have 
failed to recognise its own principle as an objective 
institution with a power of its own. (PR 270.R. 
Author's note)
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Second, Hegel argues that those who seek to deny civil rights 
to Jews in order to facilitate their integration into the state 
expressly defeat their own purpose insofar as it is the possession of 
rights that "gives those who receive them a self-awareness as 
recognised legal frechtlichel persons in civil society, and it is from 
this root infinite and free from all other influences that the desired 
assimilation in terms of attitude and disposition arises" (Ibid).
What is the precise nature of the "desired assimilation in 
terms o f attitude disposition" to which Hegel refers to this passage? 
It must be borne in mind that in the Prussian State circa 1820, 
when the Philosophy of Right made its appearance, members of the 
Jewish faith were barred from careers in university teaching and 
state administration, and from all posts directly or indirectly 
related to state sovereignty, all of which were the exclusive preserve 
of self-professed Christians. Against this background, it would be 
natural to interpret Hegel's defence of the extension of civil rights 
to the Jewish community as a whole as being calculated to 
encourage the conversion of individual Jews to Christianity, 
thereby enabling them to receive political rights of public 
participation in the life of the state. However, such an 
interpretation is clearly contradicted by the text of the Philosophy 
of Right. For example, in Paragraph 291, Hegel maintains that 
appointments to the civil service are to be made exclusively on the 
basis o f the meritocratic principle of "knowledge and proof of 
ability" in order to guarantee "every citizen the possibility of joining 
the universal state" (PR 291). At no point does Hegel stipulate that 
the personnel of the state must be Christians.
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The desired assimilation in terms of disposition and attitude 
of which Hegel speaks therefore is not predicated on the conversion 
of Jews to Christianity; rather it requires the self-overcoming of all 
negative and reactive dispositions towards the modem state in the 
recognition that the latter represents the implicit accomplishment 
of the Absolute Idea in world history. In other words, the desired 
assimilation is that of the Jews qua Jews (and, by extension, 
Catholics qua Catholics; Muslims qua Muslims, etc.) to the political 
community. In this way, Hegel rejects the standpoint of an 
extreme and intolerant nationalist liberalism (a la Fries) that would 
have Jews choose between their faith and their citizenship. But at 
the same time he also repudiates the benign form of liberalism that 
reduces the state to an instrument of the egoistic interests of civil 
society and, as a corollary of this, relegates religion to the status of 
a private association within it. Both religion and the Notstaat are 
aufgehoben in the speculative unity of the "state-religion" and the 
political community. Contra Marx, genuine social and political 
liberation does not require the abolition of religion but presupposes 
its continued existence.
In the sphere of religion, from a contemporary perspective, it 
is no longer tenable, to follow Hegel and identify the spiritual 
community with a single church or denomination. Moreover, Hegel 
may be said to have anticipated this development. In the 
Philosophy of Right he maintains that the schism of the Church 
and the subsequent proliferation of the sectarian communities, was 
necessary to enable the actualisation of the Idea of freedom in the 
modem state:
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If the state is to attain existence fDaseinl and the self­
knowing ethical actuality of spirit, its form must 
become distinct from that of authority and faith. But 
this distinction emerges only insofar as the Church for 
its part becomes divided within itself. Only then [when 
it stands] above the particular Churches, can the state 
attain universality of thought as its formal principle 
and bring it into existence [Existenz], (PR 270 R)
To this. Hegel adds the following comment: "Consequently far 
from it being, or ever having been, a misfortune for the State if the 
Church is divided, it is through this division alone that the state 
has been able to fulfil its destiny IBestimmungl as self-conscious 
rationality and ethical life" (Ibid). However, Hegel might well have 
gone on to say that the converse also holds: the fragmentation of 
religion is equally necessary from the point of view o f the fulfilment 
of its own spiritual vocation: for only with the overcoming of the 
positivity of religious authority are the conditions present for the 
development and perfection of the rational self-determining 
subjectivity necessary to the accomplishment o f the absolute 
relation to the absolute.
In his own time, Hegel identified the spiritual community 
with the Lutheran Church because the latter was the only existing 
confession fully reconciled with the foundational principles of the 
modem state. Today, however, as a consequence of the very 
process of fragmentation that Hegel welcomed, a great diversity of 
religious organisations are reconciled with modernity. Moreover, 
many religions that continue to maintain a reactionary stance 
towards the modem world, contain significant modernising factions 
within their ranks. It would therefore be contrary to the 
speculative interest to support the inclusion of a specific religious 
community within the institutional matrix of the state. Evidently,
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it follows, that where established Churches are in existence they 
ought to be disestablished and placed, on a par with other religious 
associations, in civil society. Ironically, disestablishment is a 
necessary prelude to the re-politicisation of religion.
The principle of subjective freedom inherent in the modem 
state will ensure an endless propagation of religious movements; 
but the universality of state exerts a counterveiling tendency 
towards unity. In some instances, this will result in institutional 
fusion, but for the most part it will take the form of the increasing 
convergence of disposition and attitude of which Hegel spoke 
above. "State-religion", broadly defined, is the community of the 
faithful reconciled with the modem state. As such, it is essentially 
ecumenical in character. As we have already noted, it is not 
identifiable with any single religious organisation but has potential 
adherents in all religions.
The unity-in-difference between the spiritual community and 
the political community is the accomplishment of the pure self­
recognition of rational subjectivity in absolute otherness. 
Positively, it is the achieved reconciliation between homo 
religiousus and home politlcus that accomplishes the fulfilment of 
the ideal in the real. Negatively, it serves as a preventative against 
the ldolisatlon of the state and the depoliticisation of religion, 
which are mutually destructive of ethical life.21/ This 
accomplishment however is to be ever-accomplished again; indeed, 
it simply is the accomplishing of the accomplished reconciliation 
with the absolute. For Hegel, therefore, there is no anticipated 
definitive future reconciliation between spiritual and the temporal
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powers that will once and for all accomplish the Kingdom of God on 
earth. Rather infinite reconciliation resides in the work of 
reconciling the rationed and the real - the divine and the human - 
in the etemalness of the present.
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demonstrates that the received Left/Right Old/young 
classification of the Hegelian school is over-simplistic. In fact 
within Hegel's own lifetime three distinct schools of Science 
had arisen: (a) The Right Wing (Marheineke), (b) the Old Left 
(Daub and Gans) and (c) the Young Left Hegelians 
(Feuerbach, Curave, Strauss). Hegel personally aligned 
himself with the Old-Left Hegelians, and therefore worked for 
the "translation of scientific theory into the ethical principle 
of everyday life" (320). This study is a modest attempt to 
continue the 'Old-Left' Hegelian tradition.
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CONCLUSION
In this study we have sought to show that Levinas' two major 
works, TI and OBBE, constitute a speculative system. At the heart 
of this system is an unmediated antithesis between the notion of 
an ahistorical, though visible, ethical community and the 
historically evolved structures of civil society and the state. 
However, this juxtaposition commits Levinas to the untenable view 
that the ethical community has developed an institutional matrix, 
necessary to the practice of a non-formal ethics, in isolation from 
the developing socio-historical world. Since, according to Levinas, 
the ethical community is in the world but "discontinuous" with it, 
the fate of the world only becomes a matter of absolute concern 
when historical events threaten to disturb the supposedly 
changeless 'anachronism' of its internal life. This indifference to 
the world results in an uncritical accommodation with de facto 
political power, which, in turn, rebounds upon the life of the 
ethical community, thereby fatally vitiating the ethical relation as 
Levinas conceives it.
Now, it may be objected, that even if  we have substantiated 
the argument set out above and proved our case against Levinas, 
this would not in any sense entail that we must therefore repudiate 
Levinas' concept of otherness, since the latter may be understood 
independently of the details of Levinas' phenomenological 
deduction; hence the significance of Levinas for the study of those 
groups living at the margins (e.g. feminism, rate studies, Third 
World studies etc.). However, our anatomy of the structure of 
Levinas' philosophical argument leads us to suggest that any such
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attempt to, as It were, re-apply his notion of absolute otherness in 
a different context will simply reproduce the same logic whereby 
the dysymmetrically 'transcendent' term will be subverted by the 
immanent terms to which it is 'discontinuously' opposed.
We conclude, therefore, that Levinas' notion of absolute 
otherness can only be consistently defended within the framework 
of the speculative relation between religion and the state 
propounded in Hegel's system.
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APPENDIX
In the Preface to TI Levinas states "we were impressed by the 
opposition to the idea of totality in Franz Rosenzweig's Stem der 
Elosung. a work too often present in this book to be cited" (TI 28). 
In the Star Rosenzweig maintains that his "new thinking" has 
shattered the cognitive All on which the whole of western 
metaphysics is based (SR 83). In the place of the latter's 
pretension to place the whole of thought and being on an ultimate 
first principle (arche), Rosenzweig supplied a triad of origins: God, 
world, man (SRI 7). Each origin has its own unique nature 
irreducible to the others. In Book One, each of the elements of the 
triadic "proto-cosmos" are stated and then internally negated. The 
negation of each negation is then negated in turn. Rosenzweig 
insists that the process by which the three elements are self- 
negated is not effected through an immanent dialectical necessity 
but is one of pure peradventure (SR 87). All the same by some 
'miracle' the three elements arrange themselves into a hierarchy, 
and the 'perhaps' or 'who knows' by which they are adventitiously 
related emerges as a result or a 'consequence' (SR 89). Book One 
concludes with an account of how the three elements of the proto­
cosmos pass over into a new tripartite cluster: creation - revelation 
- redemption.
In Book Two, Rosenzweig traces the movement from creation 
to revelation in terms of temporal existence rising to the eternal. 
The Biblical religion is represented as the alpha and omega of this 
historical development. It is distinguished from all other religious 
configurations insofar as it based on a divine encounter between
367
God and Man which binds the elements of the proto-cosmos 
together and enables man and the world to enter into a redemptive 
relationship with God. This relationship is ultimately 
accomplished through the giving and receiving of two divine 
imperatives. First, there is the command to love one's neighbour 
announced in the question "Where are Thou?", to which the 
response must me "Here I Am". Second, it is stated in the 
command of the lover to the beloved that "Thou shalt love"; to 
which the beloved must respond by confessing that up to now she 
has been unloved, with the words "I have sinned". This confession 
releases the beloved to be loved and to be able to love. She is thus 
transported into an infinite future beyond the temporal world (SR 
178-179). The dialogic relation is accomplished without a 
corresponding abjuration of separation. The self receives these 
commands by speaking them. The response is an act of prophetic 
witness in which one has no sooner opened one's mouth than God 
has already spoken (SR 178).
In Book Three, Rosenzweig brings together the two triads of 
the work - God - world - man and creation- revelation - redemption 
to unite them in the Davidic configuration that realises the Star of 
the title. This is represented as the culmination of a whole 
phenomenology of the sacred in which the religious of India, China 
and Islam are presented as one-sided and inadequate realizations 
of the divine-human relationship which only reenters its perfect 
expression in Judeo-Christianity. The latter alone correctly 
understand the divine-human relation in which the relation to God 
is presented as God's self-revelation of man. According to 
Rosenzweig, Judaism and Christianity represent two alternative
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but complementary covenants between God and man. Rosenzweig 
presents his notion of the 'dual covenant' through a series of binary 
oppositions. Thus, Judaism is the 'eternal life', Christianity is the 
'eternal way'; Judaism is the ever-burning star, Christianity is its 
ever-shining ways. Judaism is an 'eternal stasis', Christianity is 
eternally in motion etc.
This opposition between stasis and dynamism is central to 
Rosenzsweig's account. Judaism is essentially static because the 
spiritual calendar of the ritual year has 'lifted it out of history' 
where it dwells in an 'eternal present' that has 'power over time' 
(SR 324). For the Jewish people therefore eternity is already 
established; it is at the eschaton to which other nations aspire (SR 
327). Rosenzweig goes so far as to say the eternity of the Jewish 
people is guaranteed because it is a 'blood community' and that 
natural propagation through time will ensure its spiritual 
inheritance (SR 329). In contrast, Christianity is situated at the 
'mid-point', between the beginning and end of time. As such, it is 
wholly immersed in world-history. It mission is to overcome time 
in the name of eternity by spreading the good news to the four 
comers of the earth. Hence its function is essentially one of 
proselytization. The Christian must both overcome the pagan 
within and without himself before he cam attain to eternity. In 
sum, the essence of the distinction between the Jew and the 
Christian is this; the Jew is only ever a Jew, whereas the Christian 
is at bottom a converted pagan, he has become a Christian. This 
in turn entails that the two faiths have a radically different relation 
to the world. Rosenzweig presents this contrast on the following 
graphic terms.
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God withdraws the Jew from life by arching the bridge 
of his law high above the current of time which 
henceforth and to all eternity rushes powerlessly along 
under its arches. (SR 109)
Conversely, the role of Christian is precisely to take up the 'contest 
with the current’ (ibid). At the end of time the two paths to the one 
God will converge and the people of the 'eternal way' will return to 
'praise and glorify the root they once despised' (SR 379).
Now we may identify three main respects in which Levinas' 
philosophy is indebted to Rosenzweig. First, Levinas implicitly 
employs the Rosenzweigian device of maintaining that the various 
transitions between the different strata of his phenomenological 
deduction of the ethical relation set out in TI do not proceed via a 
series of dialectical transitions but are related by a "who knows" or 
"perhaps” or, in Levinas' terms, by relations without relation. 
Second, Levinas carries over from Rosenzweig the notion of the 
reception of the divine imperative without mediation. Rosenzweig's 
statement that the atoning self has no sooner opened its mouth to 
respond to the divine commandment then "God has already 
spoken" is reproduced by Levinas when he writes that the "truth of 
the invisible is ontologically produced by the subject that states it" 
(TI 243). Levinas also follows Rosenzweig in utilising the Biblical 
phrase "Here I am" to designate the irreducible nature of ethical 
responsibility.
Third and most importantly Levinas' notion of an immediate 
ethical revelation is predicated on a reformulation of Rosenzweig's 
distinction between the "eternal life" and the "eternal way". Levinas
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also contends that there is an ethico-religious community, 
perpetuated through natural propagation, withdrawn from the 
world and history but nonetheless visibly "discontinuously 
continuous" with it, which constitutes the eschaton of the world. 
Levinas convergence with Rosenzweig on this point may be clearly 
discerned by the simple juxtaposition of the following two passages 
taken from Rosenzweig's Star and Levinas' TI respectively:
Only the eternal people which is not 
encompassed by world history, can - at every 
moment find creation as a whole to be redeemed 
while redemption is still to come. (SR 335)
Truth requires both an infinite time and a time it 
will be able to seal, a completed time. The 
completion of time is not death, but messianic 
time, where the perpetual is converted into the 
eternal. (TI 285)
For both Rosenzweig and Levinas, then, there is an accomplished 
redemption of time within the life of the ethico-religious 
community, while unredeemed time continues to flow without it. 
Moreover, both thinkers anticipate a messianic future in which the 
whole of time and history will be redeemed. The vocation of the 
ethico-religious community is to passively witness the conditions of 
its divine election until the completion of time when the asyndeton 
of the divine contraction will be "sealed".
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